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INTRODUCTION

Administrative law aspires to bring reason to agency policymak
ing. 1 The Administrative Procedure Ace requires agencies to specifY
the basis for the rules they promulgate, 3 and in exercising their review

1

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALJSM ON THE
( 1 999) ("Much of admin istrative law consists of an effort to ensure
reason-giving by regulatory agencies . . . . The agency . . . must generate a convincing
explanation . . . . ) ; Lisa Schultz Bressman, Disciplining Delegation .�fter Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass'ns, 87 CORi\/E LL L. REV. 452, 485 (2002) (" [Administrative law
prin ciples] require agencies in general to articulate a basis for their policy determina
tions and, in particular, to articulate the stan dards for those determinations.") ; Je rry L.
Mash aw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in ajar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Adminis
trative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REv. 17, 20 (2001 ) (arguing that the demand for reason is
stronger in administra tive law than even in j udicial decision making) .
2 5 U.S.C. §§ 55 1 -559, 701-706 (2000) .
:� !d.§ 553(c).
SUPREME COURT3l

"
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of agency action under the arbitrary and capricious standard, 4 courts
have repeatedly demanded that agencies justify their decisions with
5
careful reasoning. In striving to meet administrative law ' s demands
and aspirations, agencies have applied their expertise to gather facts
and to invest in sustained scientific research. For regulatory decision
makers, science provides a systematic basis for understanding policy
problems and the potential consequences of different policy options,
and therefore , scientific evidence must play a key role in agency deci
sion making. 6 But even though science is valuable for what it can tell
administrators about policy problems and their possible solutions, sci
ence alone cannot provide a complete rationale for a policy decision

4

!d. § 706(2 ) (a) .
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
4.8 ( 1 983) (referring to the "strict and demanding" requirement that "an agency must
cogently explain why it has exercised i ts discretion in a given manner") ; see also AT&T
Corp. v. FCC, 236 F.3d 729, 736 (D.C. Cir. 200 1 ) ( invalidating an FCC rule because the
agency "ha[d] considered this question on several occasions, each time applying a test
different from that applied here " ) ; Pearson v. Shalala, 1 64 F.3d 650, 660-6 1 (D.C. Cir.
1 999) (holding that an agency cannot "refuse to define the criteria it is applying," and
that "it must be possible for the regulated class to perceive the principles which are
guiding agency action") ; Am. Lung Ass' n v. EPA, 1 34 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(" [ U] nless [ the Administrator] describes the standard under which she has arrived at
this conclusion, . . . we have no basis for exercising our responsibility to determine
whether her decision is 'arbitrary [or] capricious . . . . "' (citation omitted) ) ; Hall v.
McLaughlin, 864 F.2d 868, 872 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Reasoned decisionmaking requires
treating like cases alike ; an agency may not casually ignore its own past decisions. Di
vergence from agency precedent demands an explanation." (footnote omi tted) ) ; Small
Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 525 ( D . C. Cir. 1 983) ("By
EPA's logic, adverse health effects would permit i t to justifY any lead s tandard at all,
without explaining why i t chose the level it did. We cannot accept such incomplete
reasoning." ) ; Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 , 852 (D.C. Cir.
1 970) (" [A] n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned analysis i ndicating
that prior policies and standards are being deliberately changed, not casually ignored,
and if an agency glosses over or swerves from prior precedents without discussion i t
may cross the line from the tole rably terse t o the intolerably mute." (footnotes omit
ted) ) .
6
See, e.g., COMM. ON RESEARCH AND PE ER REVIEW IN EPA, NAT'L RESEARCH COUN5

See, e.g., Motor

CIL, STRENGTHENING SCIENCE AT THE U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY:
RESEARCH-MAt"'AGEME T AND PEER-REVIEW PRACTICES 24 (2000) ("In the absence of

sound scientific information, high-risk problems might not be adequately addressed,
while high-profile but lower-risk problems might be targeted wastefully. ") , available at
http:/ j.vww.nap.edu/openbook/0309071 275/html/24.h tml ; CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY,
J R., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CONTROL OF BUREAUCRACY 1 3 - 1 4
( 1 990) (highlighting science as one o f the three central aspects o f administrative decision making) ; Alon Rosen thai et al. , Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from nxposure to
Toxic Chemicals, 19 ECOLOGY L.Q. 269, 270 ( 1 992) ("Scien tific information about the
human health risks of exposure to toxic chemicals is critical to making sound regula
tory decisions." ) .
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because it does not address the normative aspects of administrative
7
policymaking. To fulfill administrative law's aspiration of reason,
agencies need to explain their decisions by reference not only to sci
entific evidence but also to policy principles that speak to the value
choices inherent in their decision making.
In this Article, we examine the role and limitations of science in
the important policy domain of environmental risk management. In
particular, we offer a detailed account of the use-and misuse-of sci
ence by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in its efforts to
justify recent changes to its national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) for ozone8 and particulate matter (PM) .9 Environmental
risk management is an area of public policy where science plays a vital
role in revealing the health effects associated with human exposure to
different substances. 1 0 It is also an area, however, where agencies have
often exaggerated the role of science and thus have escaped their re
sponsibility to give careful reasons for the value j udgments implicit in
their decision making. 1 1
EPA's recent revisions to its air quality standards hold profound
implications for both public health and the economy. 12 Not surpris
ingly, these revisions generated substantial political controversy 13
and led to several rounds of litigation. 1 4 In the first case to come be
fore the D.C. Circuit, the majority rejected EPA's revised standards,

See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (showing how EPA's exclusive reli
ance on science in its ozone and particulate matter rulemakings was fundamentally
mistake n ) .
8 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (july 1 8,
1997) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.9-. 1 0 ) [hereinafter EPA, Ozone Final
Rule] .
9 National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg.
38,652 (july 1 8 , 1 997) (codified as amended at 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.6-.7) [hereinafter EPA,
PM Final Rule] .
w See infra notes 34, 4 1 3 and accompanying text (noting the role of scientific
analysis in EPA decision making) .
11
See Wendy E . Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 1 6 1 3, 1 6 1 7 ( 1 995) (" [A] gencies exaggerate the contributions made by science in
setting toxic standards in order to avoid accountability for the underlying policy deci
sions.") .
12 See infra notes 369-70 and accompanying text (detailing estimated costs of the
revisions) .
1�1
See, e.g., infra note 70 and accompanying text (describing the congressional hear
ings on the standards) .
14 The standards were the subject o f multiple decisions i n the D.C. Circuit in addi
tion to a major decision in the U.S. Supreme Court. For a discussion of the litigation,
see infra notes 1 5-20, 408- 1 2 and accom panying text.
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holding that the Agency's application of the Clean Air Act violated the
constitutional nondelegation doctrine. 1 5 Congress delegated authority
to EPA to se t air quality standards that " 'protect the public health '
()
with an 'adequate margin of safety, '" 1 language that the majority held
could pass constitutional muster only if EPA applied an "intelligible
1
principle" to cabin its discretion in setting air quality standards . 7 The
D.C. Circuit's novel constitutional ruling generated considerable at
tention and seemed potentially to cast other regulatory statutes into
some doubt. IH On appeal, in the much-heralded case of Whitman v.
19
American Trucking Ass'ns, the Supreme Court rejected the D.C. Cir
cuit's constitutional analysis, holding that the Clean Air Act did not
violate the nondelegation doctrine. �0

1'' Am Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 038-40 (D.C. Cir. 1 999) , ajj'd in
part and rev'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am Trucking A�s'ns , 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) .
10
Id. at 1 034 (quoting 42 U .S.C. § 7409 (b) ( l ) (2000) ) .
17 Id. at 1 038-40.
IH
The constitutional issues presented in American Tntcking received extensive aca
demic and legal analysis. For examples of such analysis, see Cary Coglianese, 17u Con
stitution and the Costs of Clean Air; 42 ENV'T 32 ( 2000) ; Ernest Gellhorn, The Proper Role of
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 3 1 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. I n st.) 1 0 ,232 (Feb. 200 1 ) ; C. Boy
den Gray, The Search for an Intelligible Principle: Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Nondelegation
Doctrine, 5 TEX. REv. L. & POL. 1 (2000 ) ; Lisa Heinzerling, The Clean Air Act and the
Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U . PUB. L. REV. 1 2 1 (200 1 ) ; Thomas 0. McGarity, The Clean
Air Act at a Crossroads: Statutory Interpretation and Longstanding Administrative Practice in
the Shadow of the Delegation Doctrine, 9 N .Y.U. El\IVTL. LJ. 1 (2000) ; Craig N. Oren, Run
Over by American Trucking Part I: Can A'PA Revive Its Air Quality Standards?, 29 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 10,653 (Nov. 1 999) ; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Inherent Limits on
judicial Control of Agency Disaetion: The D. C. Circuit and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 52
ADMIN. L. REv. 63 (2000) ; Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98
MICH. L. REV. 303 ( 1 999) .
19 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) .
20
ld. at 475-76; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Risks After ATA, 200 1 SUP. CT.
REV. l , 3 ("[Whitman] reestablish [es] long-se ttled law allowing Congress to delegate
broad discre tionary authority to regulatory agencies.") . But (f Bressman, supra note 1 ,
at 469-70 ("[vVhitman] denie [s] agencies the power to cure deficiencies in delegating
statutes.") . The Supreme Court also rejected industry's statutory argument that EPA
can consider costs in setting air quality s tandards, affirming a string of D.C. Circuit de
cisions holding likewise. Whitman, 5 3 1 U.S. at 464-7 1 ( citing Am Lung Ass'n v. EPA,
1 34 F.3d 388, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1 998) ; Natural Res. Def. Council v. Adm'r., EPA, 902 F.2d
962, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1 990) ; Am Petroleum Inst. v. Coslle, 665 F.2d 1 1 76, 1 185 (D .C. Cir.
1 98 1 ) ; Lead Indus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 48 (D.C. Cir. 1 980 ) ) . The Supreme Court
did leave open the possibility for separate consideration of EPA's decision under the
arbitrary and capricious standard on remand to the D.C. Circuit. !d. at 476. Given th e
Supreme Court's affirmation of the adequacy of EPA' s decision making on constitu
tional grounds, it came as little surprise that the D . C. Circuit subsequently (although
not necessarily correctly) found EPA's decision making Lo withstand the arbitrary and
capricious test. Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 358 ( D .C. Cir. 2002) .
.

.

.

.
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The Supreme Court ' s decision to uphold the Act-and by impli
cation E PA's revised standards-against constitutional challenge re
solved what had become one of the most significant and controversial
issues in environmental, health , and safety regulation to emerge in re
cent years. Nevertheless, although the constitutional issues raised by
the case have been settled, the revised ozone and particulate stan
dards remain one of EPA's most significant environmental policy de
cisions. Not only will the standards have important impacts on public
health , but these two standards alone are expected to impose more
costs on the economy than all other air pollution regulations com
bined.21 The policy significance of these standards makes all the more
salient another vital issue raised by this case, one that was not explic
itly addressed by the Supreme Court and that has also escaped much
scrutiny in the academic commentary on the case. 22 The unaddressed
issue is the question of the appropriate role of science in setting risk
standards.
Agencies like EPA must rely on science to make well-informed and
effective policy decisions, such as where air quality standards should
be set, but they cannot rely on science exclusively to j ustify these deci
sions . 23 This Article explains how EPA's invocation of science in de
fense of its new air quality standards contributed to, or at least de
flected attention from, a remarkable series of inconsistencies in EPA's
positions. Given the way EPA and the courts have interpreted the
Clean Air Act, the Agency has been able to, if not been forced to,
cloak its policy j udgments under the guise of scientific obj ectivity, with
the consequence that the Agency has evaded accountability for a shift
ing set of policy positions having major implications for public health
2
and the economy. 4 In short, EPA's use of a science-based rhetoric
enabled it to avoid responsibility for providing any clear, consistent
5
reasons for its policy choices in setting air quality standards. 2 The
Agency's shifting and incoherent approach to its NAAQS decisions

21

See infra note 370 and accompanying text (detailing the amount of money spent
on compliance with the Clean Air Act) .
22
The academic literature has focused predominan tly on the consti tutional issues
raised in Whitman. See sources cited supra notes 1 8, 20.
2
3 See infra Part I.B (defining the appropriate role of science in decision making
while pointing out common uses of it) .
24 See infra Part II (discussing EPA's invocation of scie nce instead of reliance on
reasoned policy j udgments) .
2
'' Infra Part II.
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ultimately failed to live up to the aspiration for reasoned decision
making that undergirds contemporary administrative law. 2 6
In Part I of this Article , we show how EPA invoked science to jus
tify its NAAQS revisions, and we explain why such an approach mis
conceived the role of science in regulatory decision making. Drawing
on the conventional distinction between risk assessment and risk
management, we show how EPA's retreat behind the cloak of science
mistook the normative nature of risk management decisions, such as
those involved in setting air quality standards. We also show how pol
icy choices enter into standard setting even more starkly for non
threshold pollutants (such as ozone and particulate matter) , where it
appears there is no level of exposure that is free from all health ef
fects.
In Part II, we demonstrate that EPA's positions on various aspects
of its NAAQS decision making have shifted over time, even during the
course of its most recent rulemakings on ozone and particulate mat
ter. When agencies like EPA rely on science as a j ustification for how
they set risk standards, they neglect to offer a principled justification
for their policy decisions. 27 In fact, EPA has quite explicitly argued
that it should be able to approach each NAAQS rulemaking in an ad
hoc manner. 2 8 With such an ad hoc approach to risk management,
inconsistencies are to be e xpected as an inevitable result, as we show
in the incoherent positions EPA adopted in its recent revisions to its
air quality standards.
Finally, in Part III we review several alternative principles for justi
fying risk standards, showing what direction EPA and other regulatory
agencies need to take in order to develop more principled approaches
to risk management. We conclude that in order to bring greater clar
ity and coherence to air quality standard setting, Congress will need to
step in and direct EPA to use clear policy principles in justifying its
decisions. This will almost certainly require a repudiation of the fun
damental fiction, endorsed by both EPA and the Supreme Court in
Whitman, that risk standards can be set without consideration for the

26

On administrative law's aspirations for reason, see supra notes 1, 5 and infra
notes 398-402.
27 By "principled justification," we simply mean an explicit reason or explanation
for why, given what is known about the world, a standard should be set at a particular
level, such that in situations with similar conditions a similar result should follow.
2R
See infra notes 188-89 and accompanying text (presenting the Agency's claim
that it cannot be constrained by any "generalized paradigm") .
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costs or feasibility of complying with them. 29 By amending the under
lying statute, Congress can enable and encourage the Agency to live
up to the aspirations for reason embedded within contemporary ad
ministrative law.
I. S CIENCE AND S ETTING RISK STANDARDS
Throughout its recent ozone and particulate matter rulemakings,
EPA attempted to j ustify its selection of its air quality standards based
on scientific evidence, namely evidence of the health effects of such
polluti on. 30 In the early stages of the rulemaking, EPA's emphasis
on science was more restrained, and Agency documents sometimes
noted obliquely that there was some room for policy inputs in risk
management. 31 As the Agency's rulemaking proceedings progressed,
however, and as the amount of controversy surrounding them in
creased , EPA's reliance on science to justify and defend its standards
became more pronounced.
EPA initially emphasized its scientific evidence partly in response
to a campaign by opponents who questioned the soundness of the sci
ence underlying EPA's standards. 32 EPA understandably responded
to these attacks by attempting to defend the validity of its scientific
findings . Yet, in addition to defending the Agency's scien tific re
search on its own merits , EPA soon came to inflate the role of science,

2\1

See supra Part III.B (arguing that the Agency did, in fact, take cost into consid
eration) .
30 Throughout this Article, we use the terms "science" or "scientific evidence" to
refer to the natural sciences, though our discussion would in theory apply to positive
social science as well. In addition, while we refer to the "EPA" repeatedly in this Article
in its capacity as a legal entity, we recognize that government organizations are not
unitary actors, but instead are comprised of many individuals with views that may or
may not be in agreement with an agency's official rulemaking documents and court
briefs.
31 See infra note 1 64 and accompanying text (citing the Agency's brief acknowl
edgment of a policy choice in its Federa l Register notice) .
32 See, e.g., Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be Ji'inished
by July 19, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 2068 ( Feb. 1 4, 1 997) ("Industry officials . . .
continued to hammer EPA proposals as lacking a sound scientific basis . . . . ") ; AJlan
Freedman, Latest Fight on Clean Air Rules Centers on Scientific Data, CONG. Q. , Mar. 1,
1 997, at 530 ( pointing out the tendency of opponents to say that the regulations were
based on flimsy science) ; Joby Warrick, Panel Seeks Cease-Fire on A ir Quality but Gets a
War, WASI-l. POST, Feb. 6, 1 997, at A2 1 (describing opponents of EPA air quality stan
dards carrying placards reading "EPA-Show me the science") .
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using science in an attempt to justify its standards in order to provide
greater support for its position in the political arena and the courts .33
In this Part, we show how EPA appealed to a science-based rheto
ric in its ozone and particulate matter rulemakings, and we explain
why such an exclusive reliance on science is fundamen tally mistaken.
Science does properly play a vital role in environmental regulatory
decisions, and regulatory agencies do need to develop credible and
relevant scientific analysis of environmental risks.:3 4 Yet regulatory
agencies have too often invoked science in order to answer questions
that science is not designed to answer. 35 By purporting to rely on sci
ence to j ustify normative policy decisions, agencies succumb to a cate
gory mistake, since science speaks to what is, rather than to what
should be."'t> Relying exclusively on science, as EPA has done in its
:<:� A telling anecdote of this shift in EPA's emphasis can be found in Professor
Craig Oren's con trasting of two statements by EPA Administrator Carol Browner.
Oren, supra note 1 8, at 1 0 ,653. In November 1 996, at the time the ozone and fine PM
standards were first proposed, the EPA Administrator was quoted as stating that " [ t] he
question is not one of science, the real question is one of j udgment." Air Pollution:
Agency Announces Proposals to Toughen Regulations for Ozone, Particulate Matter, 27 Env' t
Rep. ( BNA) 1 5 7 1 (Nov. 29, 1 996) . Four months later, at the height of heated public,
congressional, and regulatory debate on the standards, Administrator Browner made a
1 80-degree reversal, stating that "I think i t is not a question of judgment, I think it is a
question of science." Air Quality Standards: Science-Driven Ozone, PM Proposals Will Be
Finished by July 19, EPA Says, supra note 32, at 2068. As we outline below in Part I.A,
EPA never emerged fro m its retreat behind the cloak of science and indeed only hid
itself further behind its apparen t shield. Of course, this is not the first time that EPA
has made an about-face on the role of science and policy in i ts decision making. See
Sheila Jasanoff, The Problem of Rationality in American Health and Safety Regulation, in
EXPERT EVJDENCE: INTERPRETING SCIENCE IN THE lAW 1 5 1 , 1 68-69 ( Roger Smith &
Brian Wynne eds., 1 989) (describing EPA's contradictory characterization of its cancer
principles in the context of proceedings involving the pesticides h eptachlor and
chlordane in the 1 970s) .
34
See EXPERT PANEL ON THE ROLE OF SCI. AT EPA, EPA, SAFEGUARDING THE
FUTURE: CREDIBLE SCIENCE, CREDIBLE DECISIONS 2 ( 1 992 ) ("Scien tific knowledge has
assumed an increasingly critical role as the e nvironmental issues faced by the nation
and the world grow in complexity and cut across all environmental media.") ; see also id.
at 15 ("Strong science provides the foundation for credible environmental decision
making. ") ; MARK R. POWELL, SCIENCE AT EPA: INFORMATION IN THE REGULATORY
PROCESS 8 ( 1 999) ( noting that science plays "an important part in environmental regu
la tory decisionmaking") ; Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, Remarks at the EPA
Science Forum (May 1 , 2002) ( "Sound science is the foundation of EPA's work.") ,
available at http:/ /yosemite.epa.gov/administratorI speeches.nsf.
y, Wagner, supra note 1 1 , at 1 6 1 7 (arguing that agencies have often used science
to "camouflag [ e ] controversial policy decisions" ) .
:Jti
This is not to say, of course, that normative judgments cannot affect the way that
questions of scientific research are framed or how scien tific research is interpreted.
On the contrary, especially with policy-relevant research, the ways in which normative
judgments enter into the research process can themselves be "disguised in the cloak of
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ozone and particulate rulemakings, is as misguided as it would be to
disregard relevant scientific information altogether. 37
A. "Listen to the Science:" EPA's Use of Science as a Policy Rationale
Science has considerable rhe torical appeal when it comes to de
fending regulatory decisions, as it is often described and perceived as
8
being "objective." 3 Because of its perceived objectivity, as well as the
extensive advancements in science and technology that have emerged
over the past century, science is viewed by the public as highly credible
if not even infallible . 39 Politicians and advocates regularly call for gov
°
ernment to use "sound science" in making regulatory decisions. 4 For

objectivity. " Peter Brown, Ethics and Policy Research, 2 POL'Y ANALYSIS 325, 340 ( 1 976);
see also infra notes 1 07-08 and accompanying text ( discussing the difficulties in com
ple tely separating science and policy wh en making decisions ) .
37 For an argument that agencies sometimes disregard scientific evidence, see
James W. Conrad, Jr., The Reverse Science Charade, 33 Envtl. L Rep . ( E nvtl . L Inst. )
1 0 ,306 (Apr. 2003) .
38 Whether the "objectivity" of science even makes sense as a philosophical o r so
ciological matter is certainly subj ect to debate. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE
BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 207 ( 1 995) ('There is no way for
the Jaw to access a domain of facts untouched by values or social i n terests.") ; see also
SCIENCE WARS (Andrew Ross ed., 1 996) (collecting essays critical of the n o tion of a
value-free science ) ; AFTER THE SCIENCE WARS ( Keith M. Ashman & Philip S. Baringer
eds. , 200 1 ) (exploring the debate over the extent to which science is obje ctive versus
socially constructed) . Regardless of where one stands on this issue, the fact that sci
ence is pe rceived by many people to be "obj ective" does lend persuasive strength to
scientific claims when they are made in political and legal fora. See, e.g. , Am . Truckin g
Ass ' ns v. EPA, 1 75 F . 3 d 1 027, 1 059 (D .C. Cir. 1 999) (asserting that because members of
E PA's Clean Air Science Advisory Committee ( CASAC) bring "scientific m e thods to
their evaluation of the Agency's Criteria Document and Staff Paper, CASAC provides
an obj e ctive j ustification for the pollution standards the Agency selects . " ) (Tatel, J,
dissen ting) ; James D. Wilson & JW. Anderson, VVhat the Science Says: How We Use It and
Abuse It to Make Health and Environmental Policy, RESOURCES, Summer 1 997, at 5 , 6 ("To
many laymen, certainty and precision is [sic] the essence of science: as they under
stand it, a scientific question can have only one right answer. ") .
l9 See,
e.g., NAT'L SCI. BD., NAT'L SCI. FOUND., SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING:
INDICATORS 2000, at 8-1 , 8-1 3 (200 1 ) (describing public trust in scientists and medical
researchers) , available at http:/ / www. nsf.gov/sbe/srs/seindOO/; Donald T. Hornstein,
Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of Comparative Risk A nalysis, 92
COLUM. L REv. 562, 569-75 ( 1 992) ( discussing the "allure of science" in environ
mental decision making) ; Samuel J McNaughton, VVhat Is Good Science ?, NAT. RE
SOURCES & ENV'T, Spring 1 999, at 5 1 3, 5 1 9 (" [S] cience in our society has come to have
a quality of infallibility attached to it.") .
10 See, e.g. , The Regulatory Flexibility Act:
Are Federal Agencies Using "Good Science" in
77teir Rule Making?: Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov 't Programs and Oversight and
the Subwmm. on Regulation Reform and Paperwork Reduction of the House Comm. on Small
Bus., 1 05 th Cong. 1 1 5 ( 1 997) (prepared state ment ofJames M. Harless, Techna Corp . )
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regulators, invoking science to defend a regulatory decision can be an
e ffective and expedient political strategy. 4 1 Given the political appeal
of science, regulatory decision makers have an incentive to exaggerate
the determinacy of science in an effort to mask contested policy
choices and escape scrutiny. 42 Professor Wendy Wagner has dubbed
this practice the "science charade." 43

("A common refrain today among all stakeholders in the regulatory process is 'use
good science ."') , available at 1 997 WL 105695 70.
4 1 See KAREN T. LITFIN, OZONE DISCOURSES:
SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION 4 ( 1 994) ( observing that science is a "key source of
legitimation" ) ; POWELL, supra note 34, at 6 ( remarking that science "is a favorite
weapon in political battles over environmental policy") ; Elizabeth Fisher, Drowning by
Numbers: Standard Setting in Risk Regulation and the Pursuit of Accountable Public Admini
stration, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1 09, 1 30 ( 2000) (noting the tendency for increased
reliance o n science in standard setting because of its perceived objectivity and legiti
macy) . Not only can policymakers use science to defend decisions to issue new regula
tory standards, as EPA did in the case of its revised NAAQS, but they can also use sci
ence to defend decisions to defer issuing new standards. For an argument that science
has been used as a political defense fo r regulatory inaction over food safety, see
MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, A\\ID BIOTERRORISM 46
(2003) ( noting "the invocation of 'science' as an obstmctive measure" thwarting the
development of regulations on the use of antibiotics in animal fe ed) .
42 See, e.g. , RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MA."lAGING
OURSELVES: A HISTORY OF fu\1ERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 269 ( 1 999) (asserting
that EPA risk-based decisions "in effect used scientific language to mask fundamentally
political decisions, and to allow policy to be controlled by an EPA subgovernment
rather than by a broader political process") ; JASANOFF, supra note 38, at 207 (noting
"the law's desire to cloak morally difficult judgments with the 'objective' authority of
experts and instruments") ; LITFIN, supra note 4 1 , at 4 ("[T]he cultural role of science
as a key source of legitimation means that political debates are framed i n scientific
terms; questions of value become reframed as questions of fact, with each confronta
tion leading to the search for further scientific justification . " ) ; NAT L ENVTL. POLICY
lNST., ENHANCING SCIENCE IN THE REGULATORY PROCESS 5 ( 1 999) (observing that
policymakers can blame science "instead of acknowledging social, political, or eco
nomic bases for policy decisions and taking responsibility for including those factors in
their decisions") ; David L. Baze lon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SCIENCE 277, 278 ( 1 979)
(" [S]cientists are tempted to disguise con troversial value decisions in the cloak of sci
entific obje ctivity, obscuring those decisions from political accoun tability." ) ; Giando
menico Majone, Science and Trans-Science in Standard Setting, 9 SCI., TECH., & HUM.
VALUES, Winter 1 984, at 1 5, 1 5 ("Traditionally, gove rn ment regulators have sought le
gitimacy for their decisions by wrapping them in a cloak of scientific respectability. ") ;
Mark E. Rushefsky, The Misuse of Science in Governmental Decisionmaking, 9 Scr., TECH., &
HUM. VALUES, Summer 1984, at 47, 47 ("Some policymakers have attemp ted also to
legitimize decisions by clothing them with the 'respectable neu trality' of science . " ) ;
Andrew D. Siegel, The Aftermath of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co . v. N RD C : A Broader
Notion ofjudicial Deference to Agency �xpntise, 1 1 HARV. E:NVfL. L. REv. 3 3 1 , 377 ( 1 98 7 )
( One possible result of the deference [ to scientific findings] rule i s that agencies will
strain to characterize their policy decisions, especially if they are controversial, as rest
ing on technical or scientific judgments. " ) ; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The Role of Science in
Policy, ENV'T,june 1999, at 1 7, 1 9 ("[I ] f the level of uncertainty is high enough, science
'

"
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Perhaps no agency has so mistakenly and prominently advanced
science as a justification for its policy decisions as did EPA in defend
ing its recent revisions to air quality standards for ozone and particu
late matter. In its rulemaking documents, in the courts, in Congress,
and before the general public, EPA invoked science as its exclusive
justification for revising its air quality standards . 44 The EPA Adminis
trator repeatedly argued that she simply "listened to the science" in
establishing new air quality standards. 4 5 The Agency generally avoided
describing its decisions as policy j udgments that required the articula
tion of a principled explanation for why the standards should be l ow
ered to the chosen level. Instead, EPA defended its decisions as de
termined exclusively by scientific evidence.46
The Clean Air Act specifies the steps EPA must take in setting or
revising its air quality standards. 47 The Act provides, in section 1 0 8 ,

may become the principal lever that all sides use to justify positions reached primarily
on other grounds. ") .
'l
4· Wagner, supranote ll, at l 6 1 7 .
44 EPA and other regulatory agencies have had a long history of invoking science
as a policy rationale under both Democratic and Republican Administrations. See gen
erally Wagner, supra note 1 1 (discussing the exaggeration of science in agency decision
makin g) . For example, fo rmer Admin istrator William Reilly, working in the first Bush
Administration, called generally for more "science-based regulatio n , " arguing that
"EPA must and will continue to rely on a rational, science-based process fo r dete rmin
ing when to take risk management actions ." William Reilly, Taking A im Toward 2000:
Rethinking the Nation 's Environmental Agenda, 2 1 ENVrL. L. 1 359, 1 364 ( 1 99 1 ) . Since
E PA's decisions to revise the ozone and particulate standards were some of the most
costly and controversial risk management decisions in the Agency's history, the extent
to which EPA used science as a shield was particularly problematic in this instance.
4'' See infra notes 7 1 -87 and accompanying text (detailing Administrator Browner's
statements that she based the new standards on science ) .
41; The science-based rationale deployed by EPA was not merely an example of po
litical rhetoric, as serious legal scholars have also argued fo r a similar normative justifi
cation for environmental standard se tting. For example, Dan Tarlock h as suggested,
with few qualifications, that "environ mental law and management should derive their
primary political power and legitimacy from science, not e thics." A. Dan Tarlock, Envi
ronmental Law: Ethics or Science ?, 7 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1 9 3, 1 94 ( 1996) ; see also
Susan Buck, Science as a Substitute for JVIoral Principle, in THE MOR<\L AUSTERHY OF
E?\v!RONMENTAL DECISION MAKING 25, 27-30 (john Martin Gillroy & joe Bowersox
eds., 2002) (arguing that most decisions made by environmental regulators are prop
erly based on "scientific and technical information" rather than on "moral principle") .
For additional examples, see infra notes 1 1 7-18 and accompanying text.
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 7 40 1 -760 1 ( 2000 ) . The Act directs EPA to issue both primary and
secondary standards. Id. § 7409 (a) . Primary standards aim at protecting human
health , while secondary standards address nonhuman biological and physical effects.
!d. § 7409 (b) . Although this Article focuses on EPA's decisions to revise its primary
standards for ozone and particulate matter, our discussion of the limits of science also
applies to secondary standards.

2004]

LIMITS OF SCIENCE IN SET11NG RISK STANDARDS

1 267

that the first step in promulgating a new or revised NAAQS is for the
Agency to prepare a "criteria document" for the relevant pollutant.4H
The criteria document is required to report "the latest scientific
knowledge" on "all identifiable effects on public health or welfare
which may be expected from the presence of such pollutant in the
ambient air."49 Section 1 09 of the Act then directs the EPA Adminis
trator to use her 'j udgment" to select a primary NAAQS that is "requi
site to protect the public health" based on the criteria document and
allowing for "an adequate margin of safety."50
In July 1 997, EPA promulgated revised primary NAAQS for ozone
and particular matter. The Agency revised the previous one-hour,
0. 1 2 ppm, average primary ozone standard to an eight-hour, 0.08
ppm, average standard. 51 It also added two new fine particulate matter
3
3
standards-a 1 5 pg/m annual standard and a 65 pg/m daily standard for PM2552-while retaining the existing PM10 standard ·with only
minor technical changes. 5'1 In explaining its decision, EPA stressed

48

49

Id. § 7408 (a) .
Id. § 7408 (a) ( 2 ) . The criteria documents for the most recent revisions of the

ozone and particulate matter standards were voluminous, spanning over 1 500 and
2400 pages respectively. Although the stage of preparing these criteria documents can
be thought of as akin to the stage of risk assessme nt discussed below in Part LB, it is
interesting to n ote that, on its face, the language of the Clean Air Act seems to ac
knowledge that certain policy considerations need to enter into the Administrator's
decision making, even in the process of l isting criteria poll utants and developing the
criteria documents. Section 7408(a) directs the Adminis trator (a) to add to the crite
ria list those air pollutan ts "which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution
wh ich may r·easonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare;" (b) to e n
sure that the criteria documen ts "reflect" the useful and current scientific knowledge
(though arguably n ot necessarily be based solely on such knowledge) ; and (c) to in
clude in these documents information about the impact of atmospheric patterns, in
teractions with other pollutants, and any possible impacts on welfare-but only ''to the
extent practicable." Id. § 7408 (a) (emphases added ) .
50 Id. § 7409 (b) ( l ) .
: >� EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8 , 62 Fed . Re g. at 38,857.
Compliance with
this averaging standard is measured in several steps. First, the mean ozone concentra
tion over every period of eight consecutive hours is contin uously measured at a given
site. Second, the fourth highest eight-hour average ozone concen tration over the en
tire year is determined. Finally, the three-year average of the annual fourth -highest
daily maximum eigh t-hour ozone concentrations is calculated. If the three-year aver
age is at or below 0.08 ppm, the site is in attainment with the new ozone standard. If it
is above 0.08 ppm . , it is in nonattainment.
'•� PM� '·' or fine particulate matter, refers to particles that are equal to or smaller
"
than 2.5 mic rometers in diameter. The term "pg/ m " means "micrograms per cubic
meter."
"3 E PA, PM Final Rule, supm note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,652.
PM10 refers to parti
cles that are equal to or smaller than l 0 micrometers in diameter.
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the sources of information on which it based its decision, principally
the risk assessments conducted by the Agency's staff and the advice
given by the Agency's Clean Air Science Advisory Committee ( CA
SAC) , a panel dedicated to providing EPA with scientific input on air
pollution issues . 54 Yet a statement of information sources is not a
statement of principles, and nothing in any of these information
sources explicated a policy j ustification for the revised standards. 55
Mter EPA promulgated its revised ozone and particulate matter
standards, industry groups and three States filed petitions seeking j u
dicial review of the standards in the United States Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit. In the initial round of this litiga
tion, EPA argued that the Agency's "scientific review" led it "to the in
escapable conclusion" that the existing NAAQS were not protecting
6
the public health with an adequate margin of safety. '' Mter a panel of
the Court of Appeals rejected EPA's decisions on nondelegation
grounds, finding that the Agency failed to articulate an intelligible
principle to guide its NAAQS selection, EPA appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. The Agency argued before the Supreme Court
that its decision under the Clean Air Act did not offend the nondele
gation doctrine because the Agency had been constrained by three
types of factors that together effectively constituted an "intelligible
principle." 57 The three factors were the Agency's criteria documents
reflecting "the latest scientific knowledge," the advice from CASAC,
and the rulemaking requirements of section 307 (d) of the Clean Air
Act. 58 The first two factors-the criteria documents and CASAC ad
vice-emphasized scientific inputs exclusively. 59 Since the last of these
factors was merely a procedural limitation, EPA in effect argued that

''4 EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859; EPA, PM Final
Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,655-56.
55 For a further discussion of the Agency's science-based argument in the rulemak
ing process, see infra Part II.A.
''6 Brief for Respondent at 3-4, Am Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 195 F . 3d 4 (D.C. Cir.
1 999) (No. 97-1 440) [he reinafter EPA, D . C. Cir. P M Brief] .
57 Brief for Petitioners at 22-24 , Whitman v. Am
Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457
(200 1 ) (No. 99-1 257) [ hereinafter EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief] .
" 8 !d. at 23-24.
59 Supra notes 49, 54 and accompanying text.
Section 1 09 (d) ( 2 ) (C) ( iv) required
CASAC to provide advice on other issues that go beyond scientific matters, but EPA
took the position that "neither CASAC's recommendations nor E PA's decisions on
NAAQS revisions may be influenced by § 1 0 9 ( d ) (2) (C) (iv) factors." Brief of Respon
dent at 53, Am . Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 1 95 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1 999 ) (No. 97- 1 44 1 )
[hereinafter EPA, D .C. Cir. Ozone Brief] . Thus, under E PA's interpretation of the
statute, CASAC's advice in NAAQS proceedings was limited to scientific matters.
.

.
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science alone provided the Agency with its substantive principle for
how it selected its NAAQS standards.
EPA offered other statements in its briefs to the Supreme Court
that claimed or suggested that its revised standards could be justified
on the basis of science alone. For example, it argued that "Congress
has unambiguously indicated its intent that NAAQS should be based
on scientific evidence regarding the health and welfare effects of am
bient pollution." 60 In addition, the Agency argued "that Congress
made a policy choice to cabin EPA's discretion by requiring the
Agency to set NAAQS on the basis of a specific body of information:
the latest scientific knowledge on the public health and welfare effects
caused by the presence of criteria pollutants in the ambient air."6 1 In
its opening brief to the Supreme Court, EPA repeatedly referred to
scientific evidence as the basis for its NAAQS standards:
•

•

•

•

"EPA revised the PM standards based on new scientific studies
that had emerged since EPA's last PM review . . . . "62
"To select the levels requisite to protect public health , wi th an
adequate margin of safety, the Administrator relied chiefly on
epidemiological studies that employed direct measures of fine
. I es . . . . ,63
partie
"The scientific evidence convinced the Administrator that she
should revise both the averaging time and the concentration
level of the 1 979 one-hour ozone standard. "64
"EPA must consider the factors that the [Clean Air] Act pre
scribes and provide a reasoned explanation, based on scien
tific evidence, for its decision. "65

EPA even suggested that the Supreme Court should be highly defer
ential to the Agency under the Court's Baltimore Gas56 decision pre
cisely because the selection of NAAQS standards was, it argued, a "sci
entific determination . " 67
w Brief for the Federal Respondents at 1 8 , Whitman v. Am Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457 (200 1 ) (No. 99- 1426) [hereinafter EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief] .
61
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 9, Whitman v. Am Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U .S. 457
(200 1 ) (No. 99-1 257) [hereinafter EPA, Supreme Court Reply Brief] .
62
EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief, supra note 57, at 9.
63 !d. at 1 0 .
61
!d. at 1 2.
65 !d. at 30.
,;,;
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 462 U .S. 87 ( 1 983) .
Gl
EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief, supra note 57, at 27 ("'When examining
th is kind of scien tific determination, as opposed to simple findings of fact, a reviewing
.

.
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Mter the Supreme Court upheld EPA's decision on constitutional
and statutory grounds, the litigation returned to the D.C. Circuit
Court of Appeals for consideration of challenges to the rule under the
arbitrary and capricious standard . Again, EPA stressed the scientific
basis for the standards. The Agency argued that it had "revised the
PM standards based primarily on scientific studies that had emerged
since the EPA's last review, including an extensive body of epidemiol
ogical studies on exposure to PM pollution ." 68 Similarly, in defending
its ozone decision, EPA repeatedly invoked scientific factors for its de
cision, emphasizing in particular that " [s] ignificant new clinical stud
ies provided 'conclusive evidence "' in support of the Agency ' s action. 69
court must generally be at its most deferential."' (quoting Baltimore Gas, 462 U .S. at
103) ) . The type of "scientific determination" that the Supreme Court referred to in
Baltimo-re Gas appears to have been much closer to a science-based prediction than to a
more obviously policy-based judgment such as selecting an air quality standard . In that
case , the Nuclear Regulatory Commission estimated that the long-term environ mental
impact of nuclear waste disposal was zero, an action that the Supreme Court character
ized as "making predictions, within its area of special expertise, at the fron tiers of sci
ence. " Baltimo-re Gas, 462 U.S. at 1 03. In its reply brief filed with the Supreme Court,
EPA responded to various amici briefs, including one we wrote on behalf of twenty law
professors and scien tists that argued that EPA had mistakenly claimed that science, by
itself, could justify its standard-setting decisions. Brief of Amici Curiae Gary E. Mar
chant e t a!., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U .S. 457 (200 1 ) (No. 99-1 257) . EPA
asserted that " [ t] hose amici simply ignore the rulemaking record," but, tellingly, the
government cited no policy justification for its decision in the Federal Register or else
where to support its assertion that the Agency had indeed recognized a need to make a
policy rather than a scientific determination. EPA, Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra
note 6 1 , at 6 n . l O. Instead, the Agency only cited two supporting EPA staff papers, nei
ther of which provided any policy j ustification for the Agency's decisions. !d. at 6-7
n . l O ("For example, EPA prepared a detailed 'Policy Assessment of Scien tific and
Technical Information' in each rulemaking ' to evaluate the policy implications of the
key studies and scien tific information contai ned in [ the Criteria Document] .'" ( cita
tion omitted) ) . I t speaks volumes that EPA cited only these supplementary documents,
which simply identify a range of possible standards pote n tially consistent with the sci
entific evidence and statutory requirements, without identifying any factors or ration
ales that the Administrator would subseq uently rely on to select a particular standard
from within this range . Moreover, these documents are neither part of the Adminis
trator's actual decision published in the Federal Register nor defended in the Agency's
extensive briefs filed with the D.C. Circuit and Supreme Court.
68
Brief for Respondent at 4, Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C. Cir.
2002) (No. 97-1 440) [hereinafter EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. PM Brief] ; see also id. at 2 ("In
developing the PM2 ,, standards, EPA relied primarily on studies . . . . ) ; id. at 5 ( ''To
select the levels requisite to protect public health, with an adequate margin of safety,
the Administrator relied chiefly on epidemiological studies . . . . " ) .
li'l
Brief for Respondent at 8, Am. Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355 (D.C.
Cir. 2002 ) (N o. 9 7- 1 44 1 ) [ hereinafter EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief] ; see also id. at 2
(asserting that EPA relied on scientific criteria as the basis for its decision) ; id. at 6
(characterizing the Administrator's decision as " [b ] ased on the extensive new sci
ence") .
"
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EPA also took its science-based rhetoric into the halls of Congress,
where the Agency faced intense opposition to its proposed revisions to
the ozone and particulate matter standards. 70 At a legislative hearing
in February 1 997 , Administrator Browner testified that " [c] learly, the
science calls for action." 71 "In a most compelling way," she continued,
"the science leads us to the new, stronger standards that EPA has pro
posed for smog and soot. " 72 She argued that " [s] cience now tell [s] us
that our air pollution standards are not adequate to protect the pub
lic ' s health. Let us listen to science . " 73
At another hearing held a few months later, following completion
of the public comment period but before announcement of the final
standards, Administrator Browner testified to Congress that, " [a] s you
can see from the description of the process I went through to choose
proposed levels on ozone and particulate matter, the focus has been
entirely on health, risk, exposure and damage to the environment. " 7-+
On questioning at the same hearing, the Administrator claimed that
" [t] he proposal that we take comment on is based on 250 peer
reviewed, published scientific studies" and that "the best available cur
rent science . . . forms the proposal we have made to the American
people." 75 When urged by one member of Congress to keep an open
mind on the multiple alternatives that might meet the statutory re
quirements, the Administrator replied succinctly: "We will go where
the science takes us. " 76
70 Steven P . Croley, Public Interested Regulation, 28 FLA. ST. U . L . REv. 7, 63-65
(2000) (describing the intense congressional hearings as "no picnic, for Browner espe
cially") ; Wilson & Anderson, supra note 38, at 6 ("In congressional hearing after hear
ing, E PA's Administrator, Carol Browner, defended her proposed standards as merely
reflecting ' the science . "') . Again , this strategy may have also helped defend against
critics who attacked the credibility of EPA's scientific analysis. See supra notes 38, 4 1
and accompanying text (noting the reliance on science based o n its supposed objectiv
ity) .
71 Clean Air Art: Ozone and Particulate JVJ.atter Standards: Hearing Befme the Subcomm.
on Clean A ir� Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclea-r Safety of the Senate Comm. on Env 't and
Pub. Works, 1 05th Con g. ( 1 997) ( testimony of Carol M. Browner, Administrator, EPA) .
72 Id.
73 Id.
7'
EPA 's Particulate Matter and Ozone Rulemaking: Is EPA A bove the Law ?: Hea-rings
Befme the Subcomm. on Nat 'l Econ. Growth, Nat. Res., and Regu latory Affairs of the Ho·use
Comm. on Gov 't Reform and Oversight, 1 05 th Cong. 360, 380 ( 1 99 7 ) (statement of Carol
M. Browner, Administrator, EPA) [hereinafter April 23, 1 997 Hearing] .
75
Id. at 396-97.
76 Id. at 409; see also Joint Hearing Before Subcomms. on Health & Env 't and Oversight &
Investigations of the House Commerce Comm., 1 05 th Cong. 265 ( 1 99 7 ) (testimony of Carol
A. Browner, Administrator, EPA) [hereinafter Browner. May 1 5 , 1 997 Hearing] (stat
ing that "we should go where the science takes us" ) .
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Shortly after finalizing the ozone and PM standards, Administra
tor Browner appeared before Congress to explain her decision . But
in that setting, she identified only scientific factors in her decision
making:
Clearly, the best available science shows that the previous standards
were not adequately protecting Americans from the hazards of breath ing
polluted air.

These updated standards are based on more than

250

of the latest,

best scien tific studies on ozone and PM-all of them published, peer
reviewe d, fully-debated and thoroughly analyzed by the indep e n de n t sci
e n tific committee , CASAC. We ' re talki ng literally peer review of p e e r re
view of peer review.
It is good science . It is solid science.

77

At other legislative hearings, Administrator Browner stated that the
science "determined" or "warranted" the new standards. 78
EPA continued to invoke science in public speeches, media inter
7
views, and press releases . 9 For example, when EPA proposed the re
vised ozone and PM standards, its press release claimed that Congress
required the proposed standards to be "based solely upon the best
current scientific opinion on public health effects" 80 and that accord
ingly the Agency "will use the very best science to do what is necessary
1
to protect public health in common-sense, cost-effective ways." 8 The
li

Clean Air Act Implementation: joint Hearing Before Subcomms. on Health & Env 't and
Oversight & Investigations of the House Commerce Comm., 1 05th Cong. ( 1 997) ( testimony
of Carol A. Browner, Administrator, EPA) .
78 E.g., Browner, M ay 1 5 , 1 997 Hearing, supra note 76, at 263 (arguing that EPA's
regulatory process is designed "to achieve the goals set forth in the Clean Air Act that
every American breathe clean, healthy air as determined by the latest and best scien
tific information . " ) ; id. (" [ I ] f the science warrants a revision to the standards, the law
sets forth a reasonable and rational procedure fo r implementation . . . ") ; Hearing Be
fore the Subcomm. on Energy & Env 't of the House Comm. on Sci., 1 05th Cong. ( May 2 1
1 997) ( testimony of Carol A. Browner, Administrator, EPA) (repeating that the law
prescribes the implemen tation process "if the science warrants a revision in the stan
dards") .
79 The Administrator was not the only EPA official to invoke science as the
Agency's justification for its NAAQS revisions. In an i nterview, EPA's General Counsel
was likewise quoted as saying: "' Even without the consideration of cost, there are
sound scientific reasons for setting the standards at a particular level. "' David Ruben
stei n , Legions of Business Groups Take on the Clean Air Act, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 2000,
at 96 (quoting EPA General Counsel Gary S. Guzy) .
Ho
Press Release, EPA, EPA Proposes Air Standards for Particulate Matter & Ozone
(Nov. 27, 1996) , http: / /yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf.
HI
!d. (quoting EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner) .
.

,
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Agency's press release also quoted Administrator Browner as stating
that "'EPA has based its proposal on a thorough review of the best
.
82
ava1" 1 able soence. "'
In defending her selection of the proposed standards to the pub
lic, the Administrator told reporters at an Agency briefing that "I
think it is not a question of judgment, I think it is a question of sci
ence." 83 In Philadelphia, she told the local Chamber of Commerce
that " [ t] he Clean Air Act clearly requires levels of smog and soot to be
based solely on health, risk, exposure and damage to the environ
R
ment, as determined by the best available science." 4 The Administra
tor continued by stating that " [t] he current best science must prevail
in determining the level of protection the public will be guaranteed.
Nothing else can take precedence."85 In a speech to the American En
terprise Institute on the proposed air quality standards, Administrator
Browner stated that " [ t] he science is clear and compelling . . . . We
have to go where the best available science leads us ."86 Claiming that
science determined the adequacy of the Agency's revised standards,
Administrator Browner typically ended her speeches on the ozone
7
and PM NAAQS with the admonition: "Let us listen to the science ."8

82

!d.
Science Driven Ozone, PM PToposals Will Be Fi n ish ed by ju ly 1 9, EPA Says, 27 Env' t
Rep. (BNA) 2068 (Feb. 1 4, 1 997 ) .
84 Administrator Carol M . Browner, Remarks Before the Greater Philadelphia
Chamber of Commerce ( May 1 2 , 1 997) , available at h ttp:/ /yosemite.epa.gov/admin
istrator/speeches.nsf.
85 !d.
The Administrator repeated this statement in o ther speeches. For an ex
ample of such a speech , see Administrator Carol M. Browner, Remarks Before the So
ciety of Environmental Journalists ( May 1 7, 1997) , available at h ttp:/ /yosemite.epa.
govI administratorI speeches.nsf.
86 Administrator Carol M. Browner, Remarks at the American E n terprise Insti tute
Conference: Clearing the Air: An Examination of EPA's Proposed Regulations for
Particulate Matter and Ozone (Feb. 10, 1997) , available at http:/ /yosemite.epa. gov/
administrator /speeches.nsf. In a speech to the City Club of Cleveland, the Administra
tor stated that EPA was being "truthful" to the American people by telling them that
science dictated the new standards. Administrator Carol M. Browner, Remarks Before
the City Club of Cleveland (Mar. 25, 1997) , available at http:/ /yosemite.epa.gov/
administrator/speeches.nsf [hereinafter Browner, Cleveland Speech] (claiming that
" [s] cience now tells us that our air pollution standards are not adequate to protect the
public's heal th " and arguing that EPA needed to "tighten those standards in order to
ensure that we are being truthful with the American people about the quality of the air
they are breathing and what it is doing to them") .
87
Browner, Cleveland Speech, supra note 86; see also Browner, supra note 84;
Browner, supra note 85; John H. Cushman , Jr., On Clean Air, Environmental Chief Fought
Doggedly, and Won, N.Y. TIMES, July 5 , 1 997, at A8 (quoting Administrator Browner as
stating that " [ w] hat we have done is follow the science") .
83

-
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B. Standard Setting, Science, and the Management of Risk
Although EPA invoked science as its core defense for its NAAQS
revisions, doing so mistook the ability of science to serve as a principle
for setting environmental policy standards. Science describes; it does
not prescribe. Scientific claims are empirical rather than normative.
Science seeks to supply verifiable descriptions of-and explanations
and inferences about-what is, rather than imposing judgments about
x8
what should be. While science provides valuable information needed
for regulatory decisions, science cannot on its own dictate the appro
9
priate decision about where to set environmental standards. 8

�H See, e.g. , Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 , 1 920 (2002) (" [A] ll empirical research seeks to accomplish one of three ends, or more
typically some combination thereof: amassing data for use by the researcher or o th ers;
summarizing data so they are easier to comprehend; and making descriptive or causal infer
ences . . . . " ) ; Marcia R. Gelpe & A. Dan Tarlock, The Uses of Scientific Information in Envi
ronmental Decisionmaking, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 3 7 1 , 385 ( 1 974) ("Science is concerned
with describing physical relationships and thus wi th drawing infe rences from observed
to unobserved behavior." ) ; Lee Loevinger, The Distinctive }'unctions of Science and Law,
24 ll\'TERDISC. SCI . REV. 87, 87 ( 1 999) ("The function of science is to enlarge our
knowledge and understanding of both the natural and cultural environments in which
we live . . . . Thus, the role of science is to learn , to report, and to teach-but only
facts . " ) ; Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux : Science, Law, and Politics, 1 1 YALE L.
& PoL'Y REv. 1 , 4 ( 1 993) ("Science appeals to the capacity of technical rationality and
specialized expertise to generate and test empirically falsifiable proposi tions. " ) ; see also
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 ( 1 993) (noting that science is
'"a process for proposing and refining theoretical explanations about the world"' (quot
ing Brief for the American Association for the Advancement of Science et al. as Amici
Curiae at 7-8, Daubert ( No. 92-102) ) ) .
s"
. See, e.g. , JOHN D . G RAHAM ET AL . , IN SEARCH O F SAFETY: CHEM ICALS AND CA.t'J CER
RISK 2 1 8 ( 1 988) (observing that "science cannot answer the ultimate regulatory ques
tions") ; NAT'L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., SETTING PR10R1TIES, GETfiNG RESULTS: A NEW
D IRECTION FOR EPA 6 1 ( 1 995) ("Technical information can inform EPA's decisions,
but the decisions remain policy j udgments with political and ethical components.") ;
John S. Applegate, A Beginning and Not an End in Itself: The Role of Risk Assessment in En
vironmental Decision-Making, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1 643, 1 645 ( 1 995) ("Risk is appropri
ately the starting point of much standard setting and priority setting for health-based
environmental regulation, but other factors must have equal weight . . . . [I] t is the
business of public policy, not of science, to decide how these problems should be han
dled. ") ; Paul Fischbeck et al., The Challenge of Improving Regulation, in IMPROVING
REGULATION: CASES IN ENVIRONMENT, HEALTH, AND SAFETY l, 4 (Paul Fischbeck & R.
Scott Farrow eds., 200 1 ) ("Even in the best of worlds, good science is rarely sufficient
for informed regulatory decisionmaking." ) . To say that science alone is insufficien t is
not to say that science is not help ful, or even esse ntial, for se tting regulatOiy p olicy.
Setting regulatoty standards requires both ethical or policy analysis as well as scientific
information. See ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 69 ( 1 989) ( acknowl
edging that, although "both moral understanding and instrumental knowledge are al
ways necessary for policy judgments, neither alone can ever be sufficient" ) .
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To clarify the role of science in setting environmental policy, we
distinguish in this Section between two aspects of the standard-setting
process: "risk assessment" and "risk management. " The National Re
search Council of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS/NRC) rec
ognized this distinction between risk assessment and risk management
in its influential 1 983 report known as the Red Book ,90 which estab
lished a framework for risk-based decision making that regulatory
agencies continue to follow today. The Red Book defined risk assess
ment as "the characterization of the potential adverse health effects of
1
human exposures to environmental hazards." 9 Risk assessment is
based extensively on scientific information, supplemented with what
have been termed "risk assessment policy" judgments to bridge gaps
2
and uncertainties in the scientific evidence . 9 Risk assessment is there
fore considered to be predominantly-though not exclusivel/3based on scientific evidence and analysis. 94

90 NAT ' L RESEARCH COUNCIL, NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI . , RISK AsSESSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS ( 1 983) [hereinafter NAS/NRC RED
BOOK] ; see also STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKIN G THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE
RISK REGUlATION 9 ( 1 993) (recognizing that risk regulation "has two basic parts, a

technical part, called 'risk assessment,' designed to measure the risk associated with
the substance, and a more policy-oriented part, called 'risk managemen t"') .
91
NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 1 8 ; see also 2 THE PRESIDENTIAL/
CONGRESSIONAL COMM' N ON RISK AsSESSMENT AND RISK MGMT . , FINAL REPORT: RISK
AsSESSMENT AND RISK MANAGEMENT IN REGUlATORY DECISION-MAKING 2 ( 1 997) [here
inafter RISK COMM 'N] ("Risk assessment is the systematic, scien tific characterization of

potential adverse effects of human or ecological exposures to hazardous agents or ac
tivities.") , available at http:/ / www. epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/ riskcom/ riskcom2.pdf.
92
NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 37. Such risk assessment policy judg
ments include factors such as which health effects to consider and group together, the
type of models and assumptions to use in the risk assessment, how to extrapolate data
from one small segmen t of a population to the entire population, and how to com
pute, present, and account for uncertainties. !d. at 29-33; see also REGUlATORY IMPACT
ANALYSIS PROJECT, INC., CHOICES IN RISK AsSESSMENT: THE ROLE OF SCIENCE POLICY
IN THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS, at xi ( 1 994) (acknowledging that

there are "gaps and uncertainties in scien tific knowledge, data, and methodology that
arise in the assessment of risks to human health and the environment associated with
exposure to substances, conditions, activities, and sites") , available at http: //www.
library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/batco/ html/600/687 I otherpages/ 7.html; Thomas 0. McGa
rity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in A dministrative Resolution of Science Policy Ques
tions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEO. LJ. 729, 732-47 ( 1 979) (dis
cussing a range of science policy issues that arise in risk regulation including the suffi
ciency of data and varying scientific interpretations of data) .
93 See DANIEL M. BYRD III & C. RICHARD COTHERN, INTRODU C..' TION TO RISK
A.!'-IALYSIS: A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO SCIENCE-BASED DECISION MAKING 6-8, 330-34
(2000) ( noting that risk assessment inherently and inevitably involves some judgment) ;
Sheila Jasan off, Contested Boundaries in Policy-Relevant Science, 1 7 So c . STUD . SCI.
1 95, 2 1 1 ( 1 987) (observing that analysts have "agreed that very little in a typical risk
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Risk management, o n th e other hand, is "an agency decision
making process that entails consideration of political, social, eco
n omic, and engineering information with risk-related information to
develop, analyze , and compare regulatory options and to select the
appropriate regulatory response to a poten tial chronic health haz
95
It "necessarily requires the use of value j udgments on such is
ard ."
sues as the acceptability of risk and the reasonableness of the costs of
96
control ."
As a subsequent National Research Council report reiter
ated, "science alone can never be an adequate basis for a risk de ci
97
sion" because " [r] isk decisions are, ultimately, public policy choices ."
The U.S. Supreme Court has likewise recognized that the risk man
agement decision of selecting the level at which to set health and

assessment could be labeled as pure science") ; Mark E. Rushefsky, Assuming the Conclu
sions: Risk Assessment in the Development of Cancer Policy, 4 P OL. & LIFE SCI. 3 1 , 3 1 ( 1 985)
(arguing that " [i ] n reality facts and values in policy making are hopelessly mixed") .
Even the NRC, in its " 1 983 report and accompanying working papers [ , ] acknowledged
that risk assessment unavoidably combined elements of both science and policy."
Sheila Jasan off, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise at EPA, 7 OSIRIS 1 94, 209
( 1 992) [hereinafter Jasanoff, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise] ; see also
infra note 1 08 and accompanying text (recognizing the roles that both science and
policy play in risk assessments) .
94 See GAIL CHARNLEY, DEMOCRATIC SCIENCE:
ENHANCING TH E ROLE OF SCIENCE
IN STAKEHOLDER-BASED RISK MANAGEMENT DECISION-MAKING (2000) (" [R] isk assess
ment generally constitutes the vehicle for including science in risk management deci
sion-making . . . . [ R] isk assessment is based on science to the extent possible and on
judgment when necessary. ") , available at h ttp:/ /www .epa.gov/sab/pdf/ eccm0 1006
appne.pdf; Frank Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L . 887, 889-90, 90 n.5
( 1 994) (" [Even though] purely scientific judgments contain underlying values [ , ] [i] n
the case of risk assessment . . . the overriding value is accuracy [in determining] . . . the
objective probability of an event's occurrence. Value judgments are largely irrelevant
to the probabilistic determination of scientific risk." (footnote omitted) ) .
95 NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 18-19; see also NAT'L ACAD. OF PU B.
ADMIN., supra note 89, at 37 (" [Risk management] includes a wide array of actions
such as writing and enforcing regulations, providing information and technical assis
tance, and establishing market incentives for risk reduction . " ) ; RISK COMM'N, supra
note 9 1 , at 2 (finding that "risk management is th e process of identifying, evaluating,
selecting, and implementing actions to reduce risk to human health and to ecosys
tems" for the purpose of adopting "scientifically sound, cost-effective, integrated ac
tions that reduce or preven t risks while taking into account social, cultural, ethical, po
litical, and legal considerations") .
% NAS/NRC RED BO OK , supra note 90, at 1 9 ; see also Oren, supra note 1 8, at
1 0,660 (" [T] he decision of who should be protected, and what effects they should be
protected against, is an ethical decision, not a scientific one .") .
97 NAT ' L RESEARCH COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING RISK:
INFORMING DECISIONS IN A
DEMOCRATI C SOCIElY 2 6 ( 1 996) .
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environmental standards is primarily a policy, rather than a scientific,
98
un dertaking.
While risk assessment is thus conventionally understood to be
predominantly ( but not exclusively) a scientific undertaking, risk
management decisions, including the selection of regulatory stan
dards, require making value judgments that extend beyond the scope
99
of science.
The Red Book recommended that regulatory agencies
"maintain a clear conceptual distinction between assessment of risks
and consideration of risk management altematives; that is, the scien
tific findings and policy j udgments embodied in risk assessments
should be explicitly distinguished from the political , economic, and
technical considerations that influence the design and choice of regu.
, 1 00
1 atory strateg:tes.

98 In the Court's 1 980 review of the Occupational Safety and Health Act's (OSHA)
benzene occupational exposure standard, Justice Marshall's dissen ting opinion stated:
[W] hen the question involves determination of the acceptable level of risk,
the ultimate decision must necessarily be based on considerations of policy as
well as empirically verifiable facts. Factual determinations can at most define
the risk in some statistical way; the judgment whether that risk is tolerable
cannot be based solely on a resolution of the facts.
Indus. Union Dep't v. Am . Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 706 ( 1 980) ( Marshall, ] . , dis
senting) . The plurality opinion responded directly to Justice Marshall's policy argu
ment: "We agree. Thus, while the Agency must support its finding that a certain level
of risk exists by substantial evidence, we recognize that its determination that a particu
lar level of risk is 'significant' will be based largely on policy considerations." Id. at 656
n.62 (plurality opinion ) ; see also EDLEY, supra note 6, at 75 (noting that in setting new
OSHA standards " [s] cience alone . . . cannot determine what to do with [th e ] uncer
tainties" and that " [ t]he science is inseparable from the value choices which are the
familiar grist of political decision making") .
99 See WILLIAM W. LOWRANCE, OF ACCEPTABLE RISK 75-76 ( 1 976) ( "Determining
safety, then, involves two extremely different kinds of activities . . . . Measuring risk
measuring the probability and severity of harm-is an empirical, scientific activity; Judg
ing safe ty-judging the accep tability of risks-is a normative, political activity. " ) ;
Fisher, supra note 4 1 , a t 1 30 (" [Risk] standards are normative prescriptions which re
quire the balancing of different social and political factors and the consideration of
scientific and other specialist information in the context of scientific uncertainty." ) ; see
also Jocelyn Kaiser, Showdown over Clean Air Science, 277 SCIENCE 466, 469 ( 1 99 7 ) ("De
ciding whether to set a stringent standard . . . 'becomes a value judgment. It's not a
scientific question. "' (quoting environmental heal th scien tist Arthur Upton ) ) .
100
NAS/NRC RED BOOK, supra note 90, at 7. Even though the authors of the Red
Book argued for conceptual clarity in distinguishing between risk assessment and risk
management, this does not mean that they did not acknowledge that policy considera
tions entered into the risk assessment process. See id. ( noting "the scientific findings
and policy judgments embodied in risk assessments") ; see also Jasanoff, supra note 33,
at 1 7 1 (arguing that the Red Book "definitively established that most of the determina
tions made in the process of carcinogenic risk assessment involve a mixture of science
and policy") .
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In other contexts, EPA has endorsed and relied on the NASI
101
NRC 's distinction between risk assessment and risk management.
For example, in a recent EPA guidance document on conducting
risk analysis, EPA directed Agency staff to separate risk assessment
from risk management, with risk assessment involving the selection ,
evaluation , and presentation of "scientific information," but not "deci
sions on the acceptability of any risk level for protecting public health
102
In contrast, EPA noted
or selecting procedures for reducing risks."
that risk management decisions should be based on, to the extent
101

EPA describes the "risk assessment/risk management paradigm" as an "impor
tant Agency organizing principle." Office of Research and Development, EPA, Risk
Assessment, at h ttp:/ / www . epa.gov/ord/ h tm/risk.htm ( last visited Feb. 1 0 , 2004) ; accord
William D . Ruckelshaus, Risk, Science, and Democracy , ISSUES SCI. & TECH . , Spring 1 985,
at 1 9, 28 (representing a former two-time EPA Administrator's view that there should
be a "strict distinction" between risk assessment and risk management "in all statutes
seeking to deal with risk" ) ; see also Announcement of Preliminary Determinations for
Priority Contaminants on the Drinking Water Contaminant List, 67 Fed. Reg. 38,222,
38,225 (June 3, 2002) (noting that EPA's overall approach to research on drinking
water contaminants "is closely aligned with the 1 983 National Research Council ( NRC)
risk assessment/risk management paradigm" ) .
Risk assessment . . . defines the potential adverse health consequences of ex
posure to a toxic agent. The other component, risk management, combines
risk assessmen t with . . . socioeconomic, technical, political, and other consid
erations, in order to decide whether to con trol future exposure to the sus
pec ted toxic agent and, if so, the nature and level of control.
Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,926, 26,928 ( May 1 4,
1 998) .

[R] isk assessmen t and risk management are two distinct activities. The former
involves the evaluation of the likelihood of adverse effects, while the latter in
volves the selection of a course of action in response to an iden tified risk that
is based on many fac tors (e.g., social, legal, political, or economic) in addition
to the risk assessment results.
Guidelines for Ecological Risk Assessment, 63 Fed. Reg. 26,846, 26,852 ( May 1 4 , 1 998) ;
see also Proposed Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 6 1 Fed. Reg. 1 7 ,960,
1 7 ,960 (Apr. 23, 1 996) (citing NAS/NRC report as recommending risk assessment
guidelines "to ensure that the risk assessment process was maintained as a scientific
effort separate from risk management") ; Guidelines for Developmental Toxicity Risk
Assessment, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,798, 63,800 (Dec. 5 , 1 99 1 ) ("Risk assessment . . . defines
the potential adverse health consequences of exposure to a toxic agent," while risk
management "combines risk assessment with . . . socioeconomic, technical, political,
and other considerations .") ; Guidelines for Carcinogen Risk Assessment, 5 1 Fed. Reg.
33,992, 33,992-93 (Sept. 24, 1 986) (stipulating that risk assessment should "use the
most scien tifically appropriate interpretation" and "be carried out independently from
considerations of the consequences of regulatory action") ; Sci. Pol'y Council, EPA,
Guidance for Risk Characterization, at h ttp :/ /www. epa.gov/OSP/spc/ rcguide .htm (Feb.
1 995) ("In 1 984, EPA endorsed these [NAS/NRC] distinctions between risk assessment
and risk management for Agency use , and later relied on them in developing risk as
sessment guidelines." (endnotes omi tted) ) .
102
Sci. Pol 'y Council, supra note 1 0 1 .
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permissible, a consideration of "technical feasibility (e.g., treatability
and detection limits) , economic, social, political, and legal factors," in
addition to the output of the risk assessment process. 103 According to
the EPA guidance document, "risk assessors and managers should un
derstand that the regulatory decision is usually not determined solely
101 In order to make risk as
by the outcome of the risk assessment."
sessme nts "transparent, " EPA has further stated that it is important
"that the conclusions drawn from the science are identified separately
5
Risk management, the Agency has ac
from policy judgments . " 1 0
knowledged, "goes beyond scientific considerations alone." 106
Of course, in practice the distinction between risk assessmen t and
risk management is surely not as clear cut as the distinction made in
07 This is because policy considerations
the Red Book migh t suggest. 1
almost invariably underlie, and may even dominate, many of the
choices made in conducting a risk assessment, just as they inherently
0
must pervade risk management determinations. 1 8 For this reason, a

1 03

!d. ; see also E PA, SCI EN CE POLICY CO UN CIL HANDBOOK: RlSK CH ARACTERI
ZATION 5 1 ( 2000) ("The scientific risk assessmen t and its peer review provide the
sound scien tific underpinnings for a decision. H owever, it is only one of the many fac
tors that a decision maker considers in arriving at a final environmental decision . " ) .
104
Sci. Pol'y Council, supra note 1 0 1 .
IW•
Draft Water Quality Criteria Methodology Revisions: Human Health, 63 Fed.
Reg. 43,756, 43, 769 (Aug. 1 4, 1 998 ) .
106
Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, supra note 1 0 1 , 63 Fed. Reg. at
26,928.
107

See Jasanoff, Science, Politics, and the Renegotiation of Expertise, supra note 93, at
209 ( noting the "impracticability of cleanly separating science from policy" ) .
108
See CARL'\JEGIE COMM'N ON SCI . , TECH . , & Gov'T, RlSK AND THE El'<'V IRONMENT:
IMPROVING REG LiLATORY DECISION MAKl G 69 ( 1 99 3 ) ( "The lines between science , sci
ence policy, and policy are fuzzy and wavering. " ) ; MARC K. LANDY ET AL. , ENVI
RONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY: AsKING THE WRONG QUESTIONS 1 86 ( 2d ed. 1 99 4 )
(" [T] here is no way to make a simple separation between the 'scientific' and the ' pol
icy' aspects of labeling a compound 'carcinogenic . "' ) ; Mary R. English , Can Risk As
sessment and Risk Prioritization Be Extricated from Risk Management ?, in RlSK AsSESSMENT IN
SETTING NATIONAL PRIORITIES 495, 496 (james J. Bonin & Donald E. Stevenson eds.,
1 989) (arguing that many risk assessments require policy considerations ) ; Sheila Jasa
noff, B1idging the Two Cultures of Risk Analysis, 1 3 RlSK ANALYSIS 1 2 3, 1 29 ( 1 99 3 )
(" [T] he principles by which we organize the 'facts' of risk have to derive, at least in
part, from underlying concerns of public policy . . . . " ) ; Sheila Jasanoff, Relating Risk
Assessment and Risk lVIanagement: Complete Separation of the Two Processes is a i\1isconception,
1 9 EPA J . 35, 35 ("Risk assessmen t . . . requires the exercise of subjec tive j udg
ment . . . [which] must remain sensitive to the pol icy context. ") ; Howard Kunreuther
& Paul Slovic, s·cience, Values, and Risk, 545 ANNALS A!vl. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 1 1 6,
1 1 9 ( 1 996) ( discussing "the subjective and value-laden nature of risk assessme n t") ;
Paul Slovic, Trust, t,1notion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk Assessment Battle
field, 1 99 7 U . C H I . L EGAL F. 59, 95 ( 1 997) ("Risk assessment is inherently subjective
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subsequent National Research Council report has cautioned against
making a strict separation in practice between the conceptually dis
tinct aspects of risk assessment and risk management because nonsci
entific considerations, including policy concerns and deliberation, are
109
relevant to risk assessment.
That said, agencies and commentators
continue to maintain that, notwithstanding the unavoidable in trusion
of certain policy considerations, the process of risk assessment re
mains primarily a scientific undertaking that should be treated as
largely distinct from the policy-dominated domain of risk management.

uo

For the purposes of this Article, the debate over how sharply to
distinguish risk assessment from risk management is not crucial be
cause it is a debate that focuses on how to characterize the risk as
Ill
sessmen t enterprise.
Those who reject a strict dichotomy between
risk assessment and risk management do so because they conclude

and represents a blending of science and j udgment with importan t psychological, so
cial, cultural, and political fac tors.") .
109
NAT' L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 97, at 34.
1 10
See, e.g. , I nternational Standard-Setting Activities, 67 Fed . Reg. 37,760, 37,77071 (May 30, 2002) (defining risk assessment as a "scien tifically based process" and risk
management as a "process, distinct from risk assessment, of weighing policy alterna
tives . . . and, if needed, selecting appropriate prevention and control options" ) ;
Guidelines for Neurotoxicity Risk Assessment, supra note 1 0 1 , 63 Fed. Reg. a t 26,950
(distinguishing risk characterization (assessment) from risk management and noting
that " [t] he risk manager uses the results of the risk characterization along with other
technological, social, and economic considerations in reaching a regulatory decision ") ;
Bernard D . Goldstein, l( Risk Management Is Broke, Why F'ix Risk Assessment ?, 1 9 EPA J.
37, 37 (" [R] isk management is contextual, with the best decision being related to time
and place, while risk assessment inherently embraces the concept that there is a single
right assessment for all time.") ; Howard Raiffa, Science and Policy: TheiT Sepamtion and
Integration in Risk A nalysis, in THE RISK ANALYSIS CONTROVERSY: AN I NSTITUTIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 27, 28 (Howard C. Kun reuther & Eryl V. Ley eds., 1 982) (distinguishing
between risk "assessment" and risk "evaluation") ; Ruckelshaus, supra note 1 0 1 , at 28
("It is impossible to evaluate the merits of these positions without first drawing a dis
tinction between the assessment of risk and the process of deciding what to do about
it, which is 'risk management. "') ; see also GRAH AM ET A L . , sujna note 89, at 2 1 8 ( calling
for a "neoseparationist" approach which would entail "a good-faith attempt by regula
tory institutions to address separately and explicitly the extent of risks from chemical
exposures and the acceptability of such risks") .
111
See, e.g., CARNEGIE COMM'N O N SCI., TECH., & Gov'T, sujJra note 1 08, a t 7 8 (ac
knowledgin g that risk assessment can be "assumption- and value-laden") ; LANDY ET A L . ,
supra note 1 08, at 200 ("Risk assessment is an e nterprise that is neither wholly scientific
nor wholly independent of science .") ; Terry Davies, Risk Assessment in Environmental
Policy, EARTH MATTER.') 8 (Mar. 1 999) (noting that "the practice of risk assessment has,
from the beginning, been a hybrid mixture of science and non-science") , available at
http:/ / www . earthinsti tu te .columbia.edu/libraryI earth matters/ march99 /Pages/ pageS
.html.
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that social values inevitably enter into (or should enter into) risk as
sessment judgments, not because they believe risk management deci
11 2
In the debate over the separa
sions can be based solely on science .
tion of risk assessment and risk management, neither side disputes
113
that risk management decisions are normative .
We have highlighted the distinction between risk assessment and
risk management here because a decision about where to set an air
114
quality standard falls squarely in the domain of risk management.

112

See, e.g. , H oward Lati n , Good Science, Bad Regulation, and Toxic Risk Assessment, 5
REG. 89, 90 ( 1 988) (challenging the conventional separation between risk
assessment and risk management by arguing that "social policy considerations must
play as prominent a role in the choice of risk estimates [i.e., risk assessment] as in the
ultimate determination of which predicted risks should be deemed unacceptable [i.e.,
risk management] ") . I n part, this criticism emerges because the conventional separa
ti on between risk assessment and risk manage ment serves to draw a boundary that may
make i t appear as if risk assessment is a purely scientific enterprise . See, e.g. , BYRD &
COTHERN, supra note 93, at 335 (noting that risk assessors at times "attempt to dis
guise . . . values and ethics in some decisions with scientific or technical labels") . Of
course , demarcating where science ends and policy begins, sometimes referred to as
"boundary work," is seldom easy or uncontestable. See generally THO MAS F. GIERYN,
CULTURAL BOUNDARIES OF SCIENCE: CRE D IBILI1Y ON THE LINE 66 ( 1 999) ("Boundary
work gets especially interesting when it happens in places of power, for the demarca
tion games played out there often have large consequences for the symbolic and mate
rial conditions of scientific work." ) ; Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundaries of Science, in
HANDBOOK OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY STUDIES 393, 393 (Sheila Jasanoff et al. eds.,
rev. ed. 1 995) (focusing on "the "boundary problem" in science and technology stud
ies: Where does science leave off, and society-or technology-begin? Where is the
border between science and non-science?") .
tu
See generally Ralph L . Keeney, The Role of Values in Risk Management, 545 fu"\INALS
AtvL ACAD. POL. & Soc. SC I . 1 26, 1 34 (concluding that "values are crucial to risk man
agement") .
1 14
The development of a regulatory standard is th e quintessential risk manage
ment decision. See N AT ' L ACAD . OF PUB. AD MIN, supra note 89, at 37 ( n oting that
risk management includes "writing and enforcing regulations") ; RISK COMM'N, supra
note 9 1 , at 2 (describing the "traditional definition" as referring " to the process of
evaluating alternative regulatory actions and selecting among them," though arguing
for a still broader conception of risk management to include volun tary, private sector
initiatives) , available at h ttp:/ /www . epa.gov/ncea/pdfs/riskcom/riskcom l .pdf; Fisher,
supra note 4 1 , at 1 1 3 (arguing tha t "risk regulation standards are regulative and thus
nonnative prescriptions") . EPA has frequently characterized air quality standard se tting
as a risk managemen t process. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for H azardous Air
Pollutants: Pesticide Ac tive Ingredient Production , 64 Fed. Reg. 33,550, 33,553 ( to be
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 63) (June 23, 1 99 9 ) (noting that " [ t] h e E PA's risk man
agement strategy could include the development of risk based emission standards un
der the [ Clean Air Act] " ) ; National Ambien t Air Quality Standards for Particulate Mat
ter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,652, 38,668 ( to be codified at 40 C . F.R. p t. 5 0 ) (July 1 8 , 1 99 7 )
(referring to the risk manageme n t for a "sho rt-term . . . standard" ) ; National Ambient
Air Quality Standards for Ozone and Particulate Matter, 6 1 Fed. Reg. 29 , 7 1 9 , 29,723
( to be codified at 40 C.F.R. p t. 50) (June 1 2 , 1 996) (describing EPA's decision as one
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EPA's national ambient air quality standards represent the core risk
management objectives for the nation, with significant regulatory
ramifications depending on the levels at which these standards are set.
Areas of the country that do not attain a level of air quality meeting
NAAQS are subj ect to more stringent regulatory controls, such as
standards for reformulated gasoline, automobile inspection and main
tenance programs, and tighter federal standards for the development
of new sources of pollution . 1 1 5 In setting NAAQS, or any other regula
tory standard, EPA officials need to draw upon the available scientific
evidence on the health effects of different pollutants , but ul timately
they must make a decision based on factors other than j ust the sci
ence. Standing alone , scientific data on ozone and particulate matter
do not, and cannot, provide a principled j ustification for the level at
116
which the respe ctive air quality standards are set.

o f "selecting a suite o f standards that would focus risk management approaches") ;
Proposed Requirements for Designation of Reference and Equivalent Meth ods for
PM2 ,, and Ambient Air Quality Surveillance for Particulate Matter, 6 1 Fed. Reg. 65,780,
65,793 (Dec. 1 3, 1 996) ( to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 53, 58) (referrin g to "the risk
management approach of the proposed new PM2 5 NAAQS") ; Revised Requirements
for Designation of Reference and Equivalent Methods for PM2.5 and Ambient Air Qual
ity Surveillance for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,764, 38,780 (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. p ts. 53, 58) (july 1 8, 1 997) (noting EPA's "risk managemen t approach" in set
ting NAAQS) ; NESHAPS: Final Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Hazardous
Waste Combustors, 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 52,841 ( to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63,
260, 26 1 , 264, 265, 266, 270, 27 1 ) (Sept. 30, 1 999) (characterizing decisions abou t "the
protectiveness of the MACT standards" as "national risk management decisions" ) ; Na
tional Emission Standards For Hazardous Air Pollutants : Standards for Inorgan ic Ar
senic, 5 1 Fed. Reg. 27,956, 27,957 ( to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 6 1 ) (Aug. 4 , 1 986)
(describing EPA's "Risk Management Approach" to selecting standards) ; National
Emission Standards For Hazardous Air Pollutants: Regulation of Radionuclides, 49
Fed. Reg. 43,906, 43,909 ( Oct. 3 1 , 1 984) ( to be codified at 40 C.F.R. p t. 6 1 ) ( " [T] he
individual facts, calculational operations, scientific judgments , and esti mates of uncer
tainty [are] documented and integrated in a clear and logical manner to provide a risk
assessment that can be used as a scientific basis for risk management purposes, i . e . ,
standard-setting.") .
l l '•
See 42 U .S.C. § 7503 (a) , (c) (2000) ( permit requirements) ; id. § 7507 ( new mo
tor vehicle emissions standards) ; id. § 75 l l a (state submission requirements) ; id.
§ 75 1 2 (a) ( classification and attainment dates for n onattainment areas) ; id. § 75 1 3
(additional classification and attainment dates) ; id. § 7545 (fuel regulation) .
1 1 1'
See Lead Indus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 46 (D.C. Cir. 1 980) (recognizing that
the selection of a NAAQS "presents complex questions of science, law, and social pol
icy under the Act" ) ; Reauthmization of the Clean Ai-r Act Reauthorization: Hearing Befo-re
the Senate Subwmm. on Clean Ai-r, Wetlands, Private Property and Nuclear Safety of the Cornm.
on Env 't & Pub. Wo-rks, 1 06th Con g. ( 1 999) (statement of John D . Graham, former Di
rector of the Harvard Center for Risk Analysis) [hereinafter Graham Testimony]
(" [S] cien tific information (alone) does not typically provide an intelligible basis for
the setting of safe (yet non-zero) amounts of air pollution.") ; Morton Lippmann, Role
of Science Advismy Groups in Establishing StandaTds for Ambient Air Pollutants, 6 AEROSOL
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C. The Clean A ir Act and the Problem of Non-Threshold Pollutants
Given the way the Clean Air Act has been written and interpreted,
scholars have sometimes suggested that EPA not only can , but legally
must, base its NAAQS decisions solely on science. For example, Pro
fessor Lisa Heinzerling has argued that EPA properly revised its stan
dards "based on mounting scientific evidence of the harmfulness of
these pollutants at levels allowed by the existing standards." 1 1 7 Simi
larly, Professor Robert Percival has argued that the "EPA ' s determina
tion of what levels of air pollution harm health has consistently been
understood to require a judgment based on science, not econom
ics. "1 1 8 It is true that the Clean Air Act specifies the steps EPA must
take in setting or revising its air quality standards/ 1 9 and that these
steps have been interpreted to preclude the consideration of costs. 1 20
But even though the statute may constrain EPA in certain ways, it re
mains inherently necessary to make risk management policy judg
ments when setting air quality standards.
As noted earlier, the Clean Air Act provides that in promulgating
a new or revised NAAQS, EPA must draw upon a "criteria documen t"
Scr. & TECH . 93, 1 1 4 ( 1 987) (suggesting that with respect to setting NAAQS standards,
" [s] cience and scientists cannot so lve all of the EPA's problems" ) ; Oren , supra note 1 8 ,
a t 1 0 ,660 (arguing that "the decision of who should b e protected, and what effects they
should be protected against, is an ethical decision , not a scientific one " ) . For a discus
sion of policy principles applicable to setting air quality standards, see infra Part I II .A.
117
Lisa He inzerling, The Clean Air Act and the Constitution, 20 ST. LOUIS U . PUB. L.
REv. 1 2 1 , 1 22 (200 1 ) . Heinzerling also has claimed that EPA's "standards [were]
promulgated based on this body of scien tific evidence." !d.; see also David M. Driesen,
Sustainable Development and Air Quality: The Need to Replace Basic Technologies with Cleaner
A.ltematives, 32 E nvtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L . I nst. ) 1 0,277, 1 0,282 ( Mar. 2002) (n oting that
" [ t] he revised standards reflec t new health data" ) ; Thomas 0. McGarity, The Clean Air
Act at a Crossmads: Statutmy Interpretation and Longstanding Administrative Practice in the
Shadow of the Delegation Doct-rine, 9 N .Y. U . El\iVfL. LJ. 1 , 2 ( 2000) (stating that each time
EPA has established or revised a NAAQS "the Agency based its decision on one or
more air quality criteria documents that set out in considerable detail the available sci
e n tific information on the adverse heal th effects of the relevant pollutan ts") . To be
s ure, science could demonstrate that health effects occurred at levels of exposure be
low current standards, but this scie n tific evidence by itself cannot be used to justify a
decision about whe re a standard should be set. Supra note 89 and accompanying text.
m Robert V. Percival, joint Cen ter Amici Brief Misses the Mark (AEI-Brookings Joint
Ctr. fo r Regulatory Studies, Policy Matters No. 00-1 1 , 1 990 ) , available at h ttp : / / vw.'W.
aei. brookings. org/ policyI page. ph p ::>id=55 .
.
1 1'1
Supra notes 47-50 and accompanymg text.
1�0
See Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass'ns, 53 1 U.S. 457, 464-70 ( 200 1 ) ( findin� that
Congress' instructions to EPA to set air quality standards do not allow consideration of
"the costs of achieving such a standard" ) ; Lead Indus. , 647 F.2d at 1 1 48 (stating that
"economic considerations play no part in the promulgation of ambient air quality
standards") .
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that reflects "the latest scientific knowledge" of the health effects of
12
the relevant pollutant. 1 Then, under section 1 09 of the Act, EPA is
to set a standard that is "requisite to protect the public health " with
2
"an adequate margin of safety. " 1 2 The legislative history of the Clean
Air Act provides some additional guidance for construing the brief
statutory language . In 1 9 70, when the current language of section 1 09
was enacted, the Senate Report stated that the objective of air quality
standards was to ensure "an absence of adverse effects on the health of
a statistically related sample of persons in sensitive groups." 123 NAAQS
were intended to protect susceptible groups such as "bronchial asth
matics and emphysematics who in the normal course of daily activity
are exposed to the ambient environment." 12 4 Based on this language ,
EPA and the courts have construed section 1 09 to require air quality
standards to "be set at a level at which there is 'an absence of adverse
effect' on . . . sensitive individuals." 1 25
Moreover, NAAQS must provide a "margin of safety" to ensure
that " ' a reasonable degree of protection is to be provided against haz
1
ards which research has not yet identified. "' 26 Thus, at least as re
flected in the 1 970 Senate Report, EPA was required to set NAAQS at
a level that would ensure no detectable adverse health effects in even
susceptible subgroups of the population, and then to add an addi
tional margin of safety to protect against unknown health risks that
may be discovered in the future . In short, the NAAQS were appar
ently intended to provide near-absolute protection against adverse
health effects.

121

4 2 U.S. C. § 7408 (a) ( 2 ) (2000) .
Id. § 7 409 (b) ( 1 ) .
1 2:1
S. RE P . No. 9 1 - 1 1 96, at 10 ( 19 70 ) . The Senate explained tha t an adequate
sample is "the number of persons necessary to test in order to detect a deviation in the
h ealth of any person wj thin such sensitive group which is attributable to the condition
of the ambient air." Id.
124
Id.
12''
Lead Indus. , 647 F.2d at 1 1 5 3 ; see also Whitman, 5 3 1 U.S. at 464-65 ( agreeing
with the approach taken by the D.C. Circuit in Lead In dustries) .
126
Lead Indus. , 647 F.2d at 1 1 50 (quoting S. REP . No. 9 1 - 1 1 96, at 2-3 ( 1 9 70) ) ; see
also id. at 1 1 54 ( observing that the margin of safety requireme n t was i n tended to pro
tect against health effects "wh ich have not ye t been uncovered by researc h " ) . Accord
ing to EPA:
The margin of safety requirement was in tended to address uncertainties asso
ciated with inconclusive scientific and technical information available at the
time of standard setting, as well as to provide a reasonable degree of protec
tion against hazards that research has not ye t iden tified . Both kinds of uncer
tainties are component<> of the risk associated wi th pollution at levels below
1 22
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The statutory provisions for adopting NAAQS, initially enacted in
their present form in 1 970, are based on the assumption that pollut
ants have thresholds for which it is possible to set a "safe" level. 127
Such a "threshold pollutant" causes adverse effects only above a cer
tain exposure level, designated as the threshold level. In contrast, a
"non-threshold" pollutant is one that may cause adverse effects at any
[98
level above zero exposure. For threshold pollutants, it would appear as if science alone might
be sufficient to determine the level at which an air quality standard
should be set. If a pollutant shows a clear threshold, the science
would presumably provide the basis for using this threshold as a "safe"
point below which the regulator could be assured the complete pro
tection of public health. Yet even with threshold pollutants, some
j udgments would still be required on the part of the Administrator. 1 29
Moreover, even when the standard is set below the threshold level, the
Administrator must make a clear policy judgment in selecting an
those at which human health effects can be said to occur with reasonable sci
entific certainty.
EPA, Ozone Final Rule , supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,857; see also EPA, PM Final
Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,653 (same ) .
127
See Clean Ai-r Act Amendments of 19 77: Hearing Befo-re the Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollu
tion of the Senate Comm. on Env 't & Pub. Works, 95th Cong. , 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 8 ( 1 977)
(statement of Sen . Edmund Muskie, Member, Senate Subcomm. on Envtl. Pollution)
("The Clean Air Act is based on the assumption , although we knew at the time it was
inaccurate, that there is a threshold. " ) ; Joseph M. Feller, Non-Threshold Pollutants and
Air Quality Standa-rds, 24 Er-..rvrL. L. 82 1 , 823 ( 1 994) ("A critical . . . assumption under
lies . . . the structure of the Clean Air Act . . . . The assu mption is that, for each pollut
ant of concern, thet·e is a threshold concentration, represented by the NAAQS, above
which the pollutant is a threat to health or welfare and below wh ich i t is not.") ; William
K. Reilly, FoTewoTd to ROBERT D. FRIEDMAN, SENSITIVE POPULATIONS A D ENVIRON
MENTAL STANDARDS, at vii, vii ( 1 98 1 ) ("The Clean Air Act incorporates the notion of
threshold values of pollutants, levels below which there are presumed to be no adverse
health effects, and requires that standards be set on the basis of the threshold, with a
maq�in of safety. ") .
.
28
See Natural Res. Def Council v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1 1 46, 1 1 48 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) (de
fining a "non-threshold" pollutant as one that "appears to create a risk to health at all
non-zero levels of emission ") . A non-threshold pollutant is always defi ned provision
ally, because it is "impossible to scien tifically prove the absence of a threshold, as one
can never prove a negative . " David L. Eaton & Curtis D. Klaassen , Principles of Toxicol
ogy, in CAsARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: TH E BASIC SCIENCE OF POISO S 1 1 , 2 1
(Curtis D . Klaassen ed., 6th ed. 200 1 ) .
129
Judgment would be needed in ( l ) evaluating the scientific evidence indicating
that a threshold exists, (2) determining that the threshold has been adequately speci
fied, and (3) defining what co unt<> as an "adverse effect" covered by the threshold.
Judgment would also be needed to determine whether the threshold protected suscep
tible groups and accounted for interindividual variability in response to the pollutant
in question.
.
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"adequate margin of safety" to protect against uncertain or unknown
'�
health effects at lower exposure levels. 1 0
The need for making a policy judgment is still clearer for non
threshold pollutants. Unlike with threshold pollutants, where a stan
dard can be set at a level below the threshold to provide complete
health protection, the only way to protect against the entire contin
uum of adverse health effects from a non-threshold pollutant would
131
be to set a standard at the level of zero. As a result, when regulators
set standards for non-threshold pollutants at levels above zero, they
must, at least implicitly, do so based on some criteria other than the
science, since the science indicates that health effects likely occur at
levels below the standard selected by the regulators.
It turns out that few, if any, criteria pollutants regulated under the
Clean Air Act exhibit a clear threshold. 1 32 The scientific data for
ozone and fine PM indicate a continuum of health effects down to
background (or natural) concentrations of the pollutants i n the air, at
which point the health effects associated with the pollutants cannot be
distinguished from effects caused by other factors. 1 33 In other words,
there is no identifiable threshold below which a standard for ozone or
particulate matter could be set to avoid all health effects. 1 34
·

1 30
131

42 U.S.C. § 7409 (b) ( l ) (2000) .
See Sunstein, supra note 1 8 , at 3 1 5 (noting that the apparent continuum of bio

logical responses to ozone "means that the paradigm of selecting a standard at the
lowest-observable-effects-level and then providing an 'adequate margin of safety' is not
possible") .
J:l 2 According to one report:
In no case is there evidence that the threshold levels have a clear physiological
meaning, in the sense that there are genuine adverse health effects at or
above some level of pollution, but no e ffects at all below that level. On the
contrary, evidence indicates that the amount of health damage varies with the
upward and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant, and
with no sharp lower limit.
NAT ' L ACAD. OF SC I . & NAT ' L ACAD. OF ENG ' G , AIR QUALI1Y AND AUTOMOTIVE
EMISSION CONTROL, S. DOC. No. 93-24, at 1 7 ( 1 974) [hereinafter NAS/NAE ) .
u3 See, e.g. , EPA, EPA 's Updated Clean AiT StandaTds:
A Common Sense Primer, at
http:/ / www. epa.gov/oar/primer/science.htm (Sept. 1 997) (stating that " [ t] he scien
tific community, EPA, Congress and the courts have long recognized there is no health
threshold for ozone and o ther air pollutants-in other words, no specific-level at which
all people can be fully-protected") ; Heinzerling, supra note 1 1 7, at 1 22 (acknowledging
that, at the time of E PA's decision, "the existing evidence seemed to point to the pos
sibility that there is no level at which ozone exerts no effect whatsoever on the human
body" ) ; see also infra notes 1 46-50 and accompanying text ( describing Congress' ac
knowledgment of the absence of thresholds) .
1�1
Lisa Heinzerling has sought to downplay the inherent policy j udgment called
fo r in NAAQS decision making by arguing that EPA never definitively determined that

2004]

LIMITS OF SCIENCE IN SETI1NG RISK STANDARDS

1 287

EPA acknowledged this point in its rulemaking. With respect to
ozone, EPA stated that ozone "may elicit a continuum of biological re
sponses down to background concentrations" and that "in the absence
of any discernable threshold, it is not possible to . . . identify a level at
which it can be concluded with confidence that no 'adverse ' effects
are likely to occur. " 135 Moreover, the Agency specifically rejected in
dustry arguments that the health evidence for ozone indicated the ex
istence of a threshold, responding that the available evidence sug
gested "a linear relationship down to a background level of 0.04
ppm." 1 36 For fine PM, EPA speculated that a threshold might exist,
but acknowledged that "the level or even existence of population
thresholds below which no effects occur cannot be reliably deter
mined by an examination of the results from the available studies." 1 37
ozone and particulate matter had adverse health effects down to zero. She has written:
EPA's obsen1ation that particulate matter and ozone may be "nonthreshold"
pollutants was nothing more than an admission that the agency had not
proven the existence of a level at which these pollutants had no effects on
human health . . . . It was also not a claim that the agency would regard all
such effects on health, if detected, to be sufficiently "adverse" to warrant a
regulatory response. Nor was i t a claim that the agency would regard all such
effects to be effects on public health within the meaning of the Clean Air Act.
Heinzerling, supra note 1 1 7, at 1 26 (footnotes omitted) . This argument misses the
point. Even though the Agency did not definitively demonstrate health effects all the
way to zero, i ts own analyses indicated that there were health effects below the levels at
which it chose to set its standards, including in the case of PM, a substantial number of
premature deaths every year, which certainly must be considered "adverse." Moreover,
EPA most certainly did need to make a policy judgment in deciding that some effects
were not "sufficiently 'adverse"' to warrant protectio n . The Agency knew that there
would be many individuals who would suffer health effec ts at levels of exposure per
mitted by EPA's standards, and i t strongly suspected that there would always be such
i ndividuals so long as there was some level of ozone or particulate matter in the air.
Infra Part II.B-C. Choosing to disregard these effects in setting its regulatory standard
may well have been reasonable and even j ustified, but it was a clear policy choice that
EPA failed to acknowledge openly and explain adequately. For further criticism of
Heinzerling's argument, see Richard ]. Pierce, Jr., The Appropriate Role of Costs in Envi
ronmental Regulation, 54 ADM IN . L. REv. 1 237, 1 26 1 -65 (2002 ) .
m EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8 , 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted) .
EPA further acknowledged that "no standard within the range of levels and forms con
sidered in this review, including the selecte d standard, is risk free , due to the contin
uum of risk likely posed by exposures to ambient n, [ozone] potentially down to back
ground levels." Id. at 38,873.
1 36
EPA, RESPONSES TO SIGNIFICANT COMMENTS ON THE 1996 PROPOSED RCLE ON
THE NATIONAL AivfBIENT AIR QUALI1Y STANDARDS FOR OZONE 81 (Docke t No. A-95-58,
] 997) [hereinafter EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS] ; see also id. at 84 ("There is
clear evidence from hospital admission studies that effects continue down to back
ground." ) .
1:1? EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. a t 38,670; see also Am. Trucking
Ass'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1034 (D.C. Cir. 1 999) ("EPA regards ozone definitely,
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CASAC, the advisory committee that must review the scientific ba
sis of EPA's criteria document and NAAQS standards/ 38 concurred
with EPA that "the weight of the health effects evidence indicates that
there is n o threshold concentration for the onset of biological re
sponses due to exposure to ozone above background concentra
tions. " 1 39 Rather, "it appears that ozone may elicit a continuum of bio
logical responses down to background concentrations." 1 40 Likewise, in
its review of particulate matter, CASAC concluded that " [a] s with
ozone, there appears to be no apparent threshold for biological re
sponses to PM exposures." 1 4 1 According to CASAC, the absence of a
demonstrated threshold implies "that the paradigm of selecting a
standard at the lowest-observable-effects-level and then providing an
'adequate margin of safety' is no longer possible." 142 For ozone, CA
SAC also concluded that "there is no 'bright line ' that distinguishes
any of the proposed standards (either the level or the number of al
lowable exceedences) as being significantly more protective of health"
and thus "the selection of a specific level and number of allowable ex
ceedences is a policy judgment." 1 43 In testimony to Congress, the
Chair of CASAC reiterated that "the decisions to select a given level or
number of allowable exceedences within [EPA's] proposed ranges
cannot be based on science;" 144 rather, the selection of a particular
standard was "strictly a policy j udgment." 1 45
The absence of clear thresholds for these pollutants was a well
known fact to members of Congress during deliberations over the
1 977 amendments to the Clean Air Act, if not earlier. 1 46 Senator
and PM likely, as non-threshold pollutants, i.e., ones that have some possibility of some
adverse health impact (however slight) at any exposure level above zero . ") .
138 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (d) (2) (2000) .
139 Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Commit
tee , to Administrator Carol M. Browner 2 (Nov. 30, 1 995) , available at h ttp:/ / www. epa.
govI sabI pdf/ casac02 . pdf.
Ho
Id.
1 4 1 Letter from Dr. George T. Wolff, Chair, Clean Air Scientific Advisory Commit
tee , to Administrator Carol M. Browner 3 (Jan . 5 , 1 996) , available at http:/ /www.epa.
govI sab/ pdf/ casac03. pdf.
140
- Wolff, supra note 1 39 , at 2.
3
14
Id. at 2-3.
4
1 4 EPA Proposed Clean A ir Regulations: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Health
& Env 't and House Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations, 1 05th Cong. 2 ( 1997) (state
ment of George T. Wolff, Chair, EPA's Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee's Pan
els on Ozone and PM) , available at 1 997 WL 1 0569483.
145 Id. at 1 .
6
14
Congress was strongly influenced by a 1 974 report prepared for the Senate
by the National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering which
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Muskie, the primary Senate sponsor of the amendments, observed
that for nearly all criteria pollutants, " [t] here is no threshold health
effect which can be used to say that above this threshold there is dan
14
ger to health and below it there is not." 7 The House likewise ac
knowledged in 1 977 that the "safe threshold" concept underlying sec
tion 1 09 was "at best, a necessary myth" 1 48 since "no safe thresholds can
4
be established." 1 9 Accordingly, the House noted that air quality stan
dards set by EPA at the time had failed to satisfy either of "the two
main safeguards which have been recognized as necessary in the pro
tection of public health: proof of a safe threshold level of exposure
and a fully adequate margin of safety beyond harm levels which have
1 50
already been prove d . ,
In setting air quality standards at any level above zero, the EPA
Administrator is compelled to rely upon some criterion other than the
absolute protection against health effects. As Senator Muskie recog
nized in 1 977:
I

wish i t were possible for t h e Admi nistrator t o s e t national primary and

secon dary standards that fully implem ent the statutory language . . . .
The fact is, as testimony and documents disclose, the standards do n ot
fully protect in accordance with the statutory language which gives the
Administrator authority to provide fo r additional protecti o n .

He has

had to make a pragmatic j udgmen t in the face of the fac t that he fou n d

concluded that, contrary to the assumption underlying the 1970 Act, there were no
thresholds for criteria pollutants. NAS/NAE, supra note 1 32, at 1 7-1 8.
1 47 STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT fu\.1ENDMENTS OF 1977 ( Comm. Print 1 978) , reprinted in
3 COMM. ON ENV'T & PUB. WORKS, 95TH CONG., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN
AIR Acr AME1 DMENTS OF 1 977, at 781 ( 1 978) ( remarks of Sen. Edmund Muskie ) .
Senator Muskie likewise stated:
[T] estimony on the health question over th e last 7 years over and over again
has made the po i n t that there is no such thing as a threshold for health ef
fects. Even at the national primary standard level, which is the health stan
dard, there are health effects that are not protected against.
1 23 CONG. REC. 1 8,460 ( 1 977) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie) .
148 H . R . REP. No. 95-294, at 1 1 1 ( 1 977) .
1-19 Id. at 1 27. The House Report also quoted the National Academy of Sciences in
support of this understanding:
" [ I ] n no case is there evidence that the threshold levels have a clear physio
logical meaning, in the sense that there are genuine adverse health effects at
and above some level of pollution , but no effects at all below that level. On
the contrary, evidence indicates that the amoun t of health damage varies with
the upward and downward variations in the concentration of the pollutant,
with no sharp lower limit."
!d. at 1 1 0 (quoting NAS/NAE, supra note 1 32, at 1 7 ) .
150
!d. at 1 1 1-12.
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there is n o threshold on health effects, which makes i t very difficult the n
to apply absolute health protection , and h e has not been able to do
151
that.

The House recognized that some limits were necessary to prevent
the kind of zero-risk standards that would follow from strict applica
tion of the Clean Air Act to non-threshold pollutants: " Some have
suggested that since the standards are to protect against all known or
anticipated effects and since no safe thresholds can be established, the
ambient standards should [b] e set at zero or background levels . Ob
viously, this no-risk philosophy ignores all economic and social conse
2
quences and is impractical." 1 5 Nevertheless, Congress did not amend
the statutory language of section 1 09 to reflect this recognition. Nor
did it provide any further guidance to EPA on how to justify a nonzero
standard for a non-threshold pollutant in a way that would satisfy the
Clean Air Act's requirement to "protect the public health" with an
.
r
, 1 53
" ad equate margm of sa1ety.
The House 's recognition that a zero-risk approach would "ignore
all economic and social consequences ," however, implicitly demon
strated the inevitable need to incorporate factors other than scientific
evidence about health effects in j ustifying where standards are set for
non-threshold pollutants. Any nonzero standard for a non-threshold
pollutant must inherently take into account economic and social con
siderations in addition to the scientific evidence of health effects,
since a science-only approach that seeks to prevent all "adverse ef
fects" with an "adequate margin of safety" can only be set at zero,
which everyone agrees would be nonsensical.
II. TH E ABANDONMENT OF REASON IN EPA's
AI R QUALITY STANDARD S ETTING
The selection of a NAAQS standard, especially for a non-threshold
pollutant, is a quintessential risk-management decision that, while
drawing on scientific evidence , ultimately turns on social, political,
15
and economic choices . 4 While science provides relevant information
describing the frequency and severity of adverse effects at various
1 '"

123 CONG. REc. 18 ,463 ( 1 977) (statement of Sen. Edmund Muskie ) .
H.R. REP. N o . 95-294, at 1 27 ( 1 977) .
1'>:1 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (b) ( 1 ) (2000) .
1 ''4 Reilly, sujJm note 1 27, at viii ("In the absence of a scien tifically definable
threshold, the decision makers responsible for establish ing a standard are inescapably
forced to make social , not scientific, judgments.") (statement of former Administrator
Reilly before he assumed his position as head of EPA) .
1 ;2
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pollutan t levels, this information, by itself, fails to identify the level at
which to set the standard. As we have detailed, EPA has attempted to
justify its recent NAAQS decisions (as it has earlier ones) based exclu
sively on science, when the selection of such a standard necessarily re
quires policy judgments. 155 EPA's most recent revisions to its ozone
and fine PM NAAQS not only provide yet another case study of the so
called science charade, but, more importantly, they reveal the conse
quences of a regulatory regime that permits, and even encourages,
agencies to cloak their policy decisions in science. When EPA or any
other agency invokes science to justify its regulatory decisions, it fails
to provide the public with a transparent and principled j ustification
for its regulatory decisions. 1 56
In the recent ozone and particulate matter rulemakings, EPA took
a series of inconsistent positions that remained largely hidden behind
the Agency's repeated invocation of science as the basis for its deci
sions. Throughout its rulemakings and subsequen t rounds of litiga
tion , EPA's policy positions resembled shifting sands . For example,
even though the Agency claimed to j ustify its standards based on a
singular concern for evidence of health risks, it explicitly rej ected op
tions that, according to its own analysis, would have provided greater
protection to the public from such risks. 157 In this Part, we present
some of the most significant inconsistencies that emerged in EPA's
rulemaking documents and its arguments in court. EPA's use of sci
ence as a rhetorical defense helped to mask the absence of a coher
ent, principled account for why the Agency revised its ozone and par
ticulate matter standards as it did. ';.s
155 See R. SHEP MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN
AIR ACT 261 ( 1 983) ("There is, in short, no simple answer to the question of how the
EPA sets air quality standards. Medical evidence cannot offer definitive guidance . . . .
The EPA itself has refused to deal with the problem in a forthright manner, hiding its
policy choices behind its interpretation of scientific evidence . " ) ; Kevin D. Hill, Smog,
Science & the J<,?A, 25 N. KY. L. REv . 1 , 27 ( 1 997) ( "Decisions as costly and important as
the ozone standard should not hide behind a charade of science but should be part of
the public debate.") ; Pierce, supra note 1 8, at 73 ("The A TA case is laced with symp
toms of the science charade.") ; Wagner, supra note 1 1 , at 1 640-44 (arguing that EPA's
reliance on scientific and medical evidence alone to justify its previous ozone NAAQS
is a "vivid illustration" of an "intentional science charade") .
Jst> See Nicholas A. Ashford et al. , A Hard Look at Federal Regulation of Formaldehyde:
A Departurefrom Reasoned Decisionmaking, 7 HARV. Et'-;VTL. L. REv. 297, 3 1 1 ( 1 983) (not
ing that " [s] uch an approach frustrates any effort to measure agency decisions against
the reasoned decision making standard.") .
l�i
. Infra Part I I.B-C.
' ''8 This is not to say that no consistent set of reasons could have been offered
to justify E PA's decisions. An agency's decision making may be reasonable , even if
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A. Science and EPA 's Ad Hoc Policymaking
EPA ' s reliance on science as a rationale made it easier for the
Agency to claim that it could make ad hoc policy judgments without
the need to provide a consistent set of principles to guide its NAAQS
decision making. In the ozone and particulate matter rulemakings,
EPA explicitly asserted that it could rely on scientific inputs and there
fore, did not need to provide any consistent set of policy principles to
explain its decisions. 1 59
EPA's revision of the ozone and PM NAAQS began with the
preparation of a Criteria Document and then a Staff Paper for each
pollutant. As required by the statute , the Criteria Document provided
a review of "the latest scientific knowledge" on "all identifiable effects
on public health or welfare" that may result from ambient levels of a
pollutant. 1 60 As EPA and its amici argued to the Supreme Court, the
Criteria Document was thus a "descriptive" document that was "lim
ited" to scientific information. 1 6 1 Although the Staff Paper was in
tended to "help bridge the gap between the scientific review con
tained in the Criteria Document and the j udgments required of the
Administrator in setting ambient standards," it too emphasized "con
clusions and uncertainties in the available scientific literature" to be
considered in setting the standards. 1 62 Neither the Criteria Document

inadequately reasoned. That said, given the wide disparity in health benefits achieved
between the ozone and PM decisions, we have our doubts about whether EPA's deci
sions across these rulemakings could ever have been adequately justified. Infra Part
II.D.
1 59 See infra notes 1 64, 1 88-90, 202-03 and accompanying text (elaborating on the
Agency's reluctance to establish a framework for its decision making) .
160
42 U.S.C. § 7408 (a) (2) (2000) ; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text
(discussing the preparation of criteria documents) .
161
�
A EPA indicated in its subsequent Supreme Court brief defending its ozone
and PM standards, section 1 08 (a) (2) "limits the kind of information to be included i n
the 'criteria' t o ' the latest scientific knowledge. "' E PA, Supreme Court Respondents
Brief, supra note 60, at 1 9 . Indeed, the criteria documents are intended to be "de
scriptive." See Brief for Respondents Massachusetts and New Jersey at 1 8-1 9, Whitman
v. Am . Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) (No. 99- 1 426) [hereinafter Massachusetts
and New Jersey Brief] (citing statements from early criteria documents that such
documents are "descriptive" summaries of "scientific kn owledge ," and noting that
Congress ratified this understanding of the purpose and content of the criteria docu
ments in the 1 9 70 Clean Air Act) ; see also S. REP. No. 90-403, at 26-27 ( 1 967) ( "Air
quality criteria are an expression of the scientific knowledge of the relationship be
tween various concentrations of pollutants in the air and their adverse effects on man,
animals, vegetation , materials, visibility and so on." (citation omitted) ) .
Hi')
- OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, EPA, REVIEW OF THE
NATIONAL A.iv!BIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICU U\TE MATTER: POLICY
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nor the Staff Papers purported to recommend or justify any specific
regulatory standard, but instead they identified a range of possible
standards that the staff believed would protect public health with
.
-.C
3
some margin of sa.tety. 16
The EPA Administrator is supposed to select specific standards
only after considering the information from the Criteria Document
and Staff Paper, along with public comments that had been filed dur
ing th e rulemaking process. In explaining the Administrator's deci
sions on ozone and particulate matter, EPA began by making two brief
and uncontroversial assertions. First, EPA acknowledged briefly in the
Federal Register that the Administrator's decision was a "policy choice,"
though one the Agency asserted was "left specifically to the Adminis
64
This latter language seemed to imply that the
trator ' s j udgment." 1
exercise of the Administrator's judgment did not need to be ex
plained with any meaningful policy justification.

Second, EPA reaf

firmed statements in the 1977 legislative history of the Clean Air Act
that the Agency was not required to set a zero-risk standard for a non
1 5
threshold pollutant. 6 Of course , no major participant in environ
mental policymaking has ever seriously argued that a zero-risk stan
dard is required, given that a zero-risk standard for a n on-threshold
pollutant would result, at a minimum , in the end of the industrialized

ASSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION, at I-1 ( 1 996) [hereinafter
PM STAFF PAPER] , available at h ttp:/ / www. epa.gov/ttn /oarpg/ t1sp.html.
Jb�
- OFFICE OF RESEARCH AJ"'D DEVELOPMENT, EPA, AIR QUALI'IY CRITERIA FOR
OZONE AND RElATED PHOTOCHEMICAL OXIDAJ"'TS ( 1 996) [hereinafter CRITEIUA DOCU
MENT] ; OFFICE OF AIR QUALI'IY PLANNI G & STANDARDS, EPA, REVIEW OF NATIONAL
AMBIENT AIR QUALI'IY STANDARDS FOR OZONE:
AsSESSMENT OF SCIENTIFIC AND
TECHNICAL INFORMATION 2 1 3-14 ( 1 996) [hereinafter OZONE STAFF PAPER] (recom
mending a primary eight-hour ozone standard in the range of 0,07 to 0_09 ppm ) ; PM
STAFF PAPER, supra note 1 62, at VII-47 ("Staff recommends that the Administrator con
:'
sider selecting the level of a new 24-hour PM2 5 standard from the range of 20 pg/m to
approximate!.{ 65 pg/m , and the level of � new annual PM25 standard from the range
,
of 1 2.5 pg/m to approximately 20 pg/m . ) _
164
E PA , Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,857; EPA, PM Final

�

Rule , supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,653.
1 65
E.g. , EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,857 ('The Act
does not require the Administrator to establish a primary NAAQS at a zero-risk level
but rather at a level that reduces risk sufficiently so as to protect public health with an
adequate margin of safety.") ; id. at 38,863 (" [A] zero-risk standard is neither possible
nor required by the Act.") ; id. at 38,867 ("Clearly, for pollutants, such as 03, that have
no discernible thresholds for health effects, no standard can be risk-free. ") . EPA made
identical statements in the preamble to the final PM standard. EPA, PM Final Rule,
supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,653, 38,656.
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economy as we know it. 1 66 But as we will see, this position has put the
Agency in an especially difficult, if not impossible, position when it
comes to providing a consistent j ustification for its standards. 1 6 7
'!\That EPA failed to address in its rulemaking was the critical ques
tion of what risk management principle or criterion justified the Ad
ministrator's "policy choice" in selecting nonzero standards along the
continuum of predicted health risks for ozone and fine PM.H>s In
stead, EPA identified only scientific factors to defend its choices, argu
ing that risk assessments played a "central role in identifying an
appropriate level." 1 69 In the preamble for the final ozone standard,
EPA summarized its basis for its decision by identifying the informa
tion which it gathered in the rulemaking process: ( 1 ) the Criteria
Document, (2) the Staff Paper, (3) CASAC's advice, and (4) public
comments. 1 70 Of course, a simple bibliography is not the same as a
meaningful explanation, but more importantly these various sources
of information do not themselves contain any principled j ustification
for the revised standards. As noted earlier, the Criteria Document
is limited to a description of scientific information, 171 and the Staff Pa
per was intended to "bridge" the scientific evidence and the Agency's
policy determination but did not itself recommend or develop a
I tili

See, e.g. , Am . Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 038 ( D. C . Cir. 1 999) ("No
parry here appears to advocate this [zero-risk policy] , and EPA appears to show no in
clination to adopt i t.") ; Paul R. Portney, EPA and the Evolution of Federal Regulation, in
PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 1 1 , 1 7 (Paul R. Portney & Robert
N. Stavins eels ., 2000) ( " [ I ] t is impossible to elimin ate all traces of environmental pol
lution without simultaneously shutting down all economic activity, an outcome which
neither Congress nor the public would abide . " ) .
.
167
Infra notes 364-67 and accompanymg text.
ltiH
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT STATE: THE FUTURE OF REGULATORY
PROTECTION 1 1 2 (2002) ("The basic problem is that the agency did not explain, in
co ncrete terms, why i t chose one level of regulation rather than another. ") . For a dis
cussion of risk management principles, see infra Part III.A.
1 09 EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863 (citation omitted) .
Later, in a brief defending the PM rule, EPA claimed that the Agency's full risk assess
ment played only a "limited role," but that the standards "were based primarily on
EPA's analysis of the epidemiological studies in the record," also a clearly scientific
consideration. EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. PM B ri ef, supra note 68, at 5 1 .
1 70
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859 . Although we fo
cus in this part of the text primarily on the justification EPA offered for i ts revisions to
th e ozone standard, EPA provided a similar account i n its preamble to the final rule
revising the particulate matter standards. See EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62
Feel. Reg. at 38,655 ("These decisions are based on a thorough review, in the Criteria
D ocument, of the latest scientific i nformation on known and potential human health
e ffects associated with exposure to PM at levels typically found in the ambient air." ) .
171
Supra notes 49, 1 60 and accompanying text.
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j ustification for specific policy determinations. 1 7 2 The Staff Paper ex
pressly acknowledged that setting a NAAQS standard was "a policy
choice left specifically to the Administrator's j udgment. " 173 As with the
staff materials, CASAC's input was similarly limited, almost by defini
tion, to scientific advice. 1 7 1 Finally, while public comments may raise
policy arguments in addition to scientific conclusions, they reflect the
opinions of interested individuals and organizations, not the judg
ment of the Administrator. Even though some of these comments
undoubtedly discussed policy issues and not merely scientific evidence
of health effects, EPA did not (and could not) rely on these comments
to offer the j ustification that the Agency itself is required to provide in
exercising its governmental authority. 175
Based solely on these sources of information contained in the
rulemaking record, EPA claimed to have determined that a revision to
its current standards was "appropriate ." 176 Once it made this determi
nation, EPA needed to decide the specific level at which the revised
standards should be set. In its final rule, EPA stated that a revised
ozone primary standard set at 0.08 ppm based on an eight-hour aver
1
age was likewise "appropriate. " 77 It offered as its purported "rationale"

1 72

Supra text accompanying note 1 62.
OZONE STAFF PAPER, supra note 1 63 , at 3 (citation omitted) ; id. at 2 1 3 ("In
making recommendations, staff notes that the decision ultimately made by the Admin
istrator regarding level of the primary 03 NAAQS will be based on a policy judgment as
to the degree of risk reduction that is necessary to protect public health with an ade
quate margin of safe ty.") .
1 74 Supra note 59 and accompanying text.
m See, e.g. , B 1ief of Amici Curiae Environmental Defense et al. at 2 1 , Whitman v.
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) (No. 99-1 426) (" [T] here is no plausible sce
nario under which the requirement that the agency consider comments could modifY
the standards defined i n the statute for the setting of the NAAQS. ") ; Massachusetts and
New Jersey Brief, supra note 1 6 1 , at 34 (describing as "fantastical" the argument that
"the Administrator must consider anything submitted in the public record as relevan t
to her decision setting the NAAQS" because " [s] uch a process would allow public
commenters to determine the scope and content of EPA's obligations in setting the
NAAQS") . Indeed, there is no indication i n the rulemaking record that EPA adopted
any policy criteria for setting NAAQS suggested by a public commentator.
1 6
7
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859. EPA took a similar approach in its final rule on particulate matter:
Based on the rationale and recommendations contained in the Staff Paper
and the advice of CASAC, and taking into account public comments, the Ad
m in istrator concludes that it is appropriate at this time to revise the current
PM standards to increase the public health protection provided against the
known and potential effects of PM iden tified in the air quality criteria.
EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,666.
1 77 EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,859.
1 73
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for this decision the Agency's "consideration of' health effects infor
mation , human exposure, and risk assessments : " [s] pecific conclu
sions . . . that, taken together, would be appropriate to protect public
health with an adequate margin of safety." 1 78 Of course, it is far from
clear what the Agency meant by basing its decision on "consideration
of' scientific information or, more significantly, what made its judg
ment "appropriate ." The Agency was simply begging the question.
In the preamble to the final ozone rule, EPA stated that CASAC
recognized that "the selection of specific standards requires that the
Administrator make public health policy judgments in addition to de
terminations of a strictly scientific nature ." 1 7 9 But what did such j udg
ments entail and what was EPA's reasoned basis for making them as it
did? EPA claimed that its public health policy judgment was "framed
by" the scientific information and its view that the standards should be
�
set at some "appropriate level." 1 0 It also stated that its public health
policy judgment was "informed by" various "key observations and con
8
clusions," 1 1 including the results of various health studies, the types of
health effects identified in those studies, the levels of human expo
sure , the results of EPA's risk assessment, and the advice from CA
H2
SAC. 1 Again, these types of data are relevant scientific inputs for any
risk management decision, but even taken together they categorically
differ from a policy reason that justifies setting risk standards at one
1�>
level rather than another. 3 EPA concluded in its preamble that these
factors, in particular the fact that no CASAC member endorsed a
standard below 0.08 ppm, led the Agency to focus on the alternative

1 78

!d. (emphasis added) . The Agency also stated that it examined " [a] lternative
views of the significance of the effects and factors to be considered in policy j udgments
about the appmpriate elements of the standard." !d. (emphasis added) .
1 79
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863.
I�U
fd.
181
!d.
182
!d. at 38,863-65 . The only type of public health "policy judgments" that EPA
iden tified were "th e nature and severity of the health effects involved, the size of the
sensitive population (s) at risk, the types of health information available, and the kind
and degree of uncertainties that must be addressed." !d. at 38,883. These factors are
an in tegral part of characterizing risks, the final step in risk assessment, but they do not
provide any policy principles that would justify a risk management decision. NAT'L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, SCIENCE AND JUDGMENT IN RlSK ASSESSMENT 2 7 ( 1 994) (noting
that such "science-policy" factors "are distinct from the policy choices associated with
ultimate decision-making") .
183
See, e.g. , LAI\'DY ET AL . , supra note 1 08, at 5 6 (" [T] erms like sensitive group,
health , and adequate margin of safety are not self-defining. The science of the situa
tion could not, by i tself, produce a decision." (emphasis omitted ) ) .
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4
levels of 0.08 ppm and 0 . 09 ppm. 1 8 The remainder of EPA ' s explana
tion for its selected standard consisted of a list of factors that simply
supported the obvious descriptive point that an 0.08 ppm standard
provides more health protection than does an 0.09 ppm standard. 1 85
Other statements that EPA made in the preambles to its final rules
likewise reflected a reliance on scientific factors to justify its decisions
and failed to specify any risk management criterion. For example,
EPA summarized its approach for establishing a "margin of safety"
(clearly a policy decision ) almost entirely in terms of scientific infor
mation. According to the Agency, its task was " to select an approach
that best takes into account the health effects and other information
assessed in the air quality criteria for the pollutant in question and to
apply appropriate and reasoned analysis to ensure that the scientific
uncertainties are taken into account in an appropriate manner."1 86
H owever, this itself is not an explanation of why the Agency arrived at
its revised standards. No one can deny that the Administrator should
make an "appropriate" decision, but the Administrator's underlying
rationale for these decisions was never stated, nor was any principle
offered that could explain these decisions as well as similar decisions
made by any other Administrator in the past or future. The factors
invoked by EPA speak to how the risk is characterized, not to how that
18
risk should be managed. 7 After discussing the scientific data and as
sociated uncertainties, EPA basically stopped and pronounced the
standards it had selected, explaining its decisions simply by asserting
that they were "appropriate. "
The lack of any policy justification was all the more striking be
cause the one issue where EPA most clearly should have explained its
risk managemen t judgment would have been in setting the margin of
safety. Yet, the Agency failed to articulate any clear or consistent pol
icy principles for establishing a margin of safety, instead arguing

!84

EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra n ote 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,864-65.
Id. at 38,865, 38,867-68. Of course, this observation is obvious only if ground
level ozone provides no countervailing health benefits. See infra notes 3 1 2-13 and ac
companying text (indicating that there may be potential health benefits of ozone ) .
l Bt>
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883. EPA's preamble
to the revised particulate matter standard contains virtually the same language . See
EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,688-89 ( " (T] he task of the Admin
istrator is to select an approach that best takes into account the nature of the health
effects . . . and to apply appropriate and reasoned analysis to ensure that scientific un
certain ties are taken into account in an appropriate manner.") .
lHI
For the distinction between risk characterization and risk management, see su
pra notes 9 1 -95 and accompanying text.
1 8''
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against the need to provide a principle at all . The Agency claimed
that "no generalized paradigm . . . can substitute for the Administra
tor's careful and reasoned assessment of all relevant health factors in
.
188
M oreover, because th e Agency ' s d eterreac h mg . . . a JU d gment. "
mination is "largely judgmental in nature ," it "may not be amenable to
189
quantification in terms of what risk is 'acceptable' or any other metric. "
EPA even argued that it can change its approach for setting NAAQS
on a case-by-case basis, stating that "the Administrator is not limited to
any single approach to determining an adequate margin of safe ty and,
in the exercise of her judgment, may choose an integrative approach,
a two-step approach, or perhaps some other approach, depending on
the particular circumstances confronting her in a given NAAQS re
0
view." 19 In effect, EPA argued that it possessed complete discretion to
set standards in any way it desired, without the need to offer any con
sistent, reasoned explanation for its decision .
It is not surprising, then, that EPA has been inconsistent in how it
sets the margin of safety required by the Clean Air Act. In particular,
the Agency has shifted its position on whether the margin of safety
provision requires the Agency to set primary standards below the low
est probable adverse effects identified by scientific studies. In the re
cently revised ozone standard, EPA set the primary standard at 0.08
ppm, the level at which it claimed that adverse health effects were di
1
rectly observed in clinical studies. 1 9 In past rulemakings, however,
EPA has taken the position that the margin of safety requirement
·

IR�

EPA, Ozone Final Rule , supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883; EPA, PM Final
Rule, supra note 9 , 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,688.
1 89
EPA, Ozone Final Rule , supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883 (emphasis added) ;
EPA, PM Final Rule , supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,688 (emphasis added) .
.
190
EPA, PM Fmal Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed . Reg. at 38,688; see also EPA, Ozone
Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883 ( providing an almost identical state
ment) .
t �l l
See, e.g. , EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 1 5 (" [ N ] ew clinical
studies provided 'conclusive evidence' that prolonged ozone exposure decreases lung
function and causes respiratory symptoms at ozone concentrations down to 0.08
ppm." ) ; EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863-64 (noting "clear
evidence from h uman clinical studies . . . of the following statistically significant re
sponses at 6- to 8-hour exposures to the lowest concentration evaluated, 0.08 ppm n,,
at moderate exertion: lung function decrements, respiratory symptoms . . . , n onspe
cific bronchial responsiveness, and biochemical indicators of pulmonary inflamma
tion" and admitting that these effects in some individuals are "sufficiently severe and
extended in duration to be considered adverse") ; EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO
COMM ENTS, supra note 1 36, at 1 3- 1 4 ("The Agency's decision . . . is that the n, primary
standard should be set with an 8-hour averaging period and at 0.08 ppm, a level at
which numerous controlled-exposure human studies have reported health effect.� such
as lung function decrements, respi ratory symptoms, and indicators of inflammation .") .
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directs the Agency to set the standards below those at which adverse
2
health effects are found or expected in sensitive groups. 1 9 EPA had
earlier argued that " [ t] he intent of the margin of safety requirement
was to direct the Administrator to set air quality standards at pollution
levels below those at which adverse health effects have been found or
might be expected to occur in sensitive groups." 1 93 EPA even ac
knowledged before the Supreme Court its view that air quality "stan
dards must be 'preventative or precautionary, ' reflecting an emphasis
on the ' predominant value of protection of public health "' 1 94 and that
9'
EPA should be sure to "err on the side of caution . " 1 '
Accordingly, EPA previously claimed to have set the primary stan
dard substantially below the lowest level of demonstrated adverse ef
fects in order to ensure an adequate margin of safety. For example, in
the previous revision of the ozone standard in 1 979, EPA concluded
that "the probable level for adverse effects in sensitive persons . . . is
in the range of 0 . 1 5-0.25 ppm." 1 96 Nevertheless, EPA set the standard
at 0. 1 2 ppm, well below the probable effects level, because, based
on its statutory interpretation, it was required to make a " U J udgment
of a standard level below the probable effect level that provides an

192

See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Ozone-Final Decision, 58 Fed.
Reg. 1 3008, 1 3,009 (Mar. 9, 1 993) [hereinafter EPA, 1 993 Ozone Decision ] (" [T] he
'margin of safety' requirement by definition only comes into play where no conclusive
showing of adverse effects exists . " ) ; National Primary and Secondary Ambient Air
Quality Standards for Lead, 43 Fed. Reg. 46,246, 46,247 (Oct. 5, 1978) ("'t is clear
from section 1 09 that [EPA] should not attempt to place the standard at a level esti
mated to be at the threshold for adverse health effects but should set the standard at a
lower level in orde r to provide a margin of safety." ) ; see also sujJm notes 50, 1 22, 1 27
and accompanying text. See generally William F. Pederson, Costs Matter: Effective Air
Quality Regulation in a Risky World, 20 ST. LOUIS U . PUB. L. REv. 1 53, 1 59 (200 1 ) ("A
standard that in corporates a ' margin of safety' is one that goes beyond addressing
provable harms.") .
19 :1 Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter,
52 Fed. Reg. 24,634, 24,64 1 (July 1 , 1 987) [hereinafter EPA, 1 987 PM Rule ] ; see also
Lead Indus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 130, 1 1 54 (D.C. Cir. 1 980) (remarking that Congress
"specifically directed the Administrator to allow an adequate margin of safety to pro
tect against effect� which have not yet been uncovered by research and effects whose
medical significance is a matter of disagreement" ) .
194 EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief, supra note 5 7 , at 24 (citing Lead Indus.,
647 F.2d at 1 1 52 (quoting H.R. REP. N o . 294, 95th Cong. 49 ( 1 977) ) ) .
El'>
!d. (citing Lead Indus., 647 F.2d at 1 1 55 ) .
I% Revisions to the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Photochemical
Oxidants, 44 Fed. Reg. 8202, 821 6 (Feb. 8, 1 979) [ hereinafter EPA, 1 979 Ozone Rule] .
EPA explained that it ''uses the terminology 'probable effects level' to refer to the level
that in its best judgment is most likely to be the adverse health effect threshold con
centration." Jd. at 8203.
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adequate margin of safety." 197 As EPA subsequently explained its 1 979
decision, it set the ozone standard at 0.1 2 ppm because of "the possibil
9
ity of adverse effects occurring below 0. 1 5 ppm 0 3 ." 1 8 When EPA next
revisited the ozone standard in 1 993, it concluded that the controlled
human studies failed to show any "adverse effects" below 0 . 1 5 ppm
and thus retained the existing ozone NAAQS se t significantly below
that level at 0. 1 2 ppm. 1 99 Likewise, EPA set the annual PM 1 0 standard
at 50 pg/m 3 in 1 987 to provide a "reasonable margin of safety" based
on evidence showing that long-term degradation in lung function was
:l
"likely" at 80-90 pg/m and possible at concentrations above 60 to 65
2
pg Im 3 . 00
Thus, when it came to its recent ozone and PM revisions, EPA
abandoned its earlier approach. It even argued in court that it was
1
not "required to follow any particular paradigm of decision making" 20
and that "nothing in the statute requires [the Administrator] to make
any specific 'findings ' or to structure her decision making in any par
ticular way. " 20 2 EPA ' s inconsistent application of the margin of safety
concept, combined with its assertions that it did not even need to try
to be consistent, revealed an agency intentionally or unintentionally
dodging its responsibility to give the public a principled justification
for its preferred policy outcome.
B. EPA 's Incoherent Disregard of the Health Effects
from Particulate Matter
EPA could not help but struggle to apply its preventative notion of
a margin of safety coherently, given that the Agency predicted that
adverse health effects would persist at levels below the Agency ' s new
1 97

!d. at 82 1 3 (emphasis added) . EPA further stated:
[A] t levels in the range of 0. 1 5-0 .25 ppm, adverse health effects will almost
certainly be experienced by significant numbers of sensitive persons. U nless
the standard is set somewhat below that level, the Agency would not be exer
cising the degree of prudence called for by the ' adequate margin of safe ty'
requirement of the Clean Air Act.
Id. at 82 1 7.
198
National Ambien t Air Quality Standards for Ozone; Proposed Decision , 5 7 Fed.
Reg. 35,542, 35,547 (Aug. 1 0 , 1992) (emphasis added) [hereinafter EPA, 1 992 Ozone
Proposal] .
19!1
EPA, 1 993 Ozone Decision, sujrra note 1 9 2 , 58 Fed. Reg. at 1 3, 0 1 1 .
200
EPA, 1 987 PM Rule, supra note 1 93, 52 Fed. Reg. a t 24,645.
201
EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 29.
202
Id. at 43. After losing in the D.C. Circuit, EPA changed its tune i n its argume n t
to the Supreme Court, claiming that the Clean Air Act severely constrained i ts discre
tion. EPA, Supreme Court Reply Brief, supra note 6 1 , at 8.
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standards. Although EPA purported to act to protect the public
health and err on the side of safety, the Agency actually disregarded a
range of public health effects in both the ozone and particulate mat
ter rulemakings. While the Agency might well have had good cause
for treating some level of health risk as tolerable, it never provided
any coherent account for why it turned its back on what were, at times ,
quite substantial health effects. 203
In its rulemaking on particulate matter, EPA set two standards for
fine PM-an annual standard set at 1 5 p. g/m 3 and a daily (i.e., twenty
four-hour average) standard set at 65 p.g/m 3 (after initially proposing
4
a daily standard of 50 p.g/m 3 ) . 2 0 The daily standard effectively acts as
a constraint on the variation around the average annual level of fine
PM in any given area, and in this way provides its own health protec
tion . 205 Assuming the validity of EPA's interpretation of the scientific
6
data on the health effects of fine PM, 20 EPA could have saved hun
dreds, if not thousands, of additional lives per year by setting a more
stringent daily standard than the one it did. 207 Indeed, some public
health advocacy groups claimed that EPA's PM standard left tens of
millions of Americans at risk for serious health effects. 208
203

As noted in one recent review of the PM standard:
[O] ne must recognize the arbitrariness of the limits set by U.S. EPA. There is
little, genuine, data-based or risk-based justification for the specific values
chosen by the Agency: one might as easily have set a PM2.5 annual stan dard set
�
3
at either 10 or 20 pg/m , rather than the 15 pg/m chosen.
Laura C. Green et al. , What 's WTOng with the National Ambient Air Quality Standard
(NAA QS) for Fine Particulate Matter (PM2 5) ?, 35 REG. TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY
327, 334 (2002 ) .
''0 4
- EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,679.
205
The annual standard could be met by averaging together periods of h igher
concentrations with periods during which wind or climate patterns, or fluctuations in
industrial or transportation activity, significan tly reduced the concentration of air pol
lutants. The daily standard therefore creates an upper bound on those periods of
higher concen tration.
206
We assume the validity of EPA's risk assessment only for the purpose of our dis
cussion here . Many commentators disagreed with EPA's conclusion that the available
data sufficiently demonstrated mortality health risks from PM25, leading them to advo
cate less stringent standards than those ultimately adopted by EPA. In the words of
EPA's CASAC Chairman, " [i ] f all of the [ CASAC] panel members were convinced that
the reported PM2jmortality relationship was causal, I believe we would have come to
consensus on PM standards at the low end of the EPA's recommended range." George
T. Wolff, In Response to the PM Debate, REGULATION, Winter 1 99 7 , at 9; see also Green et
al. , supra note 203, at 327 (summarizing concerns with EPA's fine PM analysis) .
20 '
See infra notes 2 1 2, 2 1 4 and accompanying text.
2118
The American Lung Association, for example , advocated a 24-hour standard
3
"
set at 18 pg/m , claiming that EPA's proposed standard set at 50 pg/m would fail to
protect the health of 89 million people. See ALA Calls for Tighter Fine PM Standard,
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EPA's risk assessment document reported the Agency's estimates
of the consequences of alternative standards for fine PM in two cities:
Philadelphia and Los Angeles. 209 In Philadelphia, EPA estimated that
the incidence of mortality associated with short-term exposure to fine
PM would be reduced by 60 deaths per year, from 370 deaths per year
under the existing standards to 3 1 0 deaths per year under EPA's new
2
fine PM standard set at 1 5 pg/m 3 annually, 65 pg/m 3 daily. 1 0 Ye t if
EPA had reduced the daily standard even further to 25 pg/m :; , with
out changing the annual standard, premature mortality from short
term exposure would have been reduced to 1 1 0 deaths per year, or
a reduction of 200 deaths per year above and beyond the 60 lives
1
predicted to be saved by the standard EPA adopted. 2 1 For mortality
from long term exposure to fine PM in Philadelphia, EPA's new stan
dard would reduce mortality from 920 deaths per year under the ex
isting standards to 660 deaths per year, for a net reduction of 260
22
deaths per year. 1 Had the Agency's sole focus been on protecting
the public health, presumably it should have adopted the more strin
gent alternative standard it considered, namely a standard set at 1 5

Says EPA Proposal Leaves Millions at Risk, Env't Rep. (BNA) , Jan. 1 4 , 1 997, at A-6. A
more stringent annual PM standard would also likely result in additional health pro
3
tection, but EPA did not evaluate a more stringent alternative than the 1 5 pg/m stan
dard it ultimately adopted. See EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,676 (admi tting that "the possibility of effects at lower annual concentrations cannot
be excluded") .
209
In the rulemaking, EPA claimed that it relied on the risk assessment "as an aid
to the Administrator in judging which alternative PM NAAQS would reduce risks suffi
ciently to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety . . . . " EPA, PM Final
Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,656. While acknowledging uncertain ty in the
quan titative estimates of health effects in the two-city study, EPA stated that "they do
represent reasonable estimates as to the possible extent of risk for these effects given
the available information." ld. Moreover, th e Agency relied on its risk assessment to
argue that "the risk remaining after attaining the current PM10 standards was on the
order of hundreds of premature deaths each year, hundreds to thousands of respira
tory-related hospital admissions, and tens of thousands of additional respiratory related
symptoms in children." Jd. Subsequently, in litigation , EPA emphasized that the
Agency's risk assessment played only a "limited role" in EPA's decision making. EPA,
200 l D. C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 68, at 5 1 .
210
PM STAFF PAPER, supra note 1 62, at VI-49.
211

212

ld.

Jd. EPA later revised its estimates of the mortality effects from long term expo
sure "to reflect the actual statistics used in the study upon which they were based," not
ing that these revisions "cumulatively reduce estimates of mortality associated with
long-term exposures by 20 to 35 % ." EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at
38,656. The Agency stated that these revisions had "no effect on risk estimates for
mortality associated with short-term exposures or the estimates for any other effect� . "
!d.
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pg/m 3 annually and 25 pg/m3 daily. This more stringent standard
would have reduced mortality in a city of this size to zero, securing an
additional reduction of 660 deaths per year. 21 3
In total, the standard that EPA adopted was expected to reduce
mortality in Philadelphia by 320 deaths per year, while the more strin
gent alternative rejected by EPA would have resulted in an additional
reduction in overall mortality of 860 deaths per year, or over two and
a half times the mortality benefits than EPA's chosen standard. Simi
larly, EPA's risk assessment indicated that in Los Angeles the Agency
could have prevented an additional 1080 deaths annually by adopting
a more stringent standard. If EPA could claim it needed to revise its
PM standard to prevent 1 620 premature deaths per year in Los Ange
les (as the Agency predicted it would achieve under the less stringent
standard) , it is hard to understand why the Agency saw no need to
lower the standard still further to prevent an additional 1 080 prema
ture deaths each year in Los Angeles (or an annual total of 2700 pre
mature deaths avoided under the more stringent al temative ) . 214
In both Philadelphia and Los Angeles, the marginal reductions in
nonmortality effects (such as respiratory and cardiac health effects)
associated with the more stringent alternative were greater than the
selected standard for every health endpoint evaluated by EPA. 2 1 5
EPA's own analysis showed that the Agency could have achieved sub
stantially greater health benefits by further reducing the twenty-four
hour fine PM standard from the 65 pg/m3 standard selected by EPA to
3
the more stringent 25 pg/m daily altemative . 21 6 As EPA's PM Staff

'' 1
3

-

EPA, P M Final Rule , supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,656. Even if these mo rtali ty effects are overstated by twenty to thirty-five percent (as the Agency has subse
quently claimed) , this would still mean preventing 430 to 530 cases of premature mor
tality.
214
PM STAFF PAPER, s1lpra note 1 62 , at VI-5 1 . EPA explained that the greater abso
lute and relative differences between Los Angeles and Philadelphia are based largely
on differences in current air quality levels: "As expected, the estimated health risk re
ductions are larger for Los Angeles County than Philadelphia County due to the
higher PM air quality levels asso ciated with meeting the current PM10 standards (i.e. ,
baseline air quality in Philadelphia is below the level required to meet the current
standards ) . " ld. at VI-54.
215
ld. at VI-49, -5 1 .
216
As the EPA P M Staff Paper stated:
Based on the limited risk analyses for two example cities, using base case as
3
sumptions, a 24-hour PM? '• standard of 25 pg/m is estimated to reduce PM
related risks associated with short-term exposures for the effects considered by
roughly 70%-85 % , relative to risks associated with attaini ng the current stan
.
dards. Alternatively, at a 24 -hour PM2 " level of 65 pg/ m ', risks are estimated
.

�
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Paper concluded, "rough estimates of incidences are appreciably lower,
but not eliminated in going from a PM2 5 standard of 65 to 25
27
rgI m3 . , 1
What stopped EPA from further tightening its daily fine PM stan
dard to the more stringent level and thereby saving thousands of addi
tional lives? The answer certainly cannot be based exclusively on a
concern for protecting the public from health risks . The record
demonstrated that, according to EPA's interpretation of the data, sta
tistically significant increases in premature mortality and significant
morbidity effects occurred at levels far below EPA's selected twenty
four-hour standard of 65 rg/m 3 for fine PM. As EPA's own PM Staff
Paper acknowledged, " [e ] pidemiological studies reporting statistically
significant associations were conducted in areas in which the mean
twenty-four-hour PM2 5 concentrations ranged from approximately 1 6
3
to 30 rg/m for mortality studies, with hospital admissions and respi
28
ratory symptoms studies falling within this range ." 1 The Staff Paper
continued by noting that " [s] everal epidemiological studies reporting
statistically significant effects include ranges of air quality that may
29
approach estimates of background levels in some locations." 1 It also
stated that "mortality studies show significant associations even when
the observed means of twenty-four-hour PM 2 5 concentrations in each
')90
of the study locations are approximately at or below 20 rg/m 3 ."-Furthermore, the EPA Staff Paper noted that the results from the
Agency's quantitative risk assessment "suggest a pattern of a contin
uum of decreasing risk with lower levels of alternative PM� ,, standards ,
:l
extending over and likely below the range of 65 to 25 rg/m PM 2 5 in
21
cluded in the risk analyses ." 2 EPA, in defending its selection of its final daily fine PM standards set at 65 rg/m 3 , observed that short-term
exposures appeared to offer the most compelling evidence of a health
9
problem-22 and agreed with the Staff Paper that short-term exposures
•

•

to be reduced by roughly 1 0 % and 40 % for the Philadelphia and Los Angeles
study areas, respectively.
!d. at VII-28.
''
-1 7
!d. at VII-29 (emphasis added ) .
218
!d. at VII-26.
� 1 9 !d. at VII-30.
no
!d.
221
!d. at VI I-28.
2�2
EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed . Reg. at 38,676 ("In accordance with
staff
and CASAC views on the relative strengths of the epidemiological studies, th e
E PA
Administrator has placed greater emphasis on the short-term exposure studies in se
lecting the level of the ann ual standard.") .
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in the range of 1 6-21 pg/m 3 resulted in statistically significant health
23
e f'C1ects. 2
EPA made an attempt to justify its decision not to set a more strin
gent twenty-four-hour fine PM standard. The Agency argued that "the
risk associated with infrequent peak 24-hour exposures in otherwise
clean areas [that is, those meeting the annual standard] is not well
enough understood at this time to provide a basis for selecting the
2
more restrictive levels . . . [below] 65 pg/m 3 ." 2 4 This claim, though , is
inconsistent with other EPA conclusions. EPA's own analysis indi
cated that it was not merely occasional "peak" concentrations that pre
sumably should have been of concern under a 24-hour standard, but
more frequent days with below-peak concentrations as well. EPA's ex
amination of the available health data concluded that "most of the ag
gregate risk associated with short-term exposures likely results from
the large number of days during which the 24-hour average concen
trations are in the low- to-mid-range, below peak 24-hour concentra
tions." 2 25 Moreover, if residual levels of fine PM remaining under
EPA's new standard would still result in hundreds, if not thousands, of
additional premature deaths, it is hard to see how EPA could properly
claim that areas meeting the annual standard were "otherwise clean"
and that there was no basis for adopting the lower standard. 22 6
223

224

ld.

.
Jd at 38,677. EPA also argued that an annual standard can "p rovide the requi

site reduction in risk associated with both annual and 24-hour averaging times in most
areas of the United States" and that a 24-hour standard "would be in tended to provide
supplemen tal protection against extreme peak fine particle levels that may occur in
some localized situations or in areas with distinct variations in seasonal fine particle
levels." Jd. at 38,674. Yet, as the textual discussion suggests, EPA's own analysis showed
that major reductions in premature mortality would be achieved with a more stringent
24-hour standard than that which was adopted by EPA, even under EPA's selected an
nual standard.
2
2 " National Ambient Air Quality Standards fo r Particulate Matter; Proposed Deci
sion, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,638, 65,652 (Dec. 1 3, 1 996 ) .
6
22
Even after a few rounds of litigation, EPA apparently still could not explain why
it was acceptable, as a policy matter, to turn i ts back on the remaining mortalities it
predic ted under the PM levels allowed under the revised standards. EPA responded to
arguments that it should have adopted more stringent PM standards by noting th at it
revised its risk assessment in a way that "resulted in a substantial reduction in the num
ber of deaths predicted" from exposure to levels permitted under the standard. EPA,
200 1 D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 68, at 54. Acknowledging that even under the re
vised risk assessment the "values of estimated risk are not zero" ( that is, the Agency still
predicted premature deaths under the new standard) , th e Agency simply dismissed its
own risk assessment as "not sufficiently reliable . " Jd. Without saying anything more,
EPA then retreated to its science-based rhetoric claiming that it based its new PM stan
dards on the "analysis of the epidemi ological studies themselves ." !d.
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Science by itself certainly could not explain why EPA did not
adopt a more stringent daily standard for fine PM, nor could a pre
cautionary approach based solely on a concern for avoiding significant
health effects. After all, the scientific analysis relied upon by EPA in
dicated that the Agency could have reduced both mortality and mor
bidity effects still further than it did. EPA's action was inconsistent
with its frequently recited position that it must "err on the side of cau
tion" by setting a margin of safety that will protect against "not just
known adverse effects , but those of scientific uncertainty or that 're
"
search has not yet uncovered. ' 227 EPA's own analysis , which the
Agency used to defend its decision to tighten the PM standard, pre
dicted that at least hundreds of cases of premature mortality nation
wide would result from fine PM exposure even if all regions in the
8
country were to meet EPA's new standards. 22
Throughout the PM rulemaking, EPA invoked uncertainty as a
wild card in an effort to defend its regulatory decisions. The Agency
dismissed the sometimes large uncertainties in the estimates it used to
support its regulatory actions, but it then cited uncertainty as a barrier
to adopting regulations that it was not otherwise inclined to adopt.
For example, EPA relied on results from "key" epidemiology studies
showing significant mortality risks from fine PM, but did so only for
the results at concentrations at and above the standard level EPA se
lected, dismissing similar results for lower concentrations in the same
studies as too uncertain to support the standards. 2 29 Yet the underly
ing studies reported no distinctions between the concentration ranges
in terms of magnitude of effect, statistical significance, or methodo
°
logical approach. 2 3 For EPA, it was as if the same studies could be
227

EPA, D . C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 56, at 49 ( quoting Lead I n dus. v. EPA, 647
F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 5 3 ( 1 980) ) .
228
See Sunstein, supra n o te 1 8 , at 329-30 (asserting th at EPA's own figures sug
gested that more deaths could be prevented by more stringen t regulations ) ; see also
Pierce, supra note 1 8 , at 74 ("Even if every area of the country were in compliance with
the new primary standards the court struck down in A TA, the best scientific evidence
available suggests that ozone and particulates would continue to kill several thousand
people per year. " ) .
229
See EPA, P M Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,675 ("While placing
substantial weight on the results of the key heal th studies in the higher range of con
centrations observed, EPA is persuaded tha t the inherent scientific uncertainties are
too great to support standards based on the lowest concentrations measured in such
studies . . . . ) .
2:10
See, e.g., Douglas W. Dockery et al. , An Association Between Air Pollution and A1or
tality in Six U.S. Cities, 329 NEW ENG. ]. MED . 1 75 3 , 1 753 ( 1 993) (concluding that " these
results suggest that fine-particulate air pollution , or a more complex pollution mixture
associated with fine particulate matter, contributes to excess mortality in certain U .S .
"
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reliable or unreliable depending simply on what was more expedient
for the Agency. 23 1 The uncertainty inherent in setting air quality stan
dards-and any other risk standards-creates the potential for oppor
tunism by any agency that decides to engage in post hoc rationaliza
tion of its decisions. Without a principled basis explaining how it
treats uncertainty, EPA's claim that uncertainty prevented it from tak
ing action to lower the PM standard only further served to illustrate
the kind of unbounded discretion that the Agency effectively claimed
for itself. m

cities") ; Joel Schwartz e t al. , Acute Effects of Summer Air Pollution on Respirat!Yry Symptom
Reporting in Children, 1 50 AM. j . RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1 234, 1 240-4 1
( 1 994) (discussing study results that did not indicate that concentration ranges af
fected the results) ; Joel Schwartz et al., Is Daily Mmality Associated Specifically with Fine
Particles ?, 46 J . AIR & WASTE MGMT. Ass'N 927 ( 1 996) . These studies found that each
3
10 pg/m elevation in fine PM levels was associated with a significant (six to four per
cent, depending on the study) increase in all-cause mortality, with no apparent thresh
old. See generally Kenneth A. Colburn & Philip R.S. Johnson, Air Pollution Concerns Not
Changed by S-PL US Flaw, 299 SCIENCE 665, 665-66 (2003) (summarizing studies relied
on by EPA) . Subsequen t to EPA's rulemaking, one of the authors upon whom EPA
relied published an analysis showing that the mortality effects from fine PM decreased
3
in a linear fashion over the range from 35 to 0 pg/m , supporting the existence of sig
n ificant mortality at levels permitted by the new standard selected by EPA. Joel
Schwartz e t al. , The Concentration-Response Relation Between PM2 5 and Daily Deaths, 1 1 0
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 1 025 (2002 ) .
2g1
EPA's treatmen t of statistical significance has also, on occasion , appeared to be
opportunistic. In the PM rulemaking, EPA claimed to have placed "greatest weight on
those studies that were clearly statistically significan t . . . . " EPA, PM Final Rule, supra
note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,676; see also EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. PM Brief, supra note 68, 62
Fed. Reg. at 49 (arguing that "EPA's conclusion [on an annual standard] is supported
by the fact that epidemiological studies performed in areas with annual mean concen
3
trations below 1 5 .7 pg/m did not find a statistically significant relationship between
daily fine particle concen tration and adverse health effects") . Yet, in 1 992, whe n EPA
set the ozone standard at 0 . 1 2 ppm, the "key study" on which E PA relied to find an
"adverse effect" at 0. 1 5 ppm did not contain statistically significant findings. See EPA,
1 992 Ozone Proposal, supra note 1 98, 57 Fed. Reg. at 35,546 ("The key study . . . by
D eLucia and Adams ( 1 97 7 ) . . . reported symptoms of discomfort and small but statis
tically-nonsignificant lung function decrements . . . at concentrations as low as 0 . 1 5
ppm Oy" ) ; EPA, 1 9 79 Ozone Rule , supra note 1 9 6 , 44 Fed. Reg. a t 8207 ("EPA ac
knowledges that Delucia and Adams failed to demonstrate any statistically significan t
decrements in pulmonary function resulting from exposure to 0. 1 5 ppm for one
hour.") .
232
As the D .C. Circuit stated, "th e increasing-uncertain ty argument is helpful only
if some principle reveals how much uncertain ty is too much . " Am . Trucking Ass'ns v.
EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 036 (D.C. Cir. 1 999) . For a review of systematic ways to accoun t
for uncertainty in regulatory decision making, see GRA.J'IGER M ORGAN & M. HENRION,
UNCERTAIN"fY: A GUIDE TO DEALING WITH UNCERTAINTY IN RISK A."JD POLICY ANALYSIS
( 1 990 ) ; Jonathan P. Caulkins, Using Models that Incorporate Uncertainty, 2 1 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 486 ( 2002) (discussing models used in policy analyses and ways ot
addressing the inherent uncertain ty that comes with using them) .
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C. EPA 's Incoherent Disregard of the Health Effects fro m Ozone
EPA's decision making in the ozone rulemaking resulted in still
more incoherence. Even though the Agency claimed to set its stan
dards based on a precautionary approach to protecting the public
�3
health ,2 EPA nevertheless disregarded a range of adverse health effects and failed to provide an adequate explanation for why one level
of risk was acceptable while another level was not. Indeed, over the
course of the ozone rulemaking, EPA actually shifted the level of re
maining risk it found acceptable .
When EPA proposed its new eight-hour, 0.08 ppm standard in
1 996, it did so knowing that the new standard still would leave the
public exposed to risk. According to EPA's risk estimates at the time,
the proposed standard still would result in 1 million occurrences of
moderate decreases in lung function and 74,000 cases of moderate-to 
severe cough in outdoor children. 234 Presumably EPA viewed this re
sidual risk as acceptable, as it did not propose the still lower option of
0 . 07 ppm. As it turned out, by the time EPA issued its final standard
in 1 997, its risk estimates had changed and the level of risk under the
old standard, the one EPA tightened, was actually lower than what it
had previously predicted would remain under the proposed 0.08 ppm
standard. 235 According to EPA's revised risk assessment, the old stan
dard resulted in only 931 ,000 cases of moderate decreases in lung
2
function and 58,000 cases of moderate-to-severe cough . 3 6 I f 1 million cases of decreased lung function could be tolerated by EPA in its
·

233 In defending its decision to lower the standard to 0.08 ppm, EPA argued i n
court that "EPA must ' err on the side o f caution' t o protect public h ealth with a n ade
quate margin of safety" and, therefore, that the Agency "considered suspected, but not
yet demonstrated, chronic effects." EPA, 2001 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at
27 ( quoting Lead I ndus . v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 53 ( 1 980) ) .
234 Memorandum from Harvey M . Richmond, Risk and Exposure Assessment
Group, to Karen M artin , Group Leader, Health Effects and Standards Group 10 tbL 3
(Feb. 1 1 , 1 99 7 ) ( o n file with author) .
2:15
The only relevant change in the Agency's risk assessment from th e proposed
rule to the final rule came from "several technical changes" that were "based on in
sights gained from the initial analyses." EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8 , 62 Fed.
Reg. at 38,86 1 .
936
Memorandum from Harvey M. Richmond, supra note 234, at 10 tbL 3 . For the
two other h ealth endpoints EPA evaluated (decreased lung fun c tion at a greater
forced expiratory volume and mode rate-to-severe chest pain ) , the 0.08 ppm standard
resulted in only a somewhat lower number of occurrences than th e 0 . 1 2 ppm standard.
In considering all four endpoints together, the combined residual h ealth effects for
the 0 . 1 2 ppm standard, which EPA found unacceptable in response to i ts final risk as
sessment, were not clearly higher than the residual effect<; under the proposed 0.08
ppm standard, which EPA found acceptable after its initial risk assessment. !d.
-·
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proposed rule , why in the final rulemaking did it need to revise the
old standard that resulted in only 931 ,000 similar cases? If 74,000
cases of cough were acceptable in the proposed rule, why were 58,000
cases of cough not acceptable in the final rule? The Agency offered
n o expl anation.
In a brief filed in the D.C. Circuit in 1 998, EPA essentially admit
ted that it had shifted its position on the level of acceptable risk, but it
argued that this was irrelevant because " [t] he relative differences are
of greater import than the absolute numbers for purposes of compar
2
ing altemative standards." 3 7 In effect, EPA's brief acknowledged that
agency decision makers had simply made up their minds to adopt a
lower standard, rather than establish any particular level of acceptable
health protection. Such an approach is inconsistent with the conven
tional understanding of the Clean Air Act, which calls for setting a
standard that protects the public health with an adequate margin of
safety, rather than setting a standard that is simply more stringent
than the existing standard-a point EPA has acknowledged in other
contexts. 2 38
More significantly, EPA failed to provide any adequate explana
tion for why it tumed its back on harms that some citizens would con
tinue to suffer even under the Agency's new standards. EPA's own
findings indicated that further reduction of the ozone standard from
0.08 ppm to 0.07 ppm would have provided additional incremental
health benefits that, in at least some cases, were even more substantial
than the benefits of the 0.08 ppm standard that EPA selected. 239 In its
rulemaking, EPA did not directly dispute those commentators "who
argue [d] that similarly large improvements in public health protec
tion would result from a standard set at 0.07 ppm as compared to the
proposed standard, such that, based on the same reasoning, the evi
dence warrants a standard set at 0.07 ppm."24° For example , EPA es
timated that the incremental risk reduction to children would be
greater if an 0.07 ppm standard was adopted:
.

<J'17

--

EPA, D . C. Cir_ Ozone Bnef, supra n ote 59, at 3 7 n.34.
EPA rejected industry's argume n t that the implementation of the current
ozone standard would have resulted in cleaner air, stating that such a factor "is irrele
van t to the issue here, i. e., what the level should be to protect public health with an
adequate margin of safety." EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 48; see also
EPA, 1 987 P M Rule, supra note 1 93 , 52 Fed_ Reg, at 24,652 ("The overriding consid
eration in selecting a standard is how well it protects public health, not its relative
stringency as compared to the previous standard_ ") _
2:�9 EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed_ Reg, at 38,868.
2:18

�411
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[T] he median p e rcent of outdoor children estimated to experi e n ce FEV1
decrements greater than 1 5 percen t is reduced from about 7.7 percent
for a 0.09 ppm, 8-hr standard to about 6. 8 percent for a 0.08 ppm , 8-hr
standard. Attaining a 0.07 ppm, 8-hr stan dard results in a further reduc
tion to about 3.0 percent of outdoor children estimated to experie nce

"'

1
this e ffect. -4

In other words, EPA's own 0.08 ppm standard would reduce the
median percentage of children experiencing lung function decre
ments by less than 1 % (0.9% ) relative to an 0.09 ppm standard (which
is roughly equivalent to the preexisting one-hour, 0 . 1 2 ppm, stan
dard) . 242 In contrast, an 0.07 ppm standard would reduce this same
health endpoint by an additional 3.8% or would provide more than
four times the health benefits of the 0.08 ppm standard. If reducing
this endpoint by 0.9% is "requisite to protect the public health ," 243
then consis tency should have dictated that reducing the same end
point by 3.8% would also be "requisite ."
EPA's attempt to justify its decision to reject the lower 0.07
ppm standard marked a departure from the past interpretations that
EPA and the courts had given to section 1 09 of the Clean Air Act.
NAAQS traditionally have been understood not only to protect
healthy persons, but also to protect the health of sensi tive sub
groups. �44 EPA identified several ozone sensitive groups, including
children playing outdoors on hot summer days and children suffering
from asthma and other respiratory illnesses. Moreover, even among
healthy individuals, there is substantial variability in the response to

2'11

OZONE STAFF PAPER, supra note 1 63 , at 203. FEV1 refers to "forced expiratory
volume," whi ch is the volume of air that can be exp i r ed in one second by a subject and
a frequently used measure of lung function. In the proposed rule , EPA states that the
0.08 ppm standard will reduce the med i an percen t o f outdoor children experiencing
15% FEV1 d e cre m en ts to 5 . 1 %, rather than the 6.8% figure cited in the S taff Paper,
while th e fi gur es for the 0.09 and 0.07 ppm standards remain the same in th e two
do cumen ts (7.7% and 3.0%, respectively) . National Ambient Air Quality Standards for
Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 65 , 7 1 6 , 65,725 (P roposed Dec. 1 3, 1 996) ( to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 50) [hereinafter EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule ] . No explanation is given by
EPA for this discrepancy. Even if the figure cited in the propo sed rule is the correct
one, it means that the benefit of reducing the standard from 0.09 ppm to 0.08 ppm is a
2.6 % (7.7% minus 5. 1 % ) reduction in children with such lung decrements, whereas to
reduce the standard to 0.07 ppm would produce a further 2. 1 % (5. 1 % m inus 3.0% )
reduction in this health effect. !d. EPA would be hard-pressed to justify why a 2.6%
percent reduction in this health effect i s im portant while a further 2. 1 % reduction is
not, and EPA did not attempt to provide any such justification .
24� EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 6 2 Fed. Reg. a t 38,858.
24 1 42 u.s.c. § 7409 (b) ( l ) (2000) .
'J-l-t
Supra notes 1 93-97 and accompanying text.
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5
ozone. 24 The existence of susceptible subgroups and the variability of
responses makes it impossible to identify an ozone exposure level at
which no significant adverse health effects would ever occur.
EPA purported to j ustify its selection of an 0.08 ppm ozone stan
dard based on its claim that "an estimated 40-65 % more children
would experience health effects that could limit their activity and in
some cases require medical treatment" at an 0.09 ppm ozone stan
dard. 246 The Agency noted that [ t] hese effects would occur an esti
mated 70-120% more times per year-a significant consideration
given concems about repeated exposures." 2 47 EPA relied on scientific
evidence showing that under the 0 . 09 ppm standard (which approxi
mated the preexisting standard) an estimated 4 1 ,000 children in the
nine cities studied would suffer moderate-to-severe pain upon deep
breathing at least once per year. 248 The Agency estimated a reduction
in this number to 27,000 children under the 0.08 standard it se
lected. 249 However, at the 0.07 ppm standard rej ected by EPA, only
about 9000 children would experience moderate or severe pain from
5
breathing. 2 0 EPA's estimates were similar for large decreases in lung
function (i.e., decreases of at least 20% ) . At the 0.09 ppm level,
97,000 children in the nine cities studied would suffer these large de
creases in lung function , while only 58,000 cases were predicted at the
25
0.08 ppm level chosen by EPA. 1 Yet, at the rej ected 0.07 ppm level,
"

245

E.g., EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 1 5- 1 6 (" [A] pproximately 520% o f healthy individuals appear to be unusually sensitive to ozone. For these ' hype r
responders,' even low ozone exposures may trigger responses that interfere with nor
mal activity." (citations omitted) ) ; CRITERIA DOCUMENT, supra note 1 63 , at 9-4 ( "There
is a large range of physiological responses among humans, with at least a 1 0-fold dif
fe rence between the most and least responsive individuals.") ; OZONE STAFF PAPE R, su
pra note 1 63, at 69 ( [T] here is wide variability in the severity of response to 03 among
both healthy individuals and those with impaired respiratory systems . " ) .
246
EPA, D. C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 23 (citing Ozone Final Rule , supra
note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38865, 38868) .
2-ll !d. at 23-24 (citation omitted ) .
''48
.
- EPA, Ozone Fmal
Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,865; EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 24 1 , 6 1 Fed. Reg. at 65,725; see also Brief of Amici Curiae Sena
tor Orrin Hatch and Represen tative Tom Bliley in Support of Respondents at 28-29,
Browner v. Am. Trucking A�s 'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 ( 200 1 ) (No. 99-1 257) (citing this evi
dence to exemplify EPA's arbitrary line drawing) .
2 19
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,865 .
2"0
EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 24 1 , 61 Fed. Reg. at 65, 725 tbl. l (0.3%
of 3.1 million outdoor children in the nine urban areas ) .
2"1
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38 ,865 .
"
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only about 1 2 ,000 children would suffer similar effects. 252 E PA never
offered the public any reason for why it believed it needed to lower
the standard to protect 1 4,000 children from moderate-to-severe pain
from breathing but at the same time it could reject an even lower
standard that would have protected still 1 8,000 more children from
the same effects. Nor did it explain why protecting an additional
39,000 children from decreases in lung function j ustified lowering the
standard but protecting still 46,000 more children did not.
As the Agency proceeded through several rounds of litigation over
the ozone revisions, a purported explanation for EPA's choice of an
0.08 ppm standard did appear to emerge. In the initial round of re
view, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that EPA failed to articulate an "intelligible principle" to constrain its
25
discretion . 3 Dissenting from that panel's holding, Judge David Tatel
articulated a science-based argument that EPA would refine and ad
vance in subsequent rounds of litigation. 254 He argued that the scien
tific evidence and advice on ozone did indeed provide a clear basis for
EPA's choice of a new NAAQS standard. Judge Tatel argued that "dif
ferent types of health effects [are] observed above and below [0] . 08
ppm," the level selected by EPA. 25 5 Specifically, he opined that the
health effects below 0.08 ppm were qualitatively different in that they
were "transient and reversible." 256 He also claimed that the scientific
evidence indicated that normal background levels of ozone sometimes
occur at 0.07 ppm but not at 0.08 ppm. 257
In petitioning the D.C. Circuit for a rehearing and advancing ar
guments on further appeal , EPA resurrected Judge Tatel's arguments
9
5

-

2

EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 241 , 6 1 Fed. Reg. at 65,725 tbl. 1 (0 .4%
of 3.1 million outdoor children i n the nine urban areas) .
253 Am. Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d. 1 027, 1 034 (D.C. Cir. 1 999) , aff'd in part
and -rev 'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass ' ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) The
court stated that "EPA's explanations for its decisions amoun t to assertions that a less
stringent standard would allow the relevant pollutant to i nflict a greater quantum o f
harm o n public health, and that a more stringent standard would result in less harm,"
and fails to set a specific "requisite" pollution level to "protect the public health ." !d. at
1 035.
2 5 4 !d. at 1 05 7-62 (Tate!, J., dissenting) ; see Pierce, supra note 1 8 , at 75 (Judge
Tatel's "dissen ting opinion in A TA . . . contains a typical symptom of the science cha
rade .") .
255 Am. Trucking, 1 75 F.3d at 1 059 (Tate!, J . , dissenting) .
2s6
Id.
5
2 7 Id. at 1 059-60. Not surprisingly, Judge Tate! acce p ted these same arguments in
the final round of litigation, authoring the panel opinion that upheld EPA's actions
under the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review. Am. Trucking Ass ' ns v. EPA,
283 F. 3d 355, 358 ( D . C . Cir. 2002) .
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in defending its a1r quality standards. 258 EPA came to argue that it
"sets primary NAAQS at levels that provide protection from medically
significant risks and not at levels that protect against any and all risks,
2
or any and all effects . " 59 EPA also asserted that the standards should
be set at the lowest level at which studies indicated a statistically sig
nificant increase in "adverse effects , " which the Agency redefined as
2
health effects that are not "transient and reversible ." 60 EPA thus ar
gued to the court that the scientific evidence on ozone indicated a
break point at 0.08 ppm, even though EPA also acknowledged, and
the record showed, that there was no known threshold for health ef?
fects from ozone.-6 1
EPA purported to identify "important and meaningful differences
in the character of the scientific evidence regarding risks-including
the estimated frequency and duration of adverse health effects-asso
2
ciated with levels above and below 0.08 ppm. "2 6 For example, EPA
argued to the Supreme Court that the scientific evidence did not sup
port se tting an ozone standard below 0.08 ppm:

2 5 3 Petition for Rehearing and Petition for Rehearing En Bane fo r the Un ited
States Environmental Protection Agency at 1 5- 1 7 , Am. Truckin g Ass' ns v. EPA, 283
F . 3d 355 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ( Nos. 97-1 440, 9 7- 1 44 1 ) [hereinafter EPA, Petition for Re
hearing] ; see also, EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, sujJra note 69, at 28-30 (stating the
EPA's argument on which Judge Tate! relied in his dissenting opinion in American
Tntcking Ass 'ns) .
2
59 EPA, Supreme Court Respondents ' Brief, supra note 60, at 33; see also id. at 36
("Section 1 09 (b) ( 2 ) [ of the Clean Air Act] clearly directs that EPA must set NAAQS at
levels requisite to protect the general population, or iden tifiable groups within com
munities, from medically significant effects.") .
260
EPA, Petition for Rehearing, supra note 258, at 1 6.
261
!d. at 1 3 .
21;2
EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief, supra note 57, at 33; see also EPA, Peti
tion for Rehearing, supra note 258, at 1 7 (" [T] he c haracter of the scien tific evidence
differed for levels above and below 0.08 ppm, and supported the selection of the 0.08
ppm level as 'requisite ' to protect public h ealth . " ) . This argument was not made in
this form in the proceedings below. In the rulemaking itself, and in the original D.C.
Ci rcuit litigation , EPA summarily dismissed an 0.07 ppm alternative with the simple
assertion that " [b] ecause health impacts below 0.08 ppm were less certain and likely to
be less serious, the Administrator focused on the 0.08 and 0.09 ppm alternatives ."
EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 23 (citing EPA, Ozone Final Rule, sujmt
note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,863, 38,868) . As with the PM rulemaking, EPA again in
voked uncertainty as a wild card. Even though uncertainty was ostensibly a barrier to
the adoption of the 0.07 ppm standard, it did not keep EPA from defending its deci
sion to lower the standard to 0.08 ppm based on "suspected, but not yet demon strated,
chronic effects" and an obligation to "err on the side of caution." EPA, 200 1 D .C. Cir.
Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 27 (quoting Lead Indus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 5 3
( 1 980) ) .
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[ T ] he record showed that average responses caused b y exposures even a t

0 .08 p p m were "typically small o r mild i n nature ."

The Admi n i s trator

recognized that repeated exposures at the 0.08 ppm level could p oten
tially p roduce adverse effects for some u nusually sensitive individuals,
b u t the record in dicated that the " m o s t certain " ozon e-re lated effects at
and below that leve l , even when adverse, are "transien t and reversible . "
Moreover, the quan titative exposure a n d risk assessm e n ts showed t h a t a
standard set at 0.08 ppm would significan tly reduce the numbe r of such
exposures.

As fo r more serious health effe c ts, EPA lacked clinical data

i ndicatin g the existence of an exposure-response relationship at ozone
9 63

levels below 0.08 ppm . -

While rej ection of an 0.07 ppm standard may have been sound or
even compelling on policy grounds, the "character of the scientific
evidence" alone did not, nor could not, justifY rejection of a standard
9
lower than 0.08 ppm.-64
Mter all, according to EPA, there was no scientifically established
threshold at which no "adverse effects" occurred. In promulgating its
final ozone standard, EPA stated that it did not "seem possible , in the
Administrator's judgment, to identifY a level at which it can be con
cluded with confidence that no ' adverse' effects are likely to occur." 2 1;c,
EPA's own brief in the Supreme Court acknowledged that " [ t] he evi
dence showed a continuum of risk within the range considered [i.e.,
0.07 to 0.09 ppm] , with statistically significant decreases in risk and
corresponding increases in public health protection for successively
2
more stringent eight-hour ozone standards." 66 Similarly, in the pre
amble to the proposed ozone standard, EPA concluded that " [w] ithin
any given urban area, statistically significant reductions in exposure
and risk associated with functional and symptomatic effects result
from alternative 8-hour standards as the level changes from 0.09 ppm
to 0.08 ppm to 0.07 ppm." 267 EPA acknowledged that the science
showed "no break poin t or bright line that differentiates between ac
ceptable and unacceptable risks within this range." 2fiH
In rejecting industry arguments that there appeared to be a
threshold for respiratory effects at 0.08 ppm, EPA argued that there
were moderate decrements in lung function (FEV 1 ) in a significant
263
264

EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief,

supra n o te 5 7 ,

at

14

( c i tations omitted) .

For purpose of the following analysis, we assume the validity of EPA's conclu-

sions on the results and meaning of the scientific evidence.
21;5

26r,
21;7
268

EPA, Ozone Final Rule,

supra note 8,

62 Fed. Reg. at

38,863.
supra note 60, at 1 2 .
24 1 , 61 Fed. Reg. at 65 ,728.

EPA, Supreme Court Respondents' Brief,
EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule,

.
Jd

supra note
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percentage of the population a t 0.08 ppm and that, moreover, "the
respons e rates at 0.07 ppm are only slightly less than these values." 2 69
EPA also found "clear evidence from hospital admission studies that
effects may continue down to background [0.04 ppm] ." 270 Indeed, al
though the relationship between ozone levels and hospital admissions
appeared somewhat less certain at lower levels, the Agency concluded
that there was "a consistency between studies which supports the asso
ciations at all levels studied" (that is, down to background levels of
0.04 ppm) . 27 1 Thus, for the very health effects on which EPA based its
selection of the 0.08 ppm ozone standard, namely respiratory effects
and hospital admissions, EPA ' s own findings in the record demon
strated that such effects occur at ozone levels well below 0.08 ppm .
Moreover, while the record showed a continuum in the frequency
and severity of respiratory effects at successively lower ozone levels, it
did not show a discernible discontinuum at 0.08 ppm between those
effects that were transient and reversible and those that were more
permanent, as Judge Tatel and EPA argued. 27 2 The maj ority of the
respiratory effects on which EPA relied to lower the primary ozone
standard down to 0.08 ppm were also transient and reversible. 2 73 Most
significantly, by invoking a distinction between effects that were tran
sient and reversible and those that were not, EPA again shifted its po
sition without offering any j ustifications . When EPA last revised the
ozone standard in 1 979, it relied on the same types of transient respi
ratory health effects to support its standard, expressly finding that
such effects were of concern and "adverse," " [e ] ven when reversible"
and "even though transitory." 271 Similarly, when the Agency previously
-?t)<). EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 1 36, at 82.
Id. at 84.
271
Jd. Moreover, even if the effects at the lower levels may have appeared less cer
tain, EPA was supposed to adopt a margin of safety to protect against less certain, or
even unknown , risks. For our previous extensive discussion on EPA's ad hoc approach
to the margin of safety requirement under the Clean Air Act, see supra notes 1 86-90
and accompanying text.
272
See Am . Trucking Ass ' ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 059 (D.C. Cir. 1 999 ) , aff 'd in
jJart and rev 'd in jJart sub nom. Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass 'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 )
(Tate!, J , dissenting) (arguing that health effects below 0.08 ppm were qualitatively
different in that they were "transient and reversible") .
27:1 As
the majori ty opinion in the D.C. Circuit noted, "it is far from apparent that
any health e ffects existing above the [0.08 ppm] level are permanent or irreversible."
!d. at l 035.
27'1
EPA, 1 979 Ozone Rule, supra note 1 96, 44 Fed. Reg. at 8207. One of the key
studies relied upon by EPA in 1979 found that subje cts were uncomfortable when ex
ercising while exposed to higher levels of ozone, but that " [t] he discomfort disap
peared shortly afte r t h e termination of the expe ri ment." See LESTER B. LAVE, THE
270
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revised the PM standard in 1987, it set the standard "in the lower por
tion of the range where sensitive, reversible physiological responses of
uncertain health significance are possibly, but not definitely, observed in
25
children. " 7
EPA's attempt to construct a scientific demarcation
based on whether effects are transient and reversible was therefore
neither supported by the record nor consistent with its own past deci
sions.
EPA has treated health effects as relevant when they could j ustify
the standard that EPA preferred, but then discounted these same
health effects in explaining why it did not adopt a more stringent al
ternative . For example, in its 1 993 decision not to revise the 0 . 1 2 ppm
ozone standard, EPA determined that lung function decrements in
the range of ten to twenty percent, even "when accompanied by symp
toms," were not "adverse effects." 27ti Yet, in revising the same standard
in 1 997, EPA shifted its position concluding that a moderate lung
decrement in the range of ten to twenty percent was indeed an "ad
2
verse effect." 7 7 In defending its most recent ozone standard against
industry attacks that it was based on nonserious and reversible lung
effects, EPA accused industry of "seek[ing] to trivialize lung function

STRATEGY OF SO CIAL REGULATION: DECISION FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 1 04 ( 1 98 1 )
(describing the DeLucia and Adams study relied upon by EPA in the 1 979 revision of
the ozone standard) .
275 EPA, 1 987 PM Rule, supra note 1 9 3 , 52 Fed . Reg. at 2 4,643 ( emphases added ) .
9 76
- EPA, 1 992 Ozone Proposal, supra note 1 98 , 57 Fed . Reg. at 35,549. The proposal also states:
[ I ] ndividuals exposed to lower levels of 03 (e.g. , 0 . 1 2 to 0. 1 5 ppm) typically
experience only mild and transient functional decreme nts [anywhere from a
-9 to -1 6 perce n t decline in FEV1 , id. at 35,548 . ] . . . [This] may be accompa
nied by symptoms such as cough, chest tightness, pain on deep inspiration,
and throat irritation . . . .

!d .

. . . Although there is a difference of opinion among the EPA's scien tific ad
visors as to the significance of decrements in lung function in the range of 10
to 20 percent when accompanied by symptoms, it is the Administrator's judg
ment that the lesse r effects associated with exposure to 03 in the range of 0 . 1 2
ppm to 0 . 1 5 ppm observed in the controlled human studies d o not consti tute
adverse effects for purposes of section 1 09 of the Act.

277 See EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 1 7 (no ting that E PA
''concluded that ' moderate' effects . . . experienced by asthmatics [defined as 1 0 to 20
percent FEV1 decrements ] would likely be adverse because they could i n terfere with
normal activity. " ) . Likewise, in its 1 9 79 revision of the ozone standard, E PA concluded
that lung fun c tion decre ments in the range of 5 to 1 5 % were adverse effects. See EPA,
1979 Ozone Rule, supra note 1 96, 44 Fed. Reg. at 8207 (" [T] he expe rts' judgments var
ied as to the poin t at which adverse effects would begin, but fell within the range of a 5
to 1 5 percent decrease .") .
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decrements and respiratory symptoms, . . . [when] these effects can be
sufficiently severe to disrupt the normal activity of both healthy indi
278
Similarly, when EPA revised its ozone stan
vidual s and asthmatics. "
dard in 1 979, it concluded that physical discomfort and pulmonary
function changes, " [e]ven when reversible" and "even though transi
tory," were "adverse effects" that needed to be taken into account "in
9
selecting the level of the primary standard." 27 Yet, in defending its
1 99 7 revision to the ozone standard, EPA argued that it was j ustified
in disregarding the health effects that occur at levels below 0.08 ppm
since "these effects ( e.g. , lung function decreases and coughs) are less
280 The same kind
serious because they are ' transient and reversible. "'
of health effects seemed relevant when they supported EPA's decision
to lower standards, but irrelevant when EPA needed to defend its de
cision not to lower standards still further.
EPA also justified its rejection of the 0.07 ppm standard by stating
that the lower standard "would be closer to peak background levels
that infrequently occur in some areas due to nonanthropogenic
sources of 0 3 precursors, and thus more likely to be inappropriately
1
targeted in some areas on such sources." 28 Of course, it bears noting
initially that any argument about setting standards to avoid naturally
occurring background levels departs from a purely health-focused jus
tification for a risk standard. It speaks to the standard's feasibility, a
factor that EPA has otherwise claimed is impermissible to use in set
R2
ting air quality standards. 2 Indeed, in previous NAAQS rulemakings,
EPA specifically rejected industry arguments that EPA should consider
the feasibility problems created by setting air quality standards too

2

78

EPA, D . C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 33 (citation omitted ) .
2 9 EPA, 1 979 Ozone Rule, supra note 1 96, 4 4 Fed. Reg. at 8207.
Likewise, in its
1 987 revision to the PM standards, EPA set the standard at a level where "reversible"
effects of "uncertain health significance" may "possibly, but not definitely" occur. EPA,
1 987 PM Rule, supra note 1 9 3, 52 Fe d. Reg. at 24,643.
280
EPA, Petition fo r Rehearing, supra note 258, at 1 6. Elsewhere in the litigation
over its NAAQS revisions, EPA emphasized the transient and reversible nature of
health effects observed at lower levels in defending its decision to reject a more strin
gen t standard. See EPA, 200 1 D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 69, at 28-30 (arguing
that while a 0.08 ppm standard may lead to adverse effects, they are transient and re
versible and, therefore, "less serious") .
281
EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868.
282
See, e.g. , EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,683 ( "For more
than a quarter of a cen tury, EPA has interpreted section 1 09 of the [ Clean Air] Act as
precluding consideration of the economic costs or technical feasibility of implement
ing NAAQS in setting them .") .
7
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2
close to the background levels . 83 If health is the only permissible con
sideration under the Clean Air Act, as EPA has argued and the courts
have affirmed, then it should not matter whether a standard is set
near or even below background levels . 284
Even if background levels were considered to be relevant, EPA's
concern about an 0.07 ppm standard approaching background levels
was not supported by the Agency's own estimates in the rulemaking
record. In conducting its risk assessment, and again in making its ar
gument to the D.C. Circuit, EPA assumed a background level of 0.04
5
ppm-not 0.07 ppm. 28 The Agency's Staff Paper indicated that "it is
reasonable to estimate that the 8-hour daily maximum 0 3 during the
summer is also in the range of 0.03 to 0.05 ppm." 285 Moreover, EPA
specifically rej ected arguments made by industry during rulemaking
27
that background levels may approach 0.08 ppm. 8 In doing so, EPA
stated that:
While background concentrations of 03 can be as high as 0.05 ppm, unless 0,1
concen trations are affected by anthropogenic VOC and/or NOx emissions, 8hr 03 background conce ntrations will typically be much lower than 0 .0 5 ppm.
A reasonable estimate of the 8-h r daily maximum 03 background during the
'>
summer season is 0.03-0.05 ppm. -88

28"

See, e.g. , Am . Petroleum I nst. v. Castle, 665 F.2d 1 1 76, 1 1 90 ( D . C . Cir. 1 98 1 )
( upholding EPA's refusal even to docket evidence submitted by industry claiming that
attainment of an ozone standard would be precluded by background ozone areas in
many parts of the coun try because "the EPA position that attainability is not cen tral to
a rulemaking of this type is correct") .
?84
In other regulatory programs, EPA has sought to reduce pollutan ts to below
background levels. For example, EPA's recently promulgated standard for arsenic lev
els in drinking water primarily controls naturally occurring levels of arsenic. See EPA,
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations: Arsenic and Clarifications to Compli
ance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976 (Jan. 2 2 , 200 1 ), ( to
be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts . 9, 1 4 1 , 1 42 ) (establishing "a health-based, non-e nforceable
Maximum Contaminant Level Goal ( MCLG) for arsenic of zero") . EPA has also taken
steps to address radon, another naturally occurring pollutant. See generally EPA, indoor
Air-Radon (Rn), http:/ / www . epa.gov/ iaq/radon/index.html (last updated Feb. 1 0 ,
2004) (describin g EPA activities i n addressing radon) . I n any case, E P A added a new
provision into 40 C.F.R. p t. 50 app. I , that created a compliance exemption for peak
ozone concentrations if they are associated with forest fires, stratospheric ozone in tru
sion , or "other natural events." See EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note
1 36, at 95 (se tting forth the justifications for adding the compliance exempti on ) . The
existence of an exemption such as this one undercuts the claim that EPA could not set
the standard lower than 0.08 ppm because of background ozone levels.
285
EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 20 n . l 9, 47 (footnote omitted) .
286
OZONE STAFF PAPER supra n ote 1 6 3 , at 2 3 .
"-8 7
EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO COMM ENTS, supra note 1 36, at 86.
288
!d.; see also id. at 93-94 (argui ng that background levels will be below 0.05 ppm
unless affected by anthropogenic emission s ) .
,
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EPA did acknowledge that "at remote o r rural sites 0 3 concentra
tions can exceed 0.07 ppm," but dismissed the relevance of this find
ing because most of these concentrations were, in the Agency's view,
289
EPA's claim that it could not adopt an
cause d by human activities.
0.07 ppm standard because it was too close to background level did
not comport with past positions taken by the Agency, nor with the
2
Agency 's own positions adopted earlier in the rulemaking. 90
In its rulemaking and subsequent rounds of litigation, EPA of
fered one remaining defense of its decision to reject the lower 0.07
ppm standard. The Agency claimed it was justified in its decision not
to set a NAAQS below 0.08 ppm based on the fact that no member of
EPA's CASAC supported a standard below 0.08 ppm. 29 1 Of course,
the statute delegates the authority to select a standard to the EPA
Administrator, not to CASAC. 292 In its subsequent brief before the
Supreme Court, EPA acknowledged that CASAC "did not relieve
the Administrator of her duty to reach decisions on specific NAAQS

289

Jd. at 86; see also id. at 94 (asserting that i t is "clear that the component consist
ing of natural background 03 is only a frac tion of rural 0,. concentrations, which are
clearly increased by h uman activities throughout the U.S. " ) .
290
See Oren, supra n o te 1 8 , at 1 0,659 (arguing that th e Agency's reasoning in
adopting its ozone standard was flawed because it failed to explain why the back
ground level was relevan t) .
291
EPA, Supreme Court Petitioners' Brief, supra note 57, at 1 4 ( noting that "none
of the CASAC advisors recommended setting the revised NAAQS at a level below 0.08
ppm" ) . Judge Tate! had advanced this point in his dissent in American Trucking Ass 'ns
v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 059 (D.C. Cir. 1 999 ) , aff'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 5 3 1 U . S. 457 (200 1 ) , and used it again in the panel
opinion in the D .C. Circui t's second round of review in the case. See Am Trucking
Ass 'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 379 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ("EPA is entitled to give 'significant
weight' to the fact that no committee member advocated a level of 0.07 ppm." (quot
ing EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868 ) ) ; see also Am Pe tro
leum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1 1 76, 1 1 88 (D.C. Cir. 1 98 1 ) (stating that EPA is required
" to submit the criteria document and standard to the SAB [Science Advisory Board]
for comment, but it was not obligated to obtain SAB approval of either before promul
gation of a final standard") . This decision was made under the same statutory provi
sion that provides CASAC authority, but before the relevant subcommittee of SAB was
renamed CASAC. H . R. REP. N o . 95-722, at 1 6 ( 1 977 ) , reprinted in 1977 U.S.C. C.A.N.
3293, 3295 (stating that the SAB 's review of EPA's air qual ity standards and criteria
documenrs"is intended to be advisory only") .
292 Whitman, 5 3 1 U.S. at 462-63 (200 1 ) ("Once a NAAQS has been promulgated,
the Administrator must review the standard (and the criteria on which it is based) 'at
five-year
intervals' and make 'such revisions . . . as may be approp riate . "' (quoting 42
"
U .S. C. § 7409 (d) ( 1 ) (2000) ) ) ; see also Am. Tr.,ucking Ass 'n s, 283 F . 3d at 358 ( describing
CASAC as an advisory commi ttee ) .
.

.
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levels." 293 The function of CASAC is to provide scientific advice, not to
make the risk management choices necessary for selecting a stan
dard. 294
Admittedly, some members of CASAC did express their "personal
2
preferences" for specific levels for the revised standards. % As EPA
has recognized elsewhere, however, the individual preferences of CA
SAC members are distinct from the collective findings of the entire
committee, which comprise the official advice that EPA must con
2
sider. 9 6 CASAC as a whole expressly concluded that the selection of
the ozone standard was a policy choice for the Administrator, rather
than a scientific determination within the expertise of the commit
tee. 297 Even though the individual views of CASAC members provided
neither a legal basis for, nor a limitation on , the Administrator's deci
sions, it is interesting to note that more than half of those members
who expressed a view actually supported a level higher than 0.08
ppm. 298 In the end, EPA effectively claimed that it was entitled to give
''93

-

EPA, Supreme Court Respondents' Brief, supra note 60, at I I . EPA ac knowledged that the official CASAC consensus view was limited to providing scientific advice ,
not advising on the ultimate selection of a regulatory standard: "Once th e Administra
tor had concluded that the NAAQS required revision, she-unlike CASAC-had to
resolve the uncertainties associated with those decisions." ld.
'>94
See EPA, No. A-95-54, RESPONSES TO SIGNIFICAt'\!T COMMENTS ON THE 1 99 6
PROPOSED RULE O N THE NATIONAL AlvlBIENT AI R QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PAR
TICULATE MATTER 26-27 ( 1 997) [herei nafter EPA, PM RESPONSE TO COMMENTS) (re
jecting comments that CASAC's failure to reach consensus on the Agency's c hosen
standards undermines the basis for those standards because such arguments "appear to
rest on questionable assumptions about the role and purposes of CASAC review,"
which is to provide scientific advice that the Administrator must consider "but is not
bound" by) .
295 EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 37 ( describing the views of indi
vidual CASAC members as "personal preferences") ; see also Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 283
F.3d at 379 ( noting that ten CASAC members expressed opinions about where the re
vised standard should be set) .
296 April 23, 1 997 H earing, supra note 74, at 370 ( "While ten of the 1 6 CASAC
members who reviewed the ozone staff paper expressed their preferences as to the
level of the standard, all believe it is ultimately a policy decision for EPA to make . " ) ;
EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra-note 59, at 37 ( "CASAC recognized that these views
were just that-'personal preferences'-and distinguished them fro m the committe e's
consensus view that the selection of a standard was a 'policy judgment' for the Admin
istrator." ) ; EPA, PM RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 294, at 29 ( " [ I ) t is important
to separate the personal opinions that individual members might express on particular
policy choices such as standard levels from their scien tific conclusions on the range of
options that is supported by the scien ce and should be considered by the Administra
tor. ") .
2'17 Supra notes 1 43-45, 1 79 and accompanying text.
�YH
EPA, Ozone Proposed Rule, supra note 241 , 6 1 Fed . Reg. at 65 ,729 (noting that
"while some CASAC members supported the choice of the proposed 0.08 ppm, fu lly
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significant weight to individual views of CASAC members when it bol
stered the Agency's decision not to lower the standard to 0.07 ppm,
but that it did not need to give them this same weight when it was less
supportive of the Agency's position.
In sum, EPA's attempt in litigation to argue that science com
pelled it to reject any ozone standard below 0.08 ppm was inconsistent
with numerous other Agency positions. The Agency disregarded the
health effects from exposures below 0.08 ppm, abandoning the posi
tion it took in previous NAAQS rulemakings that transient and re
versible effects warranted regulatory protection. EPA's position on
background levels in litigation was inconsistent with its analysis of
background levels in the rulemaking record and with its previous dis
missal of industry concerns about background levels. Finally, EPA's
position was inconsistent with its purported health-only construction
of the Clean Air Act, as presumably would have been any decision to
set a standard other than zero for a non-threshold pollutant. Reject
ing an 0.07 ppm ozone standard may well have been an appropriate
decision, but it could only be defended on public policy grounds, not
based on scientific evidence or expertise. EPA identified no such pol
icy reason to j ustify why it effectively turned its back on the adverse ef
fects that some citizens will continue to experience even if all parts of
the country come into compliance with the Agency's new standards.
D . Comparing the Health Benefits of the Ozone and
Particulate Matter Standards
One of the most striking examples of regulatory incoherence in
EPA's NAAQS revisions lies in the disparity between the health bene
fits from the revised ozone standards and the revised particulate mat
ter standard. 299 In refusing a more stringent alternative for the PM
half or more of the CASAC panel members expressing views on a specific level sup
ported a specific level or range of levels that include 0.09 ppm" ) . Furthermore, EPA
did not defer in the same way to the views of CASAC members when it came to setting
the level of its revised PM standard. Of the twenty-two members of the CASAC pan el,
only four expressed a preference for the more stringen t PM alternatives in EPA's pro
posal. Robert W. Crandall, The Costly Pursuit of the Impossible, BROOKINGS REV., Summer
l 997, at 4 1 , 45.

299 See, e.g., Lester B. Lave , Clean Air Sense, BROOKINGS REv. , Summer 1 997, at 4 1 ,
43 (noting -that EPA estimated its ozone standard would provide at most $ 1 .5 billion
annually in health benefits, while i ts particulate standard would offe r as much as $ 1 1 0

billion in health benefits) . EPA's starkly disparate responses to heal th benefits across
the two standards is an example of comparative incoherence. See Cary Coglianese,
Bounded Evaluation: Cognition, Incoherence, and Regulatmy Policy, 54 STAN . L. REv. 1 2 1 7 ,
1 22 3 (2002) (noting that comparative incoherence arises when one regulation "turns
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standard, EPA rejected an option that would have achieved a much
greater gain in health benefits than the gain EPA anticipated from its
revision of the ozone standard. If protecting the public health with an
adequate margin of safety did not require the Agency to lower the PM
standard still further, then it is far from clear why the Agency was j usti
fied in revising its ozone standard at all.
Based on staff analysis, and consistent with CASAC' s advice, the
Agency assumed that the new ozone standard would not achieve any
0 In quantifying the nonmortality health
reduction in mortality. 30
benefits of the new ozone standard, EPA estimated the total
monetized value to be $0.06 billion. 30 1 In contrast, EPA estimated that
�
lowering the daily PM 2 5 standard from the selected 65 pg/m level to
50 pg/m 3 would produce an additional $ 1 .64 billion in nonmortality

out to be inconsistent with o ther regulations of eithe r the same general type or other
types altogethe r" ) .
:wo
In setting the ozone standard, EPA found that there was insufficient evidence
of any association between ozone exposure and mortali ty, and therefore it did not rely
on any reduction in mortality to justify its new ozone standard. See, e.g. , OZONE STAFF
PAPER, supra note 1 63, at 71 (concluding that "only limited, suggestive evidence" exists
that " [ a] n increase in daily mortality [is] associated with 03 exposure" ) ; id. at 72 (not
ing that "associations between 0,1 exposure and chronic health impacts have not been
sufficiently demonstrated in humans" ) . EPA identified and used some recent scientific
studies identifying a mortality risk from ozone in its Regulatory Impact Analysis, which
had the effect of substantially increasing the Agency's estimate of the benefits of the
revised ozone standard while making clear that "this evidence was not used in the
NAAQS standard setting process . " EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSES F O R THE
PARTICULATE MATTER AND OZONE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY STANDARDS
AND PROPOSED REGIONAL HAZARD 2-9 ( 1 997 ) , [hereinafter RIA] available at h ttp: / /
www. epa.gov/ ttn/oarpg/naaqsfin/ria.html.
The EPA's response t o ozone comments
stated:
[P] remature mortality associated with 01 was not given substantial considera
tion during this review of the 03 primary NAAQS. Because some of the new
studies were considered in the Regulatory I mpact Analysis, some commen ters
may have believed mistakenly that they were considered in review of the
NAAQS . . . EPA did not give significant weight to that mortali ty evidence.
EPA, OZONE RESPONSE TO COMMENTS, supra note 1 36, at 48-49.
301
RIA , supra note 300, at 1 2 - 70 tbl . l 2-19 (estimating health benefits of the new
'
standard using an assumption of a constant annual PM standard o f 15 pg/m ) . In the
RIA, EPA claimed that some new studies not reviewed by CASAC strengthened the evi
dence for some reduced mortality benefits from the ozone standard. Although the
RIA made clear that EPA did not rely on reduced mortali ty in selecting the ozone
standard, id. at 1 2- 1 5 , 1 2-1 9 , it included an estimate of potential m ortality reduction
benefits to produce a "high-end" ozone benefits estimate. !d. at 1 2-20 to 1 2-2 1 . The
es timated reduced mortality would increase the health benefits of the ozone standard
from $0.06 to $ 1 .76 billion. Id. at 1 2-70 tbl . l 2- 1 9 . Even this latter figure, however, is
smaller than the incremental benefits of the revisions to the PM�5 standard previously
discussed.
.
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3
health benefits . 02 EPA's analysis did not permit a direct comparison
of the mortality benefits of the two PM2 5 alternatives, but given that
most of the health benefits from the PM�5 standards are from reduced
mortality , the total marginal health benefits of reducing the PM 2 5
standard from 65 to 50 pg/m 3 would likely have been much larger
than $ 1 .7 billion. The incremental benefits of reducing the daily PM
standard still further to 25 pg/m 3 would have been even larger, but
they were not calculated by EPA.
EPA's analysis clearly indicates that the health benefits foregone
by EPA's decision not to tighten the PM 2 5 daily standard below the 65
pg/m3 level dwarfed the total health benefits of the ozone standard
(by a factor of approximately 50) . 303 EPA claimed that its ozone revi
sion was necessary in order to protect public health with an adequate
margin of safety, but it also argued that a further tightening of the PM
standard to achieve significantly greater health benefits was not neces
sary to protect public health with an adequate margin of safety. EPA
offered no explanation for why its treatment of health risks should
vary markedly from one pollutant to another.' �04

302

RIA, supra note 300, at 1 2-44 tbl . l 2 .5 (listing high-end estimated monetized
health benefits for partial attainment of each of the two PM25 standards ) . EPA calcu
lated the mortality benefi ts of the two standards using slightly different methodologies,
so a dire c t apples-to-apples comparison is not possible, although the monetized mortal
3
ity health benefits of the 50 pg/m standards appear, as expected, to b e larger than the
"
benefits fo r the 65 pg/m standard.
:lo�
Furthermore, this inconsistency cannot be explained based on the uncertainty
contained in any risk analysis. Both the ozone and PM risk assessmen ts involve sub
stantial uncertainty, as EPA acknowledges. EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62
Fed. Reg. at 38 ,860 (i ndicating that "the Administrator and CASAC recognized that
there are many uncertainties inherent in such [risk assessment] analyses" of ozone ex
posure) ; EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,65 6 (noting that the
"quantitative risk estimates include significant uncertainty" ) . Moreover, the PM25 risk
estimates for the regulatory increments not adopted by EPA come from the same stud
ies and data sets that EPA used to justify the PM2 5 standard i t did select. Given that
there is no qualitative break point in the extent of uncertainty in those data, EPA can
not on one hand say that the data above its selected standard is sufficiently certain to
support regulation, but the data, produced with the same method and in the same
studies, below its standard is too uncertain to be treated as credible. See a lso supra
notes 229-32 and accompanying text (discussing EPA's use of uncertainty as claim fo r
disre� arding data that did not support i ts policies) .
3
1 4 See Sunstein, supra note 18, at 330 ("EPA's own calculations showed that a
tighter particulates standard would have produced far greater health benefits than the
ozone standard; this leaves a serious unexplained anomaly in the two standards taken
together." ) ; Sunstein, sujJ'm note 20, at 6 (" [T] ighter regulation of particulates, going
well beyond the EPA's ru le, would appear to do a great deal more to protect public
health than would the new regulation of ozone.") .
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III. TOWARD MORE PRINCIPLED RI SK MANAGEMENT
EPA's effort to rely exclusively on science may have effectively
conveyed the impression to its overseers that the Agency had a sound
basis for revising its standards, but in fact, by relying on science-based
rhetoric, the Agency had only disguised a series of ad hoc and inco
herent decisions. Positions adopted in previous rulemakings, or at
previous points in the same rulemaking, shifted in the course of the
Agency's defense of the new standards. Findings or assumptions
made in the rulemaking record were set aside in order to support the
Agency's positions in litigation. Nowhere during the entire rulemak
ing and litigation process did EPA articulate a clear policy rationale to
justify how the NAAQS standards should be set, other than to assert
�
that they were se t at the "appropriate" level. 30 ,
Given the way that section 1 09 of the Clean Air Act has been con
strued over the years, the Agency has found itself navigating unten
able conceptual terrain . Following the dictates of the Clean Air Act,
EPA has claimed to select standards that protect the public health
with an adequate margin of safety and , hence, has proceeded to de
fend revisions of its standards by marshaling scientific evidence of
health effects at levels below its previously set standards . 306 Yet, similar
evidence considered by the Agency demonstrated that health effects
would still persist even at levels below the revised standards. 307 Indeed,
with non-threshold pollutants, these effects will by definition persist at
any level above zero. 308 The Agency has admitted that it need not,
even cannot, set its standards at zero, but it has never provided any
consistent and meaningful set of reasons that j ustify its decision to
lower its standards to protect against one increment of adverse effects
but not to lower them further to protect against another increment of
adverse effects.
In this final Part, we highlight what needs to be done if air quality
standard setting is to proceed in the future with more coherent j ustifi
cation. We present four principled approaches to standard setting in
the Section that follows, with the aim of showing what has been miss
ing from EPA's decision making as well as pointing toward better ways
�05 See Sunstein, supra note 1 8 , at 327 ("EPA's presentation of all the relevant data
shows reason for concern about adverse health etiects at current levels, but leaves
many doubts about why EPA chose the particular standards it did, rather than stan
dards somewhat higher or somewhat lower.") .
:-\Otl
Supra Parts I .A, I I .A.
�117
Supra Part I I .B-C.
:lO�
Supra p art I . c .
.
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of setting air quality standards in the future. Unfortunately, some of
the most promising of these approaches are no longer permissible
under EPA's, and now the Supreme Court's, interpretation of the
Clean Air Act and therefore raise important implications for future
legal developments . In this Part, we show how achieving a more can
did and coherent policy j ustification for environmental decisions will
require a significant change in EPA's existing approach toward setting
NAAQS standards, including an abandonment of the fundamental fic
tion that costs do not and should not enter into the Agency's decision
making. Of course, given the Supreme Court's affirmation of this fic
9
tion, 30 moving toward principled standard setting will now require
legislative change, not only to overcome the restrictive interpretation
EPA and the courts have given to section 1 09 of the Clean Air Act, but
also to direct EPA to develop a set of general policy guidelines for use
in making future decisions about its air quality standards.
A. Risk Management Principles
Regulatory decisions, such as the selection of air quality standards,
involve enormous stakes in terms of both health consequences
and economic burdens. How can EPA provide a more coheren tjusti
fication for these significant decisions than it offered in its most re
cent NAAQS revisions? A regulatory agency such as EPA has four ba
sic approaches available that it can use to provide a consistent
j ustification for making risk management decisions such as setting
ambient standards: ( 1 ) eliminate all risks (or all nonnaturally occur
ring risks) ; ( 2 ) avoid unacceptable risks; (3) avoid unacceptable costs
(sometimes described as the feasibility approach ) ; and ( 4 ) balance
costs and benefits. 3 1 0 Although these approaches are not all equally
309 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457, 465 (200 1 ) (affirming that
E PA is not permitted by statute to consider costs in setting ambient air quality stan
dards) .
3 1° For a similar taxonomy of approaches, see FRANK CROSS, ENVIRONMENTALLY
IND UCED CANCER AND THE LAw 69-9 5 ( 1 989) . While the four approaches we outline
represent the major justification strategies available to risk regulators, they do not rep
resent an exhaustive list of all possible principled approaches. Another principled ap
proach would be to eliminate all costs of regulation, but this would be as misguided as
eliminating all risks. Some level of government in terven tion is needed to address envi
ronmental risk and thereby impose an appropriate level of costs on those actors that
have not fully internalized all the social costs of their action. For discussions of the ra
tionales for governmental regulation , see NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATNES:
CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECO NOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3-7 ( 1 994) ; CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION 45-46 ( 1990) ; V. KIP VISCUSI ET AL. ,
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND fu'\ITITRUST 2-3 (2000 ) . Other principled approaches
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sound strategies-nor are they all currently permissible under the Su
preme Court's interpretation of the Clean Air Act-they do illustrate
the range of possible ways to provide a consistent explanation for risk
management decision making. 3 1 1
1 . E liminate All Risks
The first approach is conceptually straightforward: eliminate all
risks. This principle could be consistently applied if EPA set its stan
dards at levels at which it believed there would be absolutely no health
risks . The Agency also could take a consistent risk management ap
proach if it chose to minimize risk by setting standards at background
levels, thereby opting to eliminate all risks except those that are natu
rally occurring (a zero additive risk approach) .
More generally, the EPA could decide to follow an approach
aimed at minimizing all risk. A minimize risk approach could in some
cases lead to a nonzero risk level if a pollutant provides some benefi
cial health effects that countervail its adverse health effects. For ex
ample, commentators in the ozone rulemaking alleged that, despite
the adverse pulmonary effects of ground level ozone, concentrations
of the pollutant also screen out harmful ultraviolet radiation. 81 2 If a

take into account issues of distributional equity-deploying a consistent strategy to
promote fairness and equality in the distribution of costs and benefits across different
See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, UN
individuals and groups within society.
DERSTANDING RISK: INFORMING DECISIONS IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 40 ( 1 996) (not
ing that in some cases "managing environmen tal risks has become a question of fair
ness, moral responsibility, and distributional equity" ) ; K.S. SHRADER-FRECHETTE, RISK
AND RATIONALITY: PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS FOR POPULIST REFORMS 1 83 ( 1 99 1 )
(arguing for weighing "egalitarian values, social obligations, and rights" as a part of risk
management decision maki ng ) .
311
Our focus here is on developing consistent general approaches to risk man
agement decision making, not on all the choices that ente r into risk decision making,
such as the treatment of uncertainty. Much has been written about the develo pment
of principled approaches to risk assessment, and government agencies have issued
guidelines for assessing and characterizing risk with the aim of increasing consistency.
See, e.g. , EPA, DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR CARCINOGEN RISK AsSESSMENT 1 ( 1 999) (offering
guidance to EPA staff and decision makers on how to develop and use risk assess
ments ) , available at http :/ / www .e pa.gov/ncea/raf/pdfs/cancer_gls.pdf. Our aim, in
contrast, is to focus on the core principles needed to justify the central risk manage
ment question that science by itself simply is unable to answer, namely the level at
which ambient risk standards should be set.
312
See, e.g., Randall Lutter & Howard Gruenspecht, Assessing Benefits of Ground-Level
Ozone: What Role for Science in Setting National Air Quality Standards, 1 5 TUL. El:'.VT L. L j .
85, 87 (200 1 ) (arguing that i n se tting its 1997 ozone standard E P A focused only o n the
ozone's harmful effects without taking into account its potential benefits) . The D .C.
Circuit, in the first round of l itigation over EPA's ozone revision, directed the Agency
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reduction of the pollutant would create offsetting risks, such as an in
crease in skin cancer, then a standard that minimizes health risks
would be set above zero . 3 1 3 In cases with such so-called risk-risk trade
offs, EPA could opt for a standard set at a level that achieves the lowest
possible adverse health effects , namely the level at which the marginal
1
adver se health effects equal the marginal beneficial health effects. 3 4
Minimizing risk would appear to resonate with the conventional
interpretation of the Clean Air Act, with its emphasis on a preventative
approach to health protection through a margin of safety. 31 5 As the
D . C . Circuit Court directed in Lead Industries, EPA should set its
NAAQS standards in a way that ensured "an absence of adverse effect"
to take these possible beneficial health effects of ozone into consideration. Am . Truck
ing Ass'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 0 27, 1 05 1 -5 3 ( D .C. Cir. 1 999 ) , afj'd in part and rev 'd in part
sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) .
313
This assumes that the dose-response curves of the health benefits and health
risks of the pollutants have different shapes. If the two dose-response curves are paral
lel, it may be that the health risks or the health benefits dominate the other at all dose
levels as they both decrease in step with exposure. In this case, the standard that
maximizes net health benefits would be set at zero (if health risks are greater than
health benefits at all exposure levels) or no standard should be set (if health benefits
are greater than health risks at all exposure levels) .
31 4 CJ Whitman, 5 3 1 U .S. at 495 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("A rule likely to cause
more harm to health than it prevents is not a rule that is 'requisite to protect the pub
lic health . "') . See LAVE , supra note 274 , at 1 5- 1 7 (outlining methods fo r weighing the
risks of exposure to a carcinogen versus the risks of eliminating it) ; John D . Graham &
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Confronting Risk Tradeoffs, in RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS I N
PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT 1 -4 (john D. Graham & Jonathan Baert
Wiener eds., 1 995) (advocating a "more rigorous framework fo r analyzing risk trade
offs" that arise when countervailing risks emerge from attempts to reduce target risks) ;
Cass R. Sunstein , Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L . REV. 1 5 33, 1 5 35-38 ( 1 996) ( argu
ing that individuals and regulators suffer from "selective attention" that allows them to
overlook ancillary risks and, therefore, advocating that policymakers act to minimize
net risks) . There are obvious affinities between such an approach and one that bal
ances all benefits and costs of a risk standard, but because the "maximize risk reduc
tion" approach focuses only on costs and benefits as measured in health effects, i t
should be distinguished from a n approach that aims to maximize net social benefits.
In those cases where the existence of some amount of a pollutant offers no offsetting
health benefits whatsoever, the "maximize risk reduction" approach equates with the
"zero risk" approach.
3 1 5 See supra notes 1 94-95 and accompanying text ( noting EPA's claim that the
protection of public health is the predominant goal of its air quality standards) . The
language in the Clean Water Act that commands the elimination of all discharges into
the nation 's waterways also exemplifies this approach. See 33 U .S.C. § 1 2 5 1 (a) ( 2000)
(stating that the national goal underlying the prevention of water pollution is to pro
tect the use of water by individuals and fish and wildlife ) . The regulation of food addi
tives under the Delaney Clause also followed this approach fo r many years. See Pub.
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1 1 08, 1 1 09 (D.C. Cir. 1 987) (finding that the Delaney
Clause, which prohibits use of color food additives "found . . . to induce cancer in man
or animal," does not contain a de minimus exception ) .
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on members of the public. 3 Of course, for non-threshold pollutants
that lack countervailing health benefits, the minimize risk principle
can only be applied consistently if EPA sets its standards at a zero or
background concentration level, something that would effectively call
for the elimination of all economic activities. 3 1 7 Quite sensibly, the
Agency has expressly disavowed any intention of adopting a zero-risk
approach, and the Supreme Court has also recognized the folly of
8
such an approach. 3 1 Moreover, while EPA has raised concerns about
background levels (when it would appear expedient) , it has neither
adopted nor applied consistently any principle of eliminating all hu
man-created pollution. 3 1 9 It has also so far rejected calls for making
health-health tradeoffs in setting NAAQS standards under a minimize
°
risk principle. 32 Consequently, if EPA is to make its risk management
decision making more coherent, it will almost certainly need to
choose a principle other than eliminating all risk.

316

Lead I ndus. v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1 1 30, 1 1 53 (D.C. Cir. 1 980) .
See W. K.IP VISCUSI , RlSK BY CHOICE: REGUlATING HEALTH AND SAFETY I N THE
WORKPlACE 1 36-38 ( 1 9 83) (using EPA's lead standard requiring that 99.5% of the
most sensitive group be exposed to levels below a zero-risk threshold as an example of
the economic inefficiencies that result from the exclusion of cost-ben efit tradeoffs in
risk management decision making) ; see also supra Part I . C (arguing that eliminating
pollution entirely would have the un iversally undesirable effect of prohibiting eco
nomic activity) .
318
See supra notes 1 64-65 and accompanying text (stating that neith e r EPA nor
any other major participant i n environmen tal policymaking has ever argued for a zero
risk standard, as it would call for the elimination of the industrialized econ omy) ; see
also Whitman, 5 3 1 U.S. at 494 ( Breyer, J., concurring) (n oting that the Clean Air Act
should not be construed as requiring "a world that is free of all risk-an impossible
and undesirable objective ") ; Indus. Un ion Dep ' t v. Am. P e troleum Inst., 448 U .S. 607,
642 ( 1 980) (noting that "safe" does not necessarily mean "risk-free" ) .
m See supra n o tes 282-9 1 and accompanying text (showing the inconsistencies in
EPA's argume n t that it set the standard at a l evel approximating "naturally occurring
back§:round levels") .
3 0 National Ambient Ai r Quality Standards for Ozone :
Final Response to Re
mand, 68 Fed. Reg. 6 1 4, 6 1 8 (Jan. 6, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (noting
that any increase in risks associated with reductions in ground-level ozone levels, such
as from increased exposure to ultraviolet radiation, is "too unce rtain at this time to
warrant any relaxation in the level of public health protection previously determined
to be requisite to protect against the demonstrated adverse respiratory effects of direct
inhalation exposure to 03 in the ambient air") .
317
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2 . Avoid Unacceptable Risks
A second approach would be for the Agency to establish a level of
32
acceptable risk for its air quality standards. 1 Rather than minimizing
all risks, the Agency would only reduce risks to a consistent and toler
able level. As with the minimize risk principle, the acceptable risk ap
proach focuses exclusively on the benefits to be reaped from a risk
3
standard. 22 It does not try to maximize those benefits , but simply to
deliver a desirable level of health benefits.
The acceptable risk approach has been used in other regulatory
contexts. For example, in setting standards for hazardous air pollut
ants, EPA has presumptively defined "acceptable risk" to mean a
maximum individual mortality risk of no greater than one in ten
thousand . 32 3 The Agency has similarly set acceptable risk targets in
other contexts, including the regulation of water quality, hazardous
wastes, and pesticides. 32 4 The Occupational Safety and Health Ad
ministration (OSHA) follows a similar approach, using a benchmark
mortality risk of one in one thousand as the level of "significant risk"

32 1

See Baruch Fischhoff, Acceptable Risk: A Conceptual Proposal, 5 RISK 1 , 4-8 ( 1 994)
( proposing an analytical procedure for determining and impleme nting an acceptable
risk approach ) ; Gary E . Marchan t & Dawn P. Danzeisen, 'A cceptable ' Risk for Hazardous
Air Pollutants, 1 3 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 535, 540-42 ( 1 989) (summarizing the four ap
proaches proposed by EPA to develop a level of acceptable risk on which to base emis
sions standards for hazardous air pollutants ) .
322
See Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH . L . REv. 1 65 1 , 1 664
(200 1 ) (describing the acceptable risk approach as "entirely benefits-based" (emphasis
omitted) ) .
323 National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Benzene Emissions
from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethylbenzene/Styrene Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels,
Benzene Equipmen t Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recovery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044,
38,045 (Sept. 1 4, 1 989) (codified at 40 .C.F. R. pt. 6 1 ) [hereinafter National Emission
Standards] . This risk level slides down towards one in one million as the size of the
exposed population increases. !d. at 38 ,044-45. In addition, the Clean Air Act now
authorizes EPA to remove categories of sources of hazardous air pollu tants from the
list of regulated sources whenever it finds "that no source in the category . . . emits
such hazardous air pollutants in quantities which may cause a life time risk of cancer
greater than one in one million to the individual in the population who is most ex
posed to emissions of such pollutants from the source." 42 U.S.C. § 74 1 2 (c) (9) (B) (i)
(2000) .
2
3 '' See March Sadowitz & John D . Graham, A Survey of Residual Cancer Risks Permit
ted by Health, Safety and Environmental Policy, 6 RISK 1 7, 25-30 ( 1 995) (outlining the risk
standards that EPA has created with respect to water quality and hazardous wastes) .
The legislative history of the Food Quality Protection Act of 1 996, Pub. L . No. I 04- 1 70 ,
1 1 0 Stat. 1 489, stipulates that EPA should apply an acceptable risk level o f one i n one
million for certain pesticide residues. H . R. REP. No. 1 04-669, pt. 2, at 41 ( 1 996) .
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5
on which it bases its occupational health standards. 32 If EPA adopted
a similar, approach, it could then use an acceptable risk crite1ion to
select a set of consistent air quality standards.
Extending an acceptable risk approach to NAAQS decision mak
ing would not be easy, however, since criteria pollutants such as ozone
and PM cause varied types of health effects other than mortality. Most
acceptable risk benchmarks established by EPA under other regula
tory programs focus exclusively, or at least primarily, on cancer mor
tality. 32 6 Mortality is a binary effect, but many of the health effects of
pollutants, like ozone, involve continuous health effects (e .g. , respira
tory irritation) that vary in intensity from a minor nuisance to a seri
ous illness. It is generally harder to define an acceptable risk level for
such continuous effects because it is necessary to address both the
27
frequency and the severity of the disease. 3
Moreover, a common
metric for morbidity is needed to compare alternative standards, each
of which may vary along multiple dimensions of predicted health ef
fects (such as if exposure contributed to circulatory as well as to pul398
monary problems) . Another issue raised by the acceptable risk approach is whether to
:n''
focus on the risks to individuals, to the population, or to both .
EPA
has yet to adopt a clear and consistent position on whether to base its
30
NAAQS decisions on maximum individual or population risk. 3 In its
395

- E.g. , Occupational Exposure to Formaldehyde, 52 Fed. Reg. 46, 1 68, 46,230
(Dec. 4 , 1 987) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1 9 1 0 , 1 926) ; Occupational Exposure to E thyl
ene Oxide , 49 Fed. Reg. 2 5 ,734, 25,764 (June 2 2 , 1 984) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt.
1 9 1 0 ) ; Occupational Exposure to Inorganic Arsenic, 48 Fed. Reg. 1 864, 1 90 2 (Jan. 1 4,
1 983) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1 9 1 0 ) ; see also Indus. U n ion Dep't v. Am. Pe troleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 ( 1 980) (determining that OSHA should use a mortality risk of
one in one thousand as a benchmark for significant risk ) ; Int'l U n ion v. OSHA, 37
F.3d 665, 670-7 1 (D.C. Cir. 1 994) ( upholding OSHA's decision to use a single risk
standard applicable to all general industry employers, rather than to disaggregate in
dustries) .
326
See, e.g. , Sadowitz & Graham, supra note 324, at 1 9-2 1 ( discussing EPA's an alysis
of risk based on cancer rates ) .
327
See Reilly, supra note 44, a t 1 365-66 ('The search for the Holy Grail o f risk
managemen t-the so called 'bright line ' that would let policy makers dete rmin e , un
der any and all circumstances, whether a particular level of risk is ' acceptabl e ' or not
seems doomed to failure .") .
328
See infra notes 3 3840 and accompanying text (analyzing EPA's comparative
analysis of continuous health effects) .
329 See Sunstein, supra n o te 20, at 9 ( " [ I ] t is not clear if the agency should focus on
the probability of harm faced by each individual, or instead on some statistical measure
of aggregate harms, faced by the population as a whole.") .
3:10
In the late 1 980s, EPA defined "acceptable risk" fo r exposure to hazardous
air pollutants under section 1 1 2 of the Clean Air Act by considering only maximum
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recent ozone revision , E PA appeared i n some ways to accept a popula
:m
tion risk approach .
Yet, in a previous NAAQS rulemaking, EPA ex
plicitly indicated that the number of people exposed was not relevant,
since " [s] tandards must be based on a judgment of a safe air quality
level and not on an estimate of how many persons will intersect with
given concentration levels." 332 The problem with relying only on levels
of risk to individuals, of course, is that it overlooks the number of
people exposed to the risk, something that clearly affects overall
health benefits.
If EPA were to measure and compare the overall benefits of dif
ferent regulatory alternatives, it would need to use consistent methods
to quantify all the benefits that it predicted from each proposed stan
dard and its alternatives. Such a careful "benefits analysis," as Profes
sor Cass Sunstein has called it, would enable the Agency to determine
whether any given regulatory option can be expected to achieve an
acceptable level of risk. 333 A benefits analysis would detail all the
health effects associated with different levels of exposure as well as
report the predicted incidence of these effects on all exposed indi
viduals, including those in any sensitive subgroups within the overall
population. 334 Such a benefits analysis would con tain EPA's best range
(or point) of estimates for the number of people likely to be exposed
to the pollutant under an altemative standard, the probabilities
that they will suffer various health effects, and the severity of those
�
effects. 3 5 These benefits could be monetized using willingness 
to-pay (WfP) measures, a standard way of aggregating different
kinds of environmental health effects across an entire population . 336
individual risk or only total population risk before ultimately selecting a hybrid ap
proach that considered both measures. National Emission Standards, supra note 323,
68 Fed. Reg. at 38,045.
331 EPA justified its selection of the 0.08 ppm ozone standard over the 0.09 ppm
standard based largely on the argument that greater numbers of people would be ex
posed to unhealthy air quality under the 0.09 ppm standard than under the 0.08 ppm
standard. EPA argued that under the 0.08 ppm standard "an estimated 40-65% more
children would experience health effects that could limit their ac tivity and in some
cases require medical treatment." EPA, D.C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note 59, at 23-24
(citing EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,868 ) .
3 32 EPA, 1 979 Ozone Rule, supra note 1 96 , 44 Fed. Reg. a t 82 1 0 .
333
· Sunstein, s upra note 18, at 363-65.
33·1
!d.
'13 '
CASS R. SUNSTEI N, RISK AND REAsON: SAFElY, LAW, AND THE E!'.'VI RONMENT 245
(2002 ) .
3% For a recent discussion of vVTP measures, see James K. Hammitt, QAL Ys Vers us
vVfP, 22 RISK A:'\IALYSIS 985 (2002) ; Cass R. Sunstein, Lives, Life Years, and Willingness to
Pay, 1 04 COLUi'vl. L. REv. 205 (2004) . EPA used willingness to pay metrics to estimate
•

_ _ ,
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Alternatively, EPA could consider using other metrics for aggregation
such as quality adj usted life years (QALY) -a measure used more
commonly in health care analyses. 337 Whatever their relative merits,
measures like VVTP and QALY serve as a common basis for measuring
the total health benefits associated with different regulatory stans
dards. 33
By using a common measure, EPA could improve the consistency
of outcomes across different standards. For example, more explicit
and detailed attention to benefits analysis might have made EPA deci
sion makers-as well as the American public-more aware that the
Agency was passing up an opportunity to secure greater health gains,
through increased tightening of the particulate matter standard, than
n
it reaped altogether from its revisions to the ozone standard. 33 In this
way, a benefits-based approach could help ensure that different stan
dards reduce risks to comparable (and acceptable) levels, achieving
comparable (and desirable) levels of health benefits. 340
While a benefits-based approach may help in identifying inconsis
tencies across rules , by itself such an approach still skirts the underly
ing question: What makes a particular level of risk "acceptable" (or a
particular level of benefits "desirable") ? An acceptable risk approach

the health benefits of its recent ozone and PM standards in its Regulatory I mpact
Analysis for its rulemaking, although it was not permitted to consider these estimates
in making its regulatory decision. RIA, supra n o te 300, at 1 2-34 to 1 2-37. For example,
EPA calculated that the value of a life saved was $4.8 million, a case of chronic bron
chitis prevented was $260,000, and a case of shortness of breath prevented was $5.30.
!d. at 1 2-40.
�m In i ts decision in American Trucking, the D . C. Circuit suggested that ano ther
possible way to aggregate health effects would be to define a generic unit of harm,
such as through QALY. Am . Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 027, 1 039-40 ( D .C. Cir.
1999) , ajf 'd in part and rev 'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
45 7 (200 1 ) . For a discussion of the QALY measure in the con text of EPA's air pollu
tion policy, see BRYA_t'l j. HUBBELL, ENVIRONM ENTAL PROTECTION AGENC"Y, IMPLE
MENTING QALYS IN THE ANALYSI S OF AIR POLLUTION REGULATIONS ( Innovative Strate
gies and Econ. Group, EPA, Working Paper May 2002 ) , available at http : / /www .
epa.gov/ttn/ecas/workingpapers/ereqaly.pdf; SUNSTEIN, supra note 335, at 246-47; see
also Richard J . Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives ?, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS . , Autumn 19 76, at 5, 1 1 (providing the original treatment of the
QALY metric ) .
�38 For comparative assessment<; of these measures, see Hammitt, supra note 336;
Janice Clair Wright, Investments that Save Lives: The Norms of Environmental and
Medical Decision Making 2-1 to 2-59 ( 1 997) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard
Un iversity) (on file with author) .
339 SujJra Part II.D.
340 See SCNSTEIN, supra note 335, at 245 ("A chief advantage of this approach is
that it should ensure interregulation consistency . . . . ) .
"
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seems to envision that government makes risk management decisions
in individual proceedings according to some predetermined level of
acceptable risk. A benefits analysis can reveal whether a particular
standard meets this predetermined level. It does not, however, pro
vide a basis for determining what that level should be. After all, any
detailed benefits analysis, such as the kind that Professor Sunstein
proposes , is really j ust a highly professional risk assessment and not
the risk management judgment called for in standard setting. 34 1 Se
lecting an acceptable risk level still requires making a reasoned judg
ment about the optimal appropriate level. 342
The acceptable risk approach suffers from another notable limita
tion: it directs that standards be set based solely on the level of bene
fits to be gained-regardless of the costs of meeting those standards.�43
To follow this approach would require that EPA set standards based
on benefits even when the costs of compliance were disproportion
ately high . 344 Moreover, the consistent application of this approach

341

See id. ( noting the "inevitable judgment of value" involved in setting standards) .
See id. (proposing not only careful benefits analysis, but also that EPA "explain
why one set of savings . . . justifies regulation, whereas other sets of savings do not") .
Justice Stephen Breyer has suggested that one approach would be for the Agency to
base an acceptable level on "the public 's ordinary tolerance" of similar health risks.
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 5 3 1 U . S. 457, 494 (200 1 ) (Breyer, J . , concurring) .
Comparative risk analysis can be used to provide information about other bench mark
risks. See M. Granger Morgan et al. , A Proposal for Ranking Risk Within Fedeml Agencies,
in COMPARING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS 1 1 2-1 5 (j. Clarence Davies ed., 1 996) (noting
that ranking risks reveals society's priorities about which risks are of i mmediate con
cern ) . For a discussion of some of th e difficulties in defining an "acceptable" level of
risk, see Adam Babich, Too Much Science in Environmental Law, 28 COLUM . J. ENVTL. L .
1 19 , 146-57 ( 2003) ; Sanford E . Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks
Through Law, 30 J URIMETRICS 271 , 283 ( 1 990) ; Marchant & Danzeisen , supra note 32 1 ,
at 548-5 7.
:H 3 For a discussion of the weight given to the level of benefits, see Feller, supra
note 1 2 7, at 873-74:
[R] elatively large risks may be tolerated if they yield comparably large bene
fits. With respect to air quality, the benefi t of tolerating a certain level of air
pollution is the pollution control expense saved by foregoing reductions in
pollution below that level. . . [A] rational selection of an acceptable level of
air quality requires consideration of the costs required to attain various levels.
Id.
�14 C
J Roy E. Albert, Carcinogen Risk Assessment in the U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency, 24 CRITICAL REV. TOXICOLOGY 75 , 84 ( 1 994) (" [T] here is no acceptable risk in
the absence of benefits. Risks at virtually any level can be ignored, depending on cir
cumstances .") .
�42

.
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would also lead the Agency to reject risk reductions below the "ac
ceptable level" even when the costs of achieving them were trivial .'w'
Of course, however desirable or undesirable an acceptable risk
approach may be, EPA has so far not even tried to use it in setting or
revising any of its NAAQS standards. The Agency has so far eschewed
responsibility for offering a consistent account of its decisions , claim
ing that the range of health effects associated with criteria pollutants
makes it too difficult to follow any "generalized paradigm" in explain
ing its NAAQS decisions. 346 As a result, it is hardly surprising that the
recently revised ozone and PM standards will achieve markedly dispa
rate levels of health benefits. 347
3. Avoid Unacceptable Costs
A third approach to consistent risk management is the mirror im
age of the acceptable risk approach. Instead of focusing exclusively
on benefits , the cost of a regulation should be the key factor. In other
words, EPA could set its standards as low as possible while keeping the
costs of compliance below an acceptable level.
This approach typically has been couched in terms of feasibility
what can be achieved without high costs or severe economic disrup
tions. 348 Saying that a standard is feasible implies that its costs are ac
ceptable. For example, OSHA is charged by statute with developing
regulations to protect workers from exposure to toxic substances "to
the extent feasible ."349 Of course, just stating that a regulatory stan
dard is "feasible" or "infeasible" is rather imprecise.350 However, j ust
as agencies have defined the concept of acceptable risk by se tting
345 See Sunstein, supra note 1 8 , at 377 (suggesting that when a nontrivial risk re
duction "would be a trivial expense, surely i t should be required" ) ; see also Int'l Union
v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1 3 1 0, 1 32 2 ( D .C. Cir. 1 99 1 ) ( " [ E ] ven a slight risk m ight be consid
ered significant if it could be reduced or eliminated at a cost (including costs of en
forcement and compliance) less than the resulting benefits.") .
3 16
See EPA, Ozone Final Rule, supra note 8 , 62 Fed. Reg. at 38,883 (arguing
against a "generalized paradigm" and for a case-by-case approach to setting NAA.QS ) ;
see also supra Part II.A (describing EPA's ad hoc approach to decision maki ng) .
"l-!7
· Supra Part II.D.
3•1H
See, e.g. , Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas 0. McGarity, Not So Paradoxical: Th e Ra
tionale for Technology-Based Regulation, 1 9 9 1 DUKE L J. 729, 744 (arguing that "society
may choose to limit its protection of workers only at the point where the protection
would cause industry substantial economic dislocation " ) ; Wendy E. Wagner, The 1'-ri
urnph of Technology-Based Standm·ds, 2000 U. ILL L . REv. 83, 93-94 (defending a stan
dard-setting approach that is based on the use of feasible technology) .
Wl 29 U .S C . § 655 (b) ( 5 ) ( 2000 ) .
:<so Sunstein, supra note 322, at 1 69 1 , 1 703.
.
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specific risk targets, they could similarly develop precise standards es
tablishing acceptable levels of costs and then reduce risk to the point
at which compliance costs reached the specified level. 351
Such an approach, it should be noted, would disregard the bene
fits of risk standards. If a standard with exceedingly high costs (or that
would cause severe economic disruption) would also save thousands
of lives, then society almost certainly would be better off even if the
costs might seem unacceptably high . 352 For example, government
regulations eliminating lead from gasoline resulted in hundreds of
millions of dollars in annual costs and appeared to threaten not only
layoffs in the industrial firms that produced lead additives but also
gasoline shortages during the transition to unleaded fuels . 353 Never
theless, these regulations also resulted in dramatic health benefits that
substantially dwarfed the costs . 354 If regulatory agencies had adhered
to an approach that avoided all regulations that imposed costs exceed
ing a specified level or threatened economic dislocation, without any

351 Regulators already use a cost ceiling as a trigger for certain legal requirements.
For example, whe n a proposed regulation is expected to impose $ 1 00 million or more
in annual costs, agencies are required to conduct formal regulatory impact analyses . 2
U.S.C. § 1 53 2 (a) ( 2 ) ( 2000 ) ; see also Exec. Order No. 1 2 ,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 5 1 ,735, § 6,
at 5 1 ,740-43 (Sept. 30, 1 993) (outlining the cost-benefit analysis required for agency
regulatory action ) . Professor Sunstein has suggested that agencies could define feasi
bility in terms of a specific number of bankruptcies, business closures, or job losses.
Sunstein, supra note 322, at 1 703.
35 2 See Sunstein, supra note 322, at 1 70 1 -02 (noting that regulations that are not
"feasible" still can result in enormous social benefits ) . A ban on tobacco sales, for ex
ample, might be one such case where a seemingly infeasible governmental interven
tion arguably could be justified. See DAVID KESSLER, A QUESTION OF INTENT: A GREAT
AMERICAN BATTLE WITH A DEADLY INDUSTRY 392 (200 1 ) (" [T] he solution to the smok
ing problem rests with the bottom line, prohibiting the tobacco companies from con
tinuing to profit fro m the sale of a deadly, addictive drug.") .
353 Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gasoline, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: AsSESSING
REGULATORY IMPACT 49, 56-57, 59, 74 (Richard D . Morgen stern ed., 1997) .
354 In its final RIA, EPA estimated that the benefits of the lead phase-down rule
would be over ten times greater than the costs. RIA, supra note 300, at 7-1 , 1 2-1 . In a
retrospective study conducted by EPA in the mid- 1 990s, the Agency's average
monetized estimate of health benefits from the elimination of lead emissions
amounted to about tvvo trillion dollars, with ninety-four percent of the reductions in
lead emissions attributed to the phase-out of lead in gasoline. OFFICE OF AIR &
RADIATION, EPA, NO. 4 1 0-R-97-002, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND
COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT, 1 970 TO 1 990, at 1 7, 52 ( 1 997) [here inafter EPA, FINAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS] , available at h ttp:/ / www . epa.gov/air/sect8 1 2/chptr l _7.p df.
These benefits exceeded, by approximately fou r times, the estimated costs of all the
regulations EPA issued under the Clean Air Act between 1 970 and 1 99 0 ($0.5 trillion) ,
not just the costs of the lead phase-out. !d. at 8.
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concern for the level of corresponding benefits, they may well have
delayed or avoided phasing out lead additives in gasoline. 355
When regulatory agencies justify their risk management decisions
based only on either costs or benefits, they can achieve consistent,
principled decision making simply by using the same level of accept
able costs or risks across different rulemakings. Nevertheless, all the
approaches we have discussed so far truncate the range of risk man
agement criteria and may therefore lead regulatory agencies, in some
cases, to make decisions that make little sense, even though they are
3
consistent. 56 Under the acceptable risk approach, however, agencies
can affirm standards that impose significant costs without propor
tional health protection gains. Under the acceptable cost approach,
agencies can reject opportunities to achieve significant net social
benefits simply because costs are high.
4. Balance Costs and Benefits
With precisely these kinds of perverse outcomes in mind, a fourth
approach for risk management would take both benefits and costs
into consideration and seek to achieve a consistent balance of the
two. 357 By considering both costs and benefits, regulators could set

355 The use of cost-benefit analysis in developing the lead phase-down rule has
been credited with hastening the elimination of lead emissions:
Without quanti tative analysis, it would n o t have been possible to make a com
pelling case for the accelerated phase down because it would not have been
possible to show how much more important lead in gasoline was relative to
the vast majority of other rules competing for attention, many of which in
volved congressional or court-imposed deadlines, in contrast to lead.
Nichols, supra note 353, at 78. The lead phase-down rule also took advantage o f a
market-like trading program designed to make the phase-down more cost-effective.
Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New
Em from an Old Idea ?, 1 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 , 1 7 ( 1 99 1 ) .
356 See Coglianese, supra note 299, at 1 2 23 (distinguishing between instrumental
and comparative coherence and the need to consider multiple dimensions of regula
tory policies) .
357 See William H . Rodgers, Jr., Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and En
vironmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1 9 1 , 2 1 4, 226 ( 1 980) (evaluating
the role for cost-benefit analysis in setting risk standards ) ; Sunstein, supTa note 322, at
1 69 1 (arguing that a reasonable approach to risk regulation involves a comparison o f
costs against benefits ) ; Edward W. Warren & Gary E. Marchant, "More Good than Harm ":
A First Principle for Envi-ronmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379,
4 1 9-25 ( 1 993) (describing how courts have interpreted the reasoned decision making
requirement in the Administrative Procedure Act to include at least a loose balancing
of costs and benefits) .
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risk management standards to maximize net benefits . 358 Several envi
ronmental statutes other than the Clean Air Act actually require agen
cies to balance benefits and costs when they are setting risk stan
9
dards. 3'' Indeed, absent statutory prohibitions to the contrary (such as
now in the Clean Air Act) , regulatory agencies are directed by Execu
tive Order 1 2 ,866 to assess both costs and benefits of significant pro
posed regulations and to "propose or adopt a [new] regulation only
upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended
regulation j ustify its costs . "360
Of course, in practice, there will be important issues regarding
measurement, valuation, and discount rates that must be treated con
sistently. 35 1 But this is true for any other approach to risk management

:;:,s For a ge neral discussion of the use of cost-benefit analysis, see COST-BENEFIT
ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, At'ID PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ( Matthew D. Adler &
Eric A. Posner eds . , 200 1 ) ; RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESliLTS
FROM REGULATIO · ( Robert W. Hahn ed., 1 996) ; Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein,
A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation ? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit A naly
sis, 1 50 U. PA. L. REv. 1 489 (2002) .
359 See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1 36a (c) (2) ( 2000) ( requiring the EPA administrator to con
sider both the costs and benefits prior to adoption of regulations on pesticides) ; 1 5
U . S . C . § 2605 (c) (2000) (requiri n g E P A adminis trator t o consider both costs and
benefits in promulgating rules with respect to the regulation of hazardous chemicals) ;
42 U.S.C. § 300g-l (b) ( 3 ) (C) (i) (2000) ( requiring EPA administrator to seek public
comment on the costs and benefits of a proposed maximum contaminan t level for na
tional drinking water regulation ) . Even when the statute calls for balancing costs and
benefits, the Agency possesses considerable discretion in how the balancing ac tually
takes place, which may still permit the Agency to make i ncoherent, inconsistent, or
costly decisions. See George Van H outven & Maureen L. Cropper, VVhen is a Life Too
Costly to Save ? The Evidence from U.S. Environmental Regulations, 30 ]. ENVTL. ECON. &
MGMT. 348, 367 ( 1 996) (noting that even though "Congress may require that the costs
of a regulation be balanced against the benefits, . . . as long as EPA has discretion in
the weights it assigns to costs and benefits, regulations issued under balancing statutes
may still be very costly") .
3f0
'
Exe c. Order No. 1 2,866, § 1 (b ) (6) , 5 8 Fed. Reg. 5 1 ,735, 5 1 ,736 (Sept. 30,
1 993) ; see also id. § 6 ( a) (3) (C) , 58 Fed. Reg. at 5 1 ,741 (detailing the required assess
ments of costs and benefits ) . The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act also requires agen
cies to prepare statements of costs and benefits of significan t proposed rules. 2 U . S.C.
§ 1 5 32 (2000) . The Act generally directs agencies in these rulemakings to adopt the
"least costly, most cost-effective or least burdensome" alternative that achieves the
regulatory objective. Id. § 1 535 (a) .
.3Gl See generally RAYMOND J. KOPP ET AL., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS AND REGULATORY
REFORM: fu"\J AsSESSMENT OF THE SCIENCE AND THE ART 1 4 -3 1 (Research for the Fu
ture , Discussion Paper No. 97-1 9, 1 997) (reviewing the state of the art in cost-benefit
methodology) ; Steve P. Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk
Verms Risk AjJpmach to Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 8 1 B.U. L. REv. 957, 986-1 007
(200 1 ) (discussing some of the challenges of using cost-benefit analysis ) . For a discus
sion of the issue of the discount rate in particular, see Richard L. Revesz, Envimnmental
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decision making, and regulators have developed guidelines for ap
2
proaching these operational issues in consistent ways. 36 When con
ducted responsibly, cost-benefit analysis can prove quite valuable in
explaining regulatory agencies ' decision making. 363 It offers a consis
ten t and systematic approach to risk management.
What is most striking is that EPA has not only rejected a cost
benefit approach but also all of the other general policy principles for
risk management. It has explicitly ruled out zero-risk and acceptable
risk approaches, and it has successfully argued that the Clean Air Act
precludes it from adopting a feasibility or cost-benefit balancing ap
proach. 364 Instead, EPA has taken an explicitly ad hoc approach . 3 65

Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REv.
941 ( 1 999) .
%9
. - See EPA, NO. 240-R-00-003, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC Al\IALYSES,
FACT SHEET 1 (2000) (providing "a sound scientific framework for p erforming eco
nomic analyses of environmental regulations and policies") , available a t h ttp:/ I
yosemite .epa.govI eel epa/ eed.nsf/webpages/ guidelines.html/file/FactSheet. pdf;
Memorandum from Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to the
Heads of Departments and Agencies, Guidelines to Standardize Measures of Costs and
Benefits and the Format of Accounting Statements 3-1 6 ( Mar. 22, 2000) (providing
guidelines for the preparation of cost-benefit analyses) , available at h ttp: / / www. wh i te
house.gov/omb/memoranda/ m00-08. pdf; see also KOPP ET AL. , supra n o te 36 1 , at 1 4-3 1
(discussing the methodological issues surrounding cost-benefit analysis) .
:163
See SUNSTEIN, supra note 1 68, at 65 ( noting that "any reasonable judgment will
ordinarily be based on some kind of weighing of costs and benefits") ; Kenn e th ]. Arrow
et al. , Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regula
tion ?, 272 SCIENCE 22 1 , 221-22 ( 1 996) (explaining the appropriate use of cost-benefit
analysis) . This does not mean that a formal cost-ben efit analysis will by itself determine
where to set a standard in any strict algorithmic sense, for there will be uncertainties
associated with it as with any other kind of analysis. EPA has mistakenly accused critics
of i ts ad hoc approach to NAAQS rulemakings as advocating "a determinate formula"
that would "straighyacket" its discretion. EPA, 200 1 D .C. Cir. Ozone Brief, supra note
70, at 1 7-26. Reliance on a cost-benefit principle provides a coherent guide for agency
discretion and a consistent basis for justifying its air quality standards. Such an ap
proach "could improve both the regulatory decisionmaking process by making it more
transparent and the regulatory decision by allowing all relevant information to be con
sidered explicitly." Brief of Amici Curiae AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory
Studies et a!. at 1 2, Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Browner, 530 U .S. 1 202 (2000) ( No. 991 426) .
364 See supra notes 1 65-66, 282 and accompanying text (noting that EPA has inter
preted the Clean Air Act to preclude consideration of economic costs or technical fea
sibility but not to require a zero-risk standard) .
36'' See supra Pan I I . A (h ighligh ting EPA's reliance on its ad hoc judgments rather
than a consistent set of principles to guide its NAAQS decision making) .
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Given this predicament, it is by no means surpnsmg that the
EPA's account of its recent NAAQS decisions has been so inconsis
tent. 366 At the core of EPA's position lies a fundamental inconsistency:
The Agency rejects any need to achieve a level of zero risk, but the
reaso n to reject a zero-risk approach is its complete infeasibility. 3 67
Thus, an important step toward achieving a more principled and con
sistent account of EPA's air quality standard would be to free the
Agency from its conceptual straightjacket. As we show in the next
•J jf
t

See SHRADER-FRECHETIE, supra note 3 1 0, at 1 82 (arguing that any stance that
rejects "systematic risk decisions . . . leaves room for arbitrary, dishonest, purely politi
cal, or irrational h azard assessmen t" ) .
3 67 See John S . Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Fol
iC)', and Toxic Substances Control, 9 1 C OL U M L . REv. 26 1 , 275 ( 1 99 1 ) (noting the "diffi
c� lty of determining an appropriate nonabsolute level of safety in the absence of cost
consideratio ns") ; Christopher H . Schroeder, In the Regulation of Manmade Carcinogens, If
Feasibility Analysis is the Answer, ·what is the Question ?, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1 483, 1 493
( 1 990) ("Any regulation short of the zero-risk paradigm depends upon there being
some countervailing value, one that conflicts with pure [risk] prevention, that merits a
role in policy formation.") ; Sunstein, supra note 1 8 , at 378 (" [ I ] t is impossible to assess
'safety' in a cost vacuum ." ) ; cj LO N L. FULLER, THE MO RALITY OF LAW 1 79 ( 1 964)
(" [P] roblems of weighing costs run throughout our legal and political life.") . Even the
decision to pursue an acceptable risk approach and to set that level at something above
zero would seem implicitly to recognize the need to balance health protection with
economic costs or other considerations. Of course, as Justice Breyer has pointed out, a
concern for infeasibility need not be entirely unrelated to a concern for public health.
Breyer conceded that eliminating all risk would be "impossible," but suggested that
EPA could defend its rejection of a zero-risk approach on health considerations since
" [p ] reindustrial society was not a very healthy society . . . [and therefore] a standard
demanding the return of the Stone Age would not prove 'requisite to protect the pub
lic health ."' Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 494, 496 (200 1 ) ( Breyer,
J., concurring) . EPA h as not taken seriously the "minimize risk" approach suggested
by Justice Breyer, supra note 320 and accompanying text, since adhering to such an
approach would necessitate that EPA take i n to account the possible health effects asso
ciated with the costs its regulations i mpose on the economy. Since the Agency's posi
tion is that it does not take costs into consideration at all in setting air quality stan
dards, then it cannot consider the possibility that "the economic cost of implementing
a very stringent standard might produce health losses sufficient to offset the heal th
gains achieved in cleaning the air." Whitman, 5 3 1 U .S. at 466. For discussions of the
estimated health effects associated with the costs of regulation, see ROBERT W. HAHN
ET AL. , Do FEDERAL REGULATIONS REDUCE MORTALriY? 1 2-22 (2000) ; Frank B . Cross,
When Environmental Regulations Kill: The Role of Health/Health Analysis, 22 E COL O GY L.Q.
729, 772-84 ( 1995 ) ; Ralph L. Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by the Costs of Regulations, 8
J. RISK & Ul'<CERTAINTY 95, 97-109 ( 1 994 ) ; Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved
CutofffoT Safety -Enhancing Regulations, 37 E CO N . 1:\'QUIRY 599 ( 1999 ) ; Paul R. Portney &
Robert N. Siavins, Regulatory Review of Environmen tal Policy: The Potential Role of Health
Health Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINlY 1 1 1 , 1 1 5- 1 9 ( 1 994) ; W. Kip Viscusi, Risk-Risk
Analysis, 8 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 5 , 9-1 2 ( 1 994) ; Ralph L. Keeney & Kenneth Green,
Estimating Fatalities Induced by Economic Impact<> of Ozone and Particulate Stan
dards 6-1 1 (June 1 997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) , available at
http: / / www. rppi.org/ environment/ ps225.html.
·

'
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Section, EPA most certainly does consider feasibility and costs when
setting its air quality standards, even though it claims otherwise. By
acknowledging the fiction that its risk management decisions are
made regardless of cost considerations, EPA could pave the way for a
36
clear, systematic j ustification for its NAAQS decision making. 8
B. Abandoning the Fiction of Ignoring Costs
The estimated costs of the recently revised ozone and particulate
matter standards make them among the most expensive federal regu
lations ever promulgated in the history of the United States. EPA es
timated that by 201 0 the standards would impose incremental costs
exceeding forty-five billion dollars per year3 69-an amount larger than
the combined annual cost of all the other Clean Air Act regulations in

368

See Pierce, supra note 1 34, at 1 255 ("I do not believe it is possible to make many
regulatory decisions in a rational manner without considering costs in some way. " ) .
369 EPA estimated that the costs of full attain ment of i ts revised ozon e and particu
late matter NAAQS would be about $47 billion per year ($9.6 billion for ozone and $37
billion for PM) by 20 10. RIA , supra note 300, at 9-1 . EPA was only able to identify
technologies that could partially attain the ozone and PM standards; thus, i t simply as
sumed that new technologies will be developed in the future that will enable full at
tainment of the two standards at a cost of $ 10 ,000 per ton. !d. at ES-9. Other cost es
timates that relaxed this assumption and addressed technological change e mpirically
were substantially h igher. For example , the President's Council of Economic Advisors
estimated that the costs of the ozone standard alone could approach $60 billion per
year. See Peter Passell, The A ir Standards Are Set, but How Clean Is Clean Enough ?, N .Y.
TI M ES , july 3, 1 997, at D2 (citing an estimate that meeting the ozone standard could
cost $ 1 1 to $60 billion per year) ; see also RANDALL LUTTER, I s EPA's OZONE STANDARD
FEASIBLE? 1 1 (AEI-Brookingsjoint Ctr. for Regulatory Studies, Regulatory Analysis 99-6
1 999) (finding that compliance with EPA's ozone standard would be seven-fold more
expensive than EPA estimated for most cities, and would be infeasible for one city) ,
available at http:/ / www .aei.brookings.org/admin/authorpdfs/page.php?id=93; ANNE
E. SMITH ET AL . , COSTS , ECONOMIC IMPACTS, AND BENEFITS OF EPA'S OZONE AND
PARTICULATE STANDARDS 2 ( Reason Pub. Pol'y l nst. , Policy Study No. 226, 1 997) (es
timating that compliance costs will range from $20 billion to $60 billion per year for
the ozone standard and $70 to $ 1 50 billion per year for the PM2 ,, standard) , available at
h ttp:/ /www.rppi.org/environment/ps226. h tml; Darrell A. Winner & Glen R. Cass, i'.f
feet of Emissions Control on the Long-Term Frequency Distribution of Regional Ozone Concentra
tions, 34 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH . 2 6 1 2 , 2 6 1 7 (2000) ( deducing that compliance with the
new 0.08 ppm ozone standard would be physically impossible even with the m ost strin
gent emissions controls) . Of course, some have hypothesized that as a general matter
ex ante estimates o f regulatory compliance costs may tend to be overstated to some
extent. For a discussion of research on the accuracy of compliance cost predictions,
see Cary Coglianese, Empirical Analysis and Administrative Law, 2002 ILL. L. REv. 1 1 1 1 ,
1 1 2 1 -22; Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation ofEnvironmental Regulation ?, 29 CAP. U . L.
REv. 2 1 , 45-48 (200 1 ) .
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effect at the time. �170 The high costs of the air quality standards might
appear to support EPA's claim that it did not consider costs in setting
the standards. 37 1 Yet, these high costs notwithstanding, it is widely ac
knowledged that the E PA does, and indeed must, consider costs when
deciding where to set air quality standards. 372

370

EPA has estimated annual costs of $ 1 9 billion ( 1 990 dollars) resulting from all
of the Clean Air Act's requirements during the period from 1 990 to 2000, an analysis
that excluded the costs of the recent ozone and particulate matter NAAQS revisions.
EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT 1 990 TO 20 1 0, at iii ( 1 999) ,
available at h ttp: / / www. epa.gov/oar/sect8 1 2. In its retrospective study of the costs and
benefits of the Clean Air Act from 1 970 to 1990, EPA estimated the annual compliance
costs associated with all its air pollution regulations ranged from $ 1 9.0 to $25.7 billion.
EPA, FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS supra n ote 354, at A-1 5 .
371 EPA, Supreme Court Respondents Brief, supra note 60, a t 44 (asserting i n a
h e ading that "Th e Administrator Did Not Base Her NAAQS Decisions On Considera
tion Of Compliance Costs.") .
372 See, e.g., Graham Testimony, supra note 1 16 ("When multi-billion dollar rule
making decisions are made, it is inevitable that regulators will consider the conse
quences of their actions as well as the reasonableness of the relationship between risks,
benefits and costs.") ; DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF
SCIENCE IN THE LAW 1 83 ( 1 999) ("In practice, therefore, despite the legal technicality
limiting EPA to promulgating regulations solely to promote health, costs are an inte
gral part of the policy-making process at EPA. " ) ; LANDY ET AL . , supra note 1 08, at 238
(" [ I ] n the absence of any threshold for risk, some balancing between costs and bene
fits had to be implicit in the standard setting decision-a reality EPA neither acknowl
edged nor forced the Congress to confron t.") ; THO MAS 0 . MCGARITY, REINVENTING
RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY Al'JALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL B U REAU CRACY 253
( 1 99 1 ) (" [EPA] has considered costs and benefits, and the advice that the Administra
tor receives orally fro m subordinates reflects those considerations.") ; MELNICK, supra
note 155, at 297 ("Regulators inevitably consider cost [in setting air quality standards] .
But presently they cannot explain how they do so.") ; David W. Barnes, Back Door Cost
Benefit Analysis Under a Safety-First Clean Air Act, 23 NAT. RES J . 827, 856 ( 1 983) (criticiz
ing the "subterfuge of back door cost-benefit analysis" in setting clean air standards ) ;
George Eads, The Confusion of Goals and Instruments: The Explicit Consideration of Cost in
Setting National Ambient Air Quality Standards, in To BREATHE fREELY: RISK, CONSENT,
AND AIR 222, 229 ( M ary Gibson ed., 1 985) (noting that it is a "policy fiction" that costs
are not considered in setting NAAQS) ; Feller, supra note 1 27, at 833 ("If all costs were
truly ignored, then no risk would be acceptable.") ; Barbara A. Finamore & Elizabeth E.
Simpson, Ambient Air Standards for Lead and Ozone: Scientific Problems and Economic Pres
sures, 3 HARV. ENVTL. L . REv. 26 1 , 274 ( 1 979) (" [E] conomic pressures were obviously
present and arguably influen tial in the formulation of the new ozone [ 1 979] and lead
[ 1 978] standards." ) ; C. Boyden Gray, The Clean Air Act Under Regulatory Refonn, 1 1 TUL.
ENVTL. LJ. 235, 235 ( 1 998) ("The plain fact is that the EPA has for a long time consid
ered costs and benefits in setting ambient standards-only it h as done so behind
closed doors . . . . " ) ; James E. Krier, On the Topology of Unifonn Environmental Standards
in a Federal System-and vVhy it Matters, 54 MD. L. REv. 1 226, 1 23 1 n . l 2 ( 1 995) ( "Con
gress has nominally insisted that costs be ignored in setting most environmental stan
dards . . . even though everyone knows this is a fiction.") ; Howard Latin, e
R gulatory
Failure, Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 2 1 ENVTL. L. 1 647, 1 658
( 1 99 1 ) (observing "EPA's great reluctance to cause serious social dislocation, even if
.
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EPA has certainly acknowledged the significant economic impacts
7
of its NAAQS decisions . 3 3 Even the amicus briefs filed in favor of EPA
in the recent NAAQS litigation admitted that the EPA Administrator
"will naturally have before her information on the implementation of
74
standards even as she sets them." 3 This awareness of the costs ap
pears to have influenced the Agency's decision making by creating a
reluctance to make standards too stringen t, even when doing so would
provide still greater public health protection. 375 After all, as Professor

tha t result appears clearly mandated by the statute") ; Gary E. Marchant, Turning Two
Blind Eyes: The EPA 's Failure to Consider Costs and Health Disbenefits in Revising the Ozone
Standard, 1 1 TUL. ENVfL. LJ. 261 , 268 ( 1 998) (stating that EPA failed "to ' come clean '
about the true nature of i ts decision-making" ) ; Oren, supra note 1 8 , at 1 0 ,662 ( "EPA
inevitably must therefore consider costs in standard-setting to help decide how strin
gent to make the standards . " ) ; Pierce, supra note 1 34, at 1 239 ( " [A] l l participants in
this decision making process know [ that] the EPA Administrator always considers costs
when making decisions pursuant to [the Clean Air Act] section 1 09 ." ) ; Pierce, supra
note 1 8 , at 85 ("I am confident that the EPA did, in fact, consider its CBA [ cost-benefit
analysis] of the ozone and particulate rules, notwithstanding its claims to the con
trary. " ) ; Sunstein, supra note 1 8 , at 308 ("There is reason to think that at least i n some
cases, an understanding of costs has affected EPA's decision about appropriate stan
dards-but that the cost-benefit b alancing has been left i mplicit and free from public
scrutiny and review." ) ; Sunstein, supra note 20, at 1 1 (noting "the appare n t fact, urged
by credible observers, that the EPA had in fac t considered costs, although tacitly and
without public supervision") ; ALA..l'\1 J . KRUPNICK & DEIRDRE FARREL L, SIX STEPS TO A
HEALTHIER OZ O N E POLICY 6 ( Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 96-1 3 , 1 996)
(" [C] osts must implicitly be playing a role . " ) , available at h ttp:/ /www. rff.o rg/ rff/
Documents/RFF-DP-96-1 3 .pdf. Without confronting either the academic record or
the logical ne cessity of EPA at least implicitly considering costs in setting NAAQS, the
Supreme Court dismissed the argumen t that EPA was "secretly considering the costs of
attainment v.1thout telling anyon e" as mere speculation. Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 47 1 n.4 (200 1 ) .
373 See, e.g. , EPA, 1 993 Ozone Decision, supra note 1 92, at 1 3 ,0 1 3 ( n oting that "im
plementation of the NAAQS can have profound economic and social as well as envi
ronmental consequences") ; EPA, 1 9 79 Ozone Rule , supra note 1 96 , 52 Fed. Reg. at
82 1 3 (admitting that "controlling ozone to very low levels is a task that will h ave sig
nificant impact on economic and social activities") ; Ore n , supra note 1 8 , at 1 0 ,662
(s tating that "EPA decisionmakers have admitted that they examine cost data when
deciding on the levels of the standards ." ) . The estimated costs of the air quality stan
dards have been included in the Federal Register notice signed by the Admin istrator. See,
e.g. , EPA, Ozone Proposed Rul e, supra note 24 1 , 6 1 Fed. Reg. at 65,746 (showing esti
mates of NAAQS benefits and costs ) .
371 Massachuse tts and New Jersey Brief, supra note 1 6 1 , at 44; see also MCGARITY,
supra note 372, at 1 62 ( noting that " [ t] he artificiality of [EPA's] attempt to shield the
decisionmaking process fro m analysis is apparent") ; EPA, Douglas M. Castle : Oral H is
tory In terview, at http : / /www. epa.gov/ historyI publications/print/ costle.h tm ( last up
dated june 1 0, 2002) ( acknowledging that the former EPA Administrator conside red
costs in his decision-making process over the 1979 ozone NAAQS revisions) .
:m See supra Part I I.B-C (indicating that EPA could have saved thousands o f addi
tional lives per year by setting more stringent standards ) .
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Joseph Feller, a former EPA attorney, has noted, " [i ] f all costs were
truly ignored, then n o risk would be acceptable." 3 76
Even if the Administrator did not explicitly consider the cost esti
mates that EPA analysts had gone to great lengths to prepare, she and
her staff could not have been unaware that the regulations EPA
T
promulgated were among the most expensive ever adopted. 3 ' After
all, an implicit recognition of cost considerations would seem to be
the only way to explain EPA's new standard for fine PM. 37 8 The only
apparent reason why EPA would accept thousands of additional pre
dicted deaths per year was because of concern about the costs of
tightening the standards even further, 379 which would have imposed
unacceptable economic burdens on society.380
In explaining its decision to rej ect the tougher PM standard, EPA
asserted that setting more stringent standards " might result in regula
tory programs that go beyond those that are needed to effectively re
8
duce risks to public health." 3 1 But under a precautionary approach
that is supposed to "err on the side of safety," the mere possibility that
3 76 Feller, supra note 1 27, at 833; see also Eads, supra note 372, at 228 ("No level of
ambient exposure above zero could be ruled out if consideration was given jus t to
health effects.") .
:m Furthermore , the intensity of industry lobbying efforts undoubtedly signaled to
EPA the economic impact at stake in i ts decisions. See Jason Scott johnston, A Game
Theoretic A nalysis ofAlternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1 50 U. PA. L.
REv. 1 343, 1 353 (2002) (deploying a game-theoretic model to show that even where
agency is precluded from taking costs into account, "the agency generally will in ternal
ize some of the compliance costs its regulation will impose" through the political proc
ess of rulemaking) .
7
3 8 Supra Part I I . B.
379
See Sunstein, s upra note 18, at 3 1 7 n . 5 1 ("E PA's failure to require more stringent regulation of particulates provides some evidence of cost consideration. On
EPA's own numbers, more stringent regulation might have provided $4 billion in in
creased benefits . . . . If these benefits were possible, why did EPA not require greater
stringency, if not because of some cost consciousness?") .
380 A recent New England journal of Medicine editorial, which accompanied a re
view generally supportive of EPA's scientific analysis of PM2 5, stated that significant fur
ther reductions in the 24-hour PM2 5 standard would have been particularly burden
some, if not impossible. James H. Ware, Particulate A ir Pollution and Mortality-Clearing
the Air, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1 798 (2000 ) . The article states that:
The epidemiologic evidence suggests that the association between fine
particle concentrations and mortality is linear across the entire range of cur
ren t concentrations. Although substantial reductions can be achieved at a
reason �ble cost, a reduction in 24-hour exposures to levels consistently below
the current range would be prohibitively costly, if not impossible, in the fore
seeable future.
!d. at 1 799.
381
EPA, PM Final Rule, supra note 9, 62 Fed. Reg. at 38, 675 (emphasis added) .
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a standard "might" exceed the level of health protection "needed"
should not prevent the Agency from adopting it. 382 Indeed, by defini
tion , erring on the side of safety would require going beyond what
might appear to be needed.
EPA advanced a similar argument in its petition for rehearing in
the D.C. Circuit, stating that section 1 09 requires that a NAAQS stan
dard be set at a level "necessary for public health protection: neither
,, 3
Given that
more nor less stringent than necessary, but 'requisite . :lR
particulate matter appears to present a continuum of risk down to
background levels ( or at least to levels well below EPA's selected stan
dard) , it is far from clear how the Agency can show that its selected
standard was neither more nor less stringent than necessary. Each in
crement of additional stringency will protect against some additional
unit of risk (some perhaps unknown or uncertain) . In the case of fine
PM, additional stringency would have protected against additional
human mortality predicted by the Agency's own risk assessment. 384 If
standards are supposed to be set solely to protect public health, and if
the Agency is supposed to be precautionary by erring on the side of
safety, then it is not possible under EPA's risk model to have a PM
standard that was too stringent. 38� Indeed, a more stringent standard
would have been "necessary" to prevent the loss of thousands of addi
tional lives, according to the Agency's own analysis. 386 When this evi
dence is taken into consideration, there is no escaping the conclusion
that there must have been some other factor-presumably cost-that
kept EPA from lowering the standard even further. 387
382

See supra notes 194-95 and accompanying text (citing EPA's Supreme Court
brief, which stated that th e predominant purpose of its standards was to be preven ta
tive and precautionary) .
383
EPA, Petition for Rehearing, sufrra note 258, at 8.
"l84
· Supra Part II.B.
�xc,
I n the case of non-threshold pollutants, where discernible harm to human
health is believed to occur down to levels just above zero, then by definition no level
can be said to be completely "safe," thus eliminating any room for erring on the side o f
safety. See Pierce, supra note 1 8, at 7 4 (describing non- threshold pollutants as having
"no level at which [ they] do not kill some people") ; supra notes 1 28, 1 3 1 -34 and ac
companying text (discussing the policy implications of regulating non-threshold air
pollutants ) .
386
See supra text accompanying notes 209-1 7 (discussing how up to 860 additional
lives in Philadelphia and 1 080 lives in Los Angeles would have been saved with more
stringent standards) .
387 As the National Academy of Sciences and National Academy of Engineering
concluded in a 1 974 report to Congress, in setting air quality standards " [ t] here is no
escape from a reasoned judgment, co ntaining an unavoidable subjective element, as
to the level at which the possible benefits from reducing pollution fu rther no longer
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Given that EPA almost certainly considers costs implicitly when
determining the level of its standards, the question arises whether so
ciety would be better served if the Agency began to consider cost esti
mates explicitly. 3 8l:l Express consideration of cost data may provide
important information that can be used to set standards that are more
cost-effective without sacrificing health protection. This is because
costs and benefits from air quality standards, like other regulatory
standards , may exhibit discontinuities and nonlinearities that can only
be discerned through careful analysis of cost functions. For example,
EPA ' s draft Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for ozone, published at
the time of the Agency's proposed rule, indicated that an eight-hour
ozone standard set at 0.08 ppm based on the fifth rather than the
fourth highest annual concentration would provide roughly equiva
lent health protection but at approximately twenty percent lower
cost. 389 This analysis suggests that there is a disconnect in the cost
effectiveness of tightening the standard from the fifth to the fourth
highest annual concentration. Had EPA been able to consider this
evidence openly and explicitly, the Administrator could have based
the standard on the fifth highest annual concentration and saved the
nation over $ 1 billion per year without sacrificing health protection. 390
Such an open consideration of costs would not only likely ensure
more cost-effective policy decisions, it would also better serve some of

justify the high probable costs of bringing about such further reduc tion." NAS/NAE,
supra note 1 32, at 1 8 .
:lHS
See Barnes, supra note 372, at 857 ("Given the presence of a cost-minded ad
ministration, society might be better off with explicit cost-benefit analysis in se tting the
air quality standards from the start and abandoning as giving an inferior result the
safety-first approach." ) .
:189 Partial attainment costs would decrease from $ 1 . 1 0 to $0.89 billion per year.
RIA, sujJra note 300, at 7-1 2. EPA's analysis also indicates that there would be l ittle, if
any, health decrement in basing the standard on the fifth highest annual concen tra
tion. EPA calculated that total monetized health benefits would actually increase if the
standard was based on the fifth rather than the fourth highest annual concentration
under one method of controlling for PM2 5 benefits , while slightly decreasing under an
alternative method. !d. at 1 2-46; see also OZONE STAFF PAPER, supra note 1 63, at 2 1 2
("Risk analyses . . . indicate that for most of the health endpoints analyzed there is little
difference in health risk, at a given level of the standard, within the ranges of 1 - to 5expected-exceedances and the second to the fifth highest 8-hr daily maximum concen
tration forms of the 0,1 primary standard.") .
.
3�10
EPA's RIA calculated the cost savmgs of a standard based on the fifth rather
than the fourth highest ann ual concentration for partial attainment of the ozone stan
dard, but not full attainment. But given that EPA estimated that the fifth highest con
cen tration would save $0.2 billion of the $ 1 . 1 billion attain ment costs, it would almost
certainly save over $1 billion of EPA's estimated $9.6 billion full compliance estimates.
RIA, supra note 300.
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the core principles that undergird adminis trative law. �91 As John Gra
ham has noted, EPA's "legal fiction" of not considering costs when set
ting NAAQS "reduces political accountability for value j udgments and
political choices, [and] hides from public scrutiny claims that are
made about risks, benefits and costs (since such claims are driven
' underground' in the course of regulatory deliberations) .":�9� Put
more simply, as Professor David Faigman has recently argued, the
9
"real loser in the PM/ozone drama was candor." 3 3 By framing the
standard-setting decision as one for which costs cannot be taken into
consideration, EPA, Congress, and the courts have endorsed a mis
leading and ultimately fictional basis for se tting air quality stan
394
dards.
In testimony to Congress on the revised ozone and PM standards,
EPA Administrator Carol Browner argued that "to allow costs and re
lated factors to influence the determination of what levels protect
public health would be to mislead the American public in a very
:l�H

See supra notes 1 , 5 and accompanying text (describing the fundamental principle of administrative law as reasoned decision making) .
:192
Graham, supra note 1 1 6 . Graham also writes that:
Although regulators might prefer to pass the buck by hiding behind a cloak of
quantitative risk assessment, it is important for a representative democracy to
deliberate explicitly about the political aspects of chemical regulation. If
regulators are not compelled to be explicit about the nature of their policy
judgments, then it is unlikely that an informed public discussion of e thics and
values will occur.
GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 89, at 1 98; see also Barton H. Thompson, Jr., People or Prai·rie
Chickens: The Uncertain Search Jar optimal Biodiversity, 5 1 ST AN . L . REv. 1 1 27, 1 1 56
( 1 999) (concluding, in a related context, that "no one can argue that our curren t sys
tem of covert, indirect consideration of costs is better than open and direct conside ra
tion" ) .
:19:1
FAlGMAN, supra note 372, at 1 87; see also id. ("The debate was phrased almost
en tirely in terms of science when the science played a decidedly minor role in the ac
tual decision . . . . Science should not be used to h ide what are essentially the true
bases for decision. " ) .
'jQ.)
..
See j. CLARENCE DAVIES & j AN MAZUREK, POLLUTION CONTROL I N THE U01ITED
STATES: EVALUATING THE SYSTEM 30 ( 1 998) ("Statutory prohibitions of considering
costs in setting environmental standards encourage dishonest, pseudoscien tific debates
that are really about policy choices ( that is, who will we protect, and from what) .") ;
LANDY ET AL . , supra note 1 08, at 3 1 6 (lamenting that EPA has "sought refuge" in "the
Clean Air Act's proh ibition against using cost considerations to decide on standards"
and that " [a] s a result the public often has an unrealistic picture of environmental un
certainty") ; Eads, supra note 372, at 231 (noting that EPA's refusal to consider costs
explicitly means that the public sees "only the shadow, not the substance" of EPA's de
cisions) ; Portney , supra note 1 66, at 77, 1 1 7 (" ( I ] t seems disingenuous to have a law
that has been interpreted to prohibit costs from being considered in setting the
NAAQSs when, in fac t, virtually everyone knows that costs do-and should-get fac
tored into decisionmaking anyway. ") .

2004]

LIMIT'S OF SCIENCE IN SETTING RISK STANDARDS

1 347

fundamental way. " 395 Yet, as we have indicated, when EPA considers
costs at least implicitly in setting air quality standards, and then denies
that it is doing so, it is actually the Agency's refusal or inability to re
veal the full basis for its decision making that "misleads the American
9
public." :1 6
C. Reforming EPA 's Air Quality Risk Management
What steps can be taken that might lead EPA to adopt a more
candid and coherent account of its risk management decision mak
ing? One possible option would be to look to the courts, while an
other would be to encourage greater awareness of the limits of science
in risk management by Agency scientists , policy advisors , and decision
makers. As we discuss below, however, each of these options is un
likely to result in any real improvements in the foreseeable future
given the prevailing construction of the Clean Air Act. Under the Su
preme Court's interpretation of the Act, the Agency is essentially
'
locked into an ad hoc approach to its standard setting.:1 17 We con
clude that if the aspiration of well-reasoned agency decision making is
395 Clean A iT Act: Ozone and Particulate Matter Standards: Hearings Bejm·e the Subcomm.
on Clean Air, Wetlands, Private Prop., and Nuclear Safety of the Senate Env 't and Pub. Works
Comm., 1 05th Cong. 282 ( 1 997) (statement of Carol M. Browner, Adm inistrator, EPA) .
390 It is not enough simply to say tha t EPA can always take costs into account when
the states develop implementation plans seeking to bring their air quality into compli
ance with the national standards. See Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass 'ns, 5 3 1 U.S. 457,
470 (200 1 ) (suggesting that, by statute , the appropriate place to consider costs and fea
sibility is in the state implementation process) . While there is nothing wrong with tak
ing costs into account during implementation, the fact that costs can potentially be
co nsidered later does not resolve the core question of how E PA should set the na tional
standards that the states must implement. Consideration of costs duri ng implementa
tion can not provide a principled explanation for how EPA sets those standards, any
more than the justice of a law imposing the death penalty for parking tickets can be
established by pointing to the potential for jury nullification . Moreover, even if costs
were considered during state implementation, this would at best only partially address
the economic impacts of the standards, for th e Clean Air Act requires the automatic
application of certain regulatory requirements in nonattainment areas and states have
no authori ty to grant exemptions from these requirements. See supra note 1 1 5 and ac
companying text (noting that areas of the country failing to attain air quality standards
are subject to more stringent regulations) .
:l!'7 Admittedly, even under the existing interpretation of the Clean Air Act, EPA
could have improved the comparative coherence of its recent NAAQS revisions by opt
ing to aim for a consistent level of residual risk (or a consistent level of health bene
fits) . In other words, adhering to a predetermined level of risk could have reduced the
incoherence between the ozone and PM standards. Supra Part I I . D . This still would
leave unanswered, however, how to j ustify the predetermined risk level (as opposed to
other levels) , a decision that would essentially remain ad hoc if costs or feasibility are
not considered.
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to become a reality for risk management of non-threshold air pollut
ants, Congress will need to step in to authorize and encourage EPA to
break free from its current, incoherent approach. The Clean Air Act
itself will need amendment if EPA is ever to pursue a principled ap
proach to air quality standard setting.
Judicial review once would have been considered an option for
encouraging EPA to adopt a more candid and consistent justification
for its decision making. The availability of judicial review long has
been viewed as a mechanism for ensuring that regulatory agencies
provide reasoned explanations for their actions. 398 In judging agency
decisions under the arbitrary and capricious standard of the Adminis
39
trative Procedure Act, 9 courts are expected to make a "searching and
careful" review of the agency record and to dismiss "post hoc ration
4
alizations" offered by the agency. 00 The prevailing doctrine imposes a
"strict and demanding requirement" on an administrative agency that
it "must cogently explain why it has exercised its discretion in a given
manner. "40 1 Moreover, even though many judges may lack the exper
tise to scrutinize scientific research, thev should be able to determine
where an agency's science ends and its policy reasoning needs to
)

398 See, e.g. , Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U . S .
29, 43 ( 1 983) (applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard and h olding that the
agency must "articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action") ; Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U .S . 402, 4 1 5-1 7 ( 1 9 7 1 ) (subjecting administrative ac
tion to "a thorough, probing in-depth review" to ensure it is not arbitrary or capri
cious ) ; Air Transp. Ass' n of Can. v. FAA, 254 F.3d 27 1 , 279 (D.C. Cir. 200 1 ) (" [W] ith
its delicate balance of thorough record scrutiny and deference to agency expertise ,
judicial review can occur only when agencies explain their decisions with precision . " ) ;
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 2 1 6 F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that an EPA de
cision was arbitrary and capricious "because the agency failed to provide a rational ex
planation for its decision") ; see also JE RRY L. l\11A SHAW, BUREAUCRATIC J USTICE:
MA.N ACING SOCIAL SECURilY DISABILilY CLAIMS 50 ( 1 983) (observing that most of
"administrative law has to do with judicial oversight of administrative rationality" ) .
399 5 U . S . C . § 706 (2) (A) (2000) ("The reviewing court shall . . . h old unlawful and
set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion , or otherwise not in accordance with law . . . . " ) .
400
Overton Park, 40 1 U . S . at 4 1 6, 4 1 9 .
401
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 48; see also SEC. OF ADMIN. L. & REG. P RAC. , AM. BAR
AsS'N, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT P ROJECT :
FINAL BLACK LETTER
STATEMENT 23 (200 1 ) (noting that courts may reverse an agency action when it "is un
supported by any explanation or rests upon reasoning that is seriously flawed" or
where " [t] he action is, without legitimate reason and adequate explanation, inconsis
tent with prior agency policies or precedents") [ herein after ABA, BLACK L E TTE R
STATEMENT] , available at http:/ / www/ abanet.org/adminlaw/apa/home.html.
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begin, and, thus, compel the agency to j ustify its risk management
choices with coherent reasoning. 402
Although an entrenched doctrinal tradition in American adminis
trative law requires agencies to give reasoned explanations, 403 there
also exists an equally substantial tradition of judicial deference to
agency action .-104 Notwithstanding widely held claims that judicial re
view under the arbitrary and capricious standard has ossified the
rulemaking process, judges actually only review a small fraction of
agency rules and, typically, defer to administrative agencies in con
ducting such review. 405 Moreover, even though the courts have
402

See ABA, BLACK LETTER STATEMENT, supra note 40 1 , at 20 ( noting that courts
commonly "review agency findings that may be termed factual but actually embody a
degree of normative judgment" ) ; Bazelon, supra note 42, at 279 (" [A] t the interface of
fact and value, courts can help ensure that the value component of decisions is explic
itly acknowledged, not hidden in quasi-scientific jargon .") . Wendy Wagner suggested
an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act requiring regulatory agencies to
clearly demark scientific from policy judgments. See Wagner, supra note 1 1 , at 1 7 1 1
(suggesting that such an amendment would "correct the courts' current inclination to
interpret the APA to require more, rather than less, quan titative and technical justifi
cations" ) . While such an amendment might be helpful, it does not seem necessary,
since a reviewing court presumably should be able to strike down a regulation as arbi
trary and capricious if the agency misrepresen ts a policy decision as a scientific deter
mination .
40 3 This general administrative law tradition has been reflected i n judicial deci
sions reviewing air quality standards. See supra note 5.
404 See, e.g. , Natural Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 902 F.2d 962, 968, 973 (D.C. Cir.
1 990) (stating that the court must "defer to the agency's interpretation of equivocal
evidence, so long as it is reasonable," when reviewing predictions that are within the
agency's area of expertise and at the fron tiers of science ) ; Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d
1 , 34 (D.C. Cir. 1 976) (characterizing the arbitrary and capricious standard of review as
"a highly deferential one" that "presumes agency action to be valid") .
40 '; See Coglianese, supra note 369, at 1 1 29 (" [ I ] t appears that judicial review blocks
the EPA from taking action in only about 0 . 5 % of all its rulemakings.") . Overall, the
D .C. Circuit upholds EPA rulemakings in their entirety almost as often as it finds even
a single reason to remand the rule to the agency. See Cary Coglianese , Assessing Con
sensus: The Promise and Performance of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L .J 1 255, 1 308-09
n.249 ( 1 997) (noting that, from 1 979 to 1 990, EPA rules were affirmed in their entirety
in fifty-one percent of the cases decided by the D.C. Circuit) ; Patricia M. Wale!, Regula
tion at Risk: Are CoU?·ts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problt;m. ?, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 62 1 ,
636-39 ( 1 994) ( reporting that agency rules were upheld i n their entirety in over fifty
percent of the cases decided by the D.C. Circuit during the 1 992- 1 993 term) . Moreo
ver, these judicial remands do not appear to be too demanding, as EPA is usually able
to take some action to see that its original decision is carried out. See William S. jor
dan , III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere
with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through Informal Rulem.aking�, 94 Nw. U . L.
REV. 393, 422-24 (2000) ( finding that EPA was able to overcome twen ty-seven of thirty
nine remands from the D.C. Circuit from 1 985 to 1 995 and concluding that judicial
review causes "relatively little interference with agency attemp ts to achieve regulatory
goals") .
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required agencies to give reasons for their regulatory actions, in prac
tice this does not necessarily compel agencies to give sound or consis
,
tent reasons, even where judges purport to give them a "hard look. -101;
As the litigation over EPA's recent NAAQS revisions demonstrates,
when it comes to reviewing decisions purportedly based on highly
specialized scientific analysis, j udges tend to give agencies a deferen
tial pass. Particularly in rulemakings that generate a large volume of
scientific analysis, agencies can readily appeal to the authority of sci
entific studies and can look for (and usually find) some pattem in the
scientific evidence that appears to rationalize their decision . This ra
tionalization holds even if in the next, similar rulemaking the pattern
of the same kind of evidence aligns differently. By practicing this "sci
ence charade," agencies can escape the need to provide a consistent,
reasoned account of the core policy issues imbedded in risk manage107
ment.
That is what happened, in the end, with EPA. Of course , in the
initial round of litigation , Judge Stephen Williams recognized that
EPA ' s emperor had no clothes. Despite a voluminous record of scien
tific analysis, all of which was reviewed by the Clean Air Science Advi
sory Committee, Judge Williams concluded that EPA had provided
"no intelligible principle by which to identify a stopping point" for its
air quality standards. 408 Unfortunately, Judge Williams 's insight came
accompanied with a novel constitutional argument that the Supreme
Court quickly rejected, and that may have made the significance of his
core observation easier to discount.

-!Oo

Offering "a reason" is not necessarily the same as offering "a good reason ." For
example, Frederick Schauer explains:
[A) judge who says she has decided for the plaintiff because it is raining in
Calcutta offers a reason . . . even though the reason, unconnected to any
sound basis for decision, is a bad one . . . . [A] l though i t is a bad reason, i t still
exhibits the feature . . . of offering a justification or explanation for the result
reached.
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 4 7 STA.'\1 . L. REv. 633, 636 ( 1 995) . EPA prepared
lengthy documents that purported to offer a justification or explanation for its
NAAQS, but because it has not adopted any principle with respect to the core policy
issues, and because science by i tself cannot address these issues, the agen cy's proffered
explanation is akin to the judge deciding for the plaintiff "because it is raining in Cal
cutta."
407 See Wagner, supra note l l , at 1 664 (noting "the tendency of many courts to de
fer to the agency as expert when the issue is framed as scientific in nature " ) .
-lw<
Am. Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 1 75 F.3d 1 0 27, 1 037 (D.C. Cir. 1 999 ) , ajj'd in jHllt
and rev 'd in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am . Trucking Ass 'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (200 1 ) .
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The Supreme Court, i n an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia, in
terpreted the Clean Air Act in such a way as to preclude the adminis
trator from considering costs. 409 The Court concluded that the Act di
rected EPA to use "information about health effects . . . to identifY the
maximum airborne concentration of a pollutant that the public
health can tolerate, decrease the concentration to provide an 'ade
quate ' margin of safety, and set the standard at that level."4 10 The
Court held that this prosaic understanding of the statute provided
adequate guidance to sustain the constitutionality of the Clean Air
Act. Dismissing concems about the inability to take a principled
health-only approach for non-threshold pollutants , the Court de
clared that it was simply "not conclusive for delegation purposes" that
ozone and PM were non-threshold pollutants with health effects oc
curring at levels below EPA's promulgated standards . 4 1 1 With the Su
preme Court effectively affirming the incoherent approach embedded
in the longstanding interpretation of the Clean Air Act, it was not sur
prising that the D.C. Circuit, on remand, upheld EPA's revised stan
dards under the arbitrary and capricious test and deferred ultimately
to the agency's "expert judgment. "41 2 In the end, EPA prevailed and
secured judicial approval for its explicitly ad hoc decision making.
409 See Whitman, 531 U.S. at 471 ('The text of § 1 09 (b) , interpreted in its statutory
and historical context and with appreciation for its importance to the [Clean Air Act]
as a whole, unambiguously bars cost considerations from the NAAQS-setting proc
ess . . . . ") . In his concurrence , Justice Breyer drew extensively on th e legislative h istory
of the Clean Air Act to conclude that EPA may not consider technological or economic
feasibility in setting NAAQS:
[T] he legislative h istory shows that Congress intended the statute to be "tech
nology forcing." Senator Edmund Muskie, the primary sponsor of the 1 970
amendments to the Act, introduced them by saying that Congress' primary re
sponsibility in drafting the Act was not "to be limited by what is or appears to
be technologically or economically feasible," but "to establish what the public
interest requires to protect the health of persons," even if that means that "in
dustries will be asked to do what seems to be impossible at the present time. "
Jd. at 490-9 1 (Breyer, J, concurring) (quoting 1 1 6 CONG. REC. 32, 901-02 ( 1 970)
(statement of Sen. Muskie) )
410 J
d. at 465. Interestingly, this language by the Court indicates that EPA must
take a "two-step" approach according to the statute in setting i ts air quality standards,
first identifying a "safe" level and then adding an adequate margin of safety. In the
past, EPA has expressly rejected any need to follow this "two-step" or any other consis
tent approach in setting its air quality standards. See supra text accompanying notes
1 86-90 (noting that EPA has continually refused to offer a policy justification in setting
the margin of safety and instead has claimed that the administrator has sole discretion
in determining how it is addressed) .
1
41
Whitman, 5 3 1 U .S . at 475.
412
Am. Trucking Ass 'ns v. EPA, 283 F.3d 355, 373 (D .C. Cir. 2002) . For a careful
analysis of the Supreme Court's approach to statutory interpretation in Whitman, see
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If j udicial review no longer ensures coherent reasoning by EPA,
another possible option would be for EPA professionals to commit
themselves to candor about the role and limits of science in making
risk management decisions . The Agency has, after all, recently initi
ated several efforts to improve its scientific analysis .m In particular ,
EPA has made reliance on "sound science" one of its agency-wide stra
15
tegic goals ,'1 14 creating an office of science advisor4 and taking steps to
ensure that its analysis meets the standards for reliable scientific evi
6
dence provided in the Information Quality Act. 4 1 These efforts to
improve the quality of agency science are certainly important in their
own right , but by themselves are insufficient to prevent future at
4
tempts to stretch the limits of what science can bear. 17 Indeed , calls
for a "science-based" approach to risk regulation , however warranted ,
may mistakenly reinforce the tendency of EPA and other agencies to
cloak their policy decisions in scientific terms . 4 1 8 What the Agency

Pierce, supra note 1 34 , at 1 25 1 ( " [T] he Court seemed to announce and to apply a new
canon that is inherently inconsistent with all of the pre-existing law applicable to in
terpretation of agency-administered regulatory statutes . " ) .
m For a discussion of the need to improve scientific analysis and i ts role vvithin
EPA decision making, see E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is
Three a Crowd ?, 3 1 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. I nst. ) 10, 1 25, 1 0, 1 25-1 28 (Jan. 200 1 ) .
414
EPA, FY 2003 ANNUAL PERFORMAl'\ICE PLAN, at VII I-I (2002 ) , at http:/ /www.
epa.govI ocfo/budget/2003/2003ap/2003ap.h tm.
4 1 5 See Press Release, EPA, Whitman Appoints Gilman Science Advisor (June
2002) (quoting Administrator Whitman as directing the EPA Science Advisor to "en
sure that the highest quality science is better integrated i n to the Agen cy's programs,
policies and decisions") , available at h ttp:/ / www. epa.govI o rd/htm/ sci-advi .h tm.
416
Pub. L. No. 1 06-554, § 5 1 5, 1 1 4 Stat. 2763A- 1 54 (200 1 ) ; see also O FF I C E OF
ENVTL. INFO., EPA, NO. EPA/260R-02-008, GUIDE LINES FOR ENSU RING AND l'vL<\XI
MIZING THE QUALI1Y, OBJECTIVITY, UTILI1Y, AND 1NTEGRI1Y OF INFORMATION DIS
SEMINATED BY THE ENVIRONMEI\:TA L PROTECTION AGENCY 4 ( 2002) ("Our Guidelines
reflect EPA's best effort to present our goals and commitment� for ensuring and
maximizing the quality of information we disseminate . . . . EPA's intention is to fully
implement these Guidelines in order to achieve the purposes of Section 5 1 5 .") , av ail
able at http:/ /www . epa.gov/oei/qualityguidelines/EPA-OE I-IQG-FINAL- l 0 . 2 .pdf.
4 1 7 That said, one recent proposal for improving the use of science at EPA would
encourage science advisors to make explicit policy recommendations, under the the
ory that allowing scientists to express policy advice openly might disco urage disingen
uousness. E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science 's Voice at EPA, 66 LAw & Co�·.JTEMP .
PROBS. 45 (2003) . Elliott argues that " [i ] f told that i t is improper to make policy rec
ommendations, scientific groups are much more likely to smuggle in their policy
predilections covertly, e i ther consciously or unconsciously." !d. at 5 8 . H e believes
" [w] e would be far better advised to invite scientific advisory bodies to sefJarate their
scientific conclusions from their policy recommendations, and to e mpmver them to
address both." ld.
m See, e.g. , Press Release, Office of Management and Budget, OMB Announces
Science-Based Regulatory Review Framework (Sept. 25, 200 1 ) (calling for "high-quality
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needs is not only "sound science," but also sound policy reasoning re
garding its risk management decisions . 4 1 9 Part of the mandate of the
new science advisor should include a duty to notifY the Administrator
when the Agency is overemphasizing the role of science in j ustifYing
its policy recommendations.
Even with better and more circumspect scientific advice, however,
the Agency still may shirk from providing consistent reasons for its risk
management decisions. After all, EPA already had the benefit of sci
ence advisors who explained that the choice of where to set its new air
quality standards was not a question that science could answer. 42 0 CA
SAC clearly explained to the Administrator that the decision about
what alternative NAAQS standard it selected was a "policy judg
ment."421 In other recent regulatory proceedings, EPA's science advi
sory committees have pointed out the limitations of science within
regulatory decision making, specifically warning EPA when it was
overrelying on science. 422 Notwithstanding the sound advice it has
cost-benefit analyses, science-based risk assessments, peer review, consultation with
state and local governments, and specific consideration of the welfare of small busi
nesses") , available at http:/ /www .wh itehouse.gov/omb/pubpress/ 200 1-38.h tml. Even
though those who call for a "science-based" approach to regulation generally mean to
increase the rigor and reliability of scientific research that forms the basis of agency
risk assessments (surely a noteworthy aim ) , such calls may unintentionally increase the
incentives for couching policy decisions in terms of "listening to the science." See supra
Part I . A (describing the rhetorical use of science to h ide arbi trary policy decisions) ; see
also Kunreuther & Slovic, supra note 1 08, at 1 2 3 (" [T] echnical analysis is vital for mak
ing risk decisions better informed, more consistent, and more accoun table. However,
value conflicts and pervasive distrust in risk management cannot be reduced by techni
cal analysis. Trying to address risk controversies with more science, in fact, is likely to
exacerbate conflict.") .
4 1 9 See supra Part III.A (detailing a more principled approach to justif)'ing risk
management decisions) . In setting environmental standards, " [ v] alue judgments must
be made about how much health protection is feasible and affordable and who should
pay the costs of cleanup." John D. Graham, Science and Environmental Regulation, in
HARNESSING SCIENCE FO R El\lVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 1 , 2 (John D. Graham ed.,
1 99 1 ) . Making these judgments requires hard thinking about risk management prin
ciples, even more than perfecting scientific techniques. Obviously, the Agency needs
to invest in both.
420 See supra notes 1 43-45, 1 79 , 297 and accompanying text (detailing CASAC's re
peated statements that the setting of the NAAQS standards was a policy judgment
rather than a scientific determination ) .
421
Wolff, supra note 1 39, at 2.
m For- example, in commenting on EPA's proposed methodology for setting "re
sidual risk" standards for hazardous air pollutants, the Interim Chair of EPA's Scien
tific Advisory Board (SAB) advised the Administrator on behalf of the SAB Executive
Committee that "while we certainly endorse the concept of science-based decisionmak
ing at the Agency, we also recognize that no one is well served by asking science to take
on an impossible task." Letter from Dr. Morton Lippmann, Interim Chairman, EPA

1 354

UNIVER'51TY OF PE-NNSYLVANIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 1 5 2 : 1 255

received about the limits of science , EPA has continued to use science
42
as a fig leaf for its policy choices. 3
If neither science advisors nor judicial overseers can ensure that
EPA will strive for principled, risk management decision making, per
haps we should simply accept that EPA will set its standards in an ad
hoc manner and take steps to enhance the democratic basis for the
4
policy choices embedded in the Agency's risk management. 42 After
all, even if it makes sense to delegate to agencies on issues requiring
scientific expertise, it is much harder to claim that agencies like EPA
possess comparable expertise in making social policy judgments , such
as determining an acceptable level of risk. Consequently, even if
agency expertise is needed to assess and characterize risks, the policy
judgments embedded within any risk management decision arguably
should be made by a more democratically accountable decision maker
25
or through more direct democratic means. 4 Dean Elena Kagan, for
example, has argued that the President should play a greater role in
regulatory decision making because agencies do not possess any spe
cial expertise to make value judgments and the President is more di
42
rectly accountable to the citizenry. 6
While there is much to the idea of holding regulatory agencies
more accountable to elected officials, that position only makes it more

Science Advisory Board, to Carol M . Browner, Administrator, EPA 2 (july 25, 2000) ,
available at http:/ / www. epa.gov/sab/pdf/eccm005. pdf.
m Wagner, supra note 1 1 , at 1 6 1 7 (" [A] gencies exaggerate the contributions
made by science in setting toxic standards in order to avoid accoun tability for the un
derlying policy decisions.") .
124
See, e.g. , Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American A dministrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REv. 1 667, 1 698 ( 1 975) ( theorizing that a major thrust of contemporary ad
ministrative law in the United States h as been to foster a more pluralistic and transpar
e n t process by which agencies develop regulations) .
m For the standard exposition of this general argument, see THEODORE ] . LOWI ,
THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STAT ES (2d ed. 1 979 ) .
But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: VVhy Administrators Should Make Political Decisions,
l J .L. ECON. & ORG. 8 1 , 95-99 ( 1 985 ) (arguing that executive branch agencies should
be given more power in deference to the electorate 's choice in electing the president) .
�26
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 1 1 4 HARV. L. REv. 2245 , 2353
(200 1 ) (" [A] gency expert� have neither democratic warrant nor special competence to
make the value judgments-the essentially political choices-that underlie most ad
ministrative policymaking.") . Reliance on political intervention as a reason for admin
istrative policymaking would represen t a shift in the traditional direction of adminis
trative law, which has generally favored independent reasoning by agency decision
makers. See Mashaw, supra note 1, at 21 (" [A] retreat to political will or intuition is al
most always unavailable to modern American administrative decisionmakers. The
electoral connection is generally unavailable as a justification for administrative ac
tion .") .
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important that agencies respect the limits of science in setting risk
standards. Mter all , even those who favor greater involvement by the
President or Congress in regulatory decision making acknowledge a
need for relying on agency expertise, particularly on scientific ques
tions. 427 As Dean Kagan writes, "there is no good reason for a Presi
dent to displace or ignore purely scientific determinations" because
" [ t] he exercise of presidential power in this context would threaten a
kind of impartiality and obj ectivity in decisionmaking that conduces
to both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the administrative pro
8
cess." 42 As a result, rather than curing the problems with how EPA set
its recent air quality standards, any argument for improving the
democratic basis for the policy choices in risk management actually
makes it all the more imperative that regulatory agencies openly ac
2
knowledge science ' s limits . 4 9 Using science to justify nonscientific de
cisions only serves to shield agency decision making from the political
institutions that oversee the agency. 430
Given how EPA has proceeded in its NAAQS rulemakings, citizens
are left with a fundamental question unanswered: What justifies the
revisions of the ozone and PM standards? 43 1 Those who will continue

42 7

See Kagan, supra note 426, at 2353 ("However much political judgment per
vades administration and however much political actors should take the lead as to
these questions, an important place for substan tive expertise remains in generating
sound regulatory decisions. ") .
4 8
2
ld. at 2357.
4
29 See id. at 2332 (" [T] he need for transparency, as an aid to holding governmen
tal decisionmakers to account, here reaches its apex.") ; see also GRAHAM ET AL., supra
note 89, at 2 1 8 (" [S] cience cannot answer the ultimate regulatory questions . . . . Only
by recognizing the l imited role of science as resolver of conflict can [ the policy consid
erations underlying regulatory decisions] be addressed explicitly and democrati
cally.") .
4 30 See Wagner, supra note 1 1 , at 1 6 1 7 ("Although camouflaging controversial pol
icy decisions as science assists the agency in evading various political , legal, and institu
tional forces, doing so ultimately delays and distorts the standard-setting mission , leav
ing in its wake a dysfunctional regulatory program.") .
431 See SUNSTEIN, supra note 335 , at 240-4 1 ("Th e EPA's own public justification
was . . . in important respects vague and conclusory . . . . Hence any reader is likely to
be puzzled about exactly why EPA chose the particular regulations i t did-about why it
did not regulate either somewhat more or somewhat less. " ) . Dean Kagan argues that
sometimes presidential intervention should count as an answer to a question such as
this one. Kagan , supra note 426, at 2382. In the case of EPA's NAAQS revisions, even
that answer was not offered and instead the Agency sought to shield i tself within the
cloak of science. Supm Part LA It is n o t clear, furthermore , whether the President
would have intervened to make the critical policy decision. See Kagan, supra note 426,
at 2356-57 (noti ng President Clinton's "frequent practice of sidestepping involvement"
in cases where regulators would "confront the question , which science alone cannot
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to suffer from environmentally induced respiratory problems or
whose family members will die prematurely due to the levels of pollu
tion permitted under EPA's standards are entitled to a coherent rea
son why the Agency did not set lower standards in the face of evidence
of remaining health effects.-132 Similarly, those who lose out on jobs or
forego an increased standard of living as the result of the high costs of
the revised standards can also reasonably demand a clear and candid
explanation. 433 Yet right now, EPA cannot say anything sensible to
those who will be affected by its air quality standards. The Agency is
locked into a fictional framework that presumes that pollutants have
clear threshold health effects (which they do not) and that costs can
be ignored (which they cannot) _m The law now prohibits the Agency
from clearly explaining why it draws the line where it does.
How can EPA achieve greater candor and consis tency in its
NAAQS rulemakings? Given the prevailing legal structure as well as
the incentives agencies have to hide behind the perceived objectivity
of science, it seems unlikely that improvements will result from any
5
thing other than legislative change .43 Since EPA does not have a
strong incentive to abandon its scientific rhetoric and articulate policy
principles, legislative change must do more than simply reject the
current interpretation of section 1 09. It seems unlikely that EPA
would take up such an initiative on its own accord, so legislative
amendments are needed to spur meaningful change . Such amend
ments must either provide EPA with a preferred policy approach, such

answer, of how to make determinate judgments regarding the protection of h ealth and
safety in the face both of scientific uncertainty and compe ting political interests") .
n2
See Daniel A. Farber, Risk Regulation in Perspective: Reserve Mining Revisited, 2 1
ENVfL. L . 1 32 1 , 1 340 ( 1 99 1 ) ("When the decision is being made b y an administrator
or a judge, we would like to have a little more guidance than simply the decision
maker's gut reac tion. Too many different kinds of people get jobs as administrators
and judges for us to simply trust their i n tuiti ons . " ) .
.m Sl!NSTEIN , supra n ote 335, at 7-8 ("When the costs of regulation are h igh, real
people will be hurt, through increased prices, decreased wages, and even greater un
employment . . . . [T] h e costs should be placed 'on-screen,' so that if they are to be
incu rred, it is with knowledge and approval rather than ignorance and wishful thin k
ing." ) .
m See supra notes 1 33-36, 1 66, 368 and accompanying text and Part Ili.B (discuss
ing the lack of threshold levels in the health effects of pollutants to air and the neces
sity of considering costs whe n setting air quality standards) .
i3" See Wagner, supra n ote 1 1 , at 1 65 1 (arguing that without some external man
date "no rational agency or administrative official acting in her own self-interest would
expose the underlying policy choices when faced with the numerous benefits of en gag
ing in the science charade and the high price to be paid for proceeding any other
way") .
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as by directing the Agency to balance benefits and costs, or by impos
ing a mandate on the Agency to articulate a principle to explain its
NAAQS decision making.
Legislative change will not come easily, to be sure, but it may be
come more viable when the absurdity of the Clean Air Act's outmoded
legislative model becomes still clearer to those across the political
spectrum. This was the case with the Delaney Clause, which Congress
amended after many years, once the Act was interpreted to require
the elimination of all cancer risks from pesticide residues in food.436 If
the Clean Air Act follows a course similar to that taken with the De
laney Clause , then ever-advancing knowledge about the adverse effects
from still lower levels of air pollutants may force EPA and Congress to
confront the absurdity of the current interpretation of the Clean Air
Act. For example , the recent identification of genetic susceptibilities
to pollutants such as particulate matter and ozone may well heighten
the demand under the existing statutory framework to set even more

436 The Delaney Clause, adopted in the late 1950s, required agencies to prohibit
all carcinogens in food additives. Food Additives Amendment of 1 958, 21 U.S.C. §
348 ( c ) ( 3 ) (A) (2000 ) . For decades, EPA and the Food and Drug Administration at
tempted to evade the harsh and unrealistic absolutism of the Delaney Clause by apply
ing various exceptions and limitations. See Edward Dunkelberger & Richard A
Merrill, The Delaney Paradox Reexamined: Regulating Pesticides in Processed Foods, 48 FOOD
& DRUG LJ. 4 1 1 , 4 1 6- 1 8 ( 1 993) (describing EPA's efforts to ameliorate the extreme
effects of a strict interpretation of the Delaney Clause, including a short-lived effort to
establish a de minimus exception ) ; Richard A Merrill, FDA 's Implementation of the De
laney Clause: Repudiation of Congressional Choice or Reasoned Adaptation to Scientific Prog
ress ?, 5 YALE J ON REG. 1 , 2 1 -4 1 ( 1 988) (describing how, by circumscribing and rein
terpreting the statute in a number of instances, the "FDA chipped away at the edges of
the Delaney Clause") . Once the courts confirmed that the Delaney Clause would re
quire zero-risk standards that would impose unacceptable burdens on society, Con
gress stepped in to amend the food safety laws. See, e.g. , Food Quality Protection Act of
1 996, Pub. L. No. 1 04-1 70, 1 1 0 Stat. 1 489 (legislating additive and pesticide levels in
food and applying a "reasonable certainty" standard instead of the Delaney Clause 's
zero tolerance policy) ; Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d 985 , 990 (9th Cir. 1 992) (rejecting the
Agency's interpretation of the Delaney Clause intended "to bring about a more sensi
ble application of the regulatory scheme" because " [r] evising the existing statutory
scheme . . . is neither our function nor the function of the EPA" ) ; James Smart, All the
Stars in the Heavens Were in the Right Places: The Passage of the Food Quality Protection Act of
1996, 1 7 STAN. ENVfL LJ. 273, 289-333 ( 1 998) (detailing the repeated congressional
attempts to legislate around the strict prohibitions of the Delaney Clause, culminating
with the passage of the Food Quality Protection Act in 1 996) . But see James S. Turner,
Delaney Lives! Reports of Delaney :5 Death Are G1eatly Exaggerated, 28 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl.
L Inst.) 1 0 ,003, 1 0 ,004 (jan . 1 998) ( arguing that the Food Quality Protection Act of
1 996 "neither removes the protections provided by the Delaney Clause prohibition
against adding cancer-causing substances to food nor reflects a public policy rationale
or political consensus to do so" ) .
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7
stringent standards. 43 As scientific research continues to document
the public health effects that EPA already acknowledges still exist un
der its revised standards, the pressures to lower air quality standards
ever closer to zero will persist and likely increase over time , as will, of
course, the costs for complying with more stringent standards. Per
haps fortunately, at least for those who value reason and candor in
governmental policymaking, this dynamic will most likely result, even
tually, in a broader recognition of the need for statutory reform. If
this is correct, then perhaps it is only a matter of time before Congress
steps in and adopts a more realistic legislative approach that will bring
clarity to this important domain of risk management.
C ONCLUSION

The recent revisions to the ozone and PM standards confirm what
has been widely known since at least the mid-1 970s, namely that sec
3R
tion 1 09 of the Clean Air Act is unrealistic. 4 As scientific knowledge
has expanded, health risks have been identified at decreasing levels of
exposure . In light of this evolving evidence, it is no longer possible to

4�7

See generally GEORGE D. LEIKAUF ET AL. , H EALTH EFFECT I NST. , RESEARCH
REPORT NO. 1 05 , PATHOGE?-IO MIC MECHANISMS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER INDUCTION
OF ACUTE LUNG INJURY AND INFLAMMATION IN MICE ( 200 1 ) (reporting that genetic fac
tors contributed to the response of mice to inhaled nickel particles ) ; E n rico Ber
gamaschi et al. , Polymorphism of Quinone-metabolizing Enzymes and Susceptibility to Ozone
induced Acute Effects, 1 63 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CRITICAL CARE MED. 1 42 6 ( 200 1 ) ( demon
strating a link between human genotype and lung function after ozone exposure ) ; Ste
ven R. Kleeberger et al., Linkage A nalysis of Susceptibility to Ozone-Induced Lung Inflamma
tion in Inbred Mice, 1 7 NATURE GENETICS 475 ( 1 997) ( finding a genetic fac tor that
increased susceptibility to lung damage brought on by ozone exposure ) ; William F.
McDonnell, Individual Variability in Human Lung Function Responses to Ozone Exposure, 2
E.NVTL. TOXICOLOGY PHARMACOLOGY 1 7 1 , 1 75 ( 1 996) ( finding widespread interindi
vidual variation in response to ozone exposure and speculating that gen etic factors
may explain some of this variation ) ; Yosh inori Ohtsuka et al. , Genetic Linkage Analysis of
Susceptibility to Particle Exposure in Niice, 2 2 AM. J. RESPIRATORY CELL & MOLECULAR
BIOLOGY 574 (2000) ( iden tifying a genetic trait in mice linked with increased suscepti
bility to immune dysfunction induced by particulate exposure ) . As th e susceptible
subgroups carrying these gen etic variants become better characterized, EPA will likely
be confronted with an even clearer choice to either set more stringent standards to
protect such sensitive subgroups, perhaps even adopting standards approac hing zero,
or to recognize that other fac tors such as cost need to be taken into consideration in
providing a rationale for decisions about standards set at levels above zero. Gary E .
Marchant, Genomics and Toxic Substances: Part 11-Genetic Susceptibility to Environmental
Agents, 33 Envtl. L . Rep tr. (Envtl . L. Inst. ) 1 064 1 , 1 0656 (Sept. 2003) .
43� See supra n o tes 1 47-5� and accompanying text ( noting that even members of
Congress have acknowledged the disingenuousness of the Clean Air Act's framework
during past deliberations over legislative amendments ) .
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select a standard that protects the public health, with an adequate
margin of safety, from all the adverse effects of non-threshold pollut
ants, at least not without imposing dire economic costs on the na
��'�
tion.
As a practical matter, EPA has had little choice but to disre
gard evidence about substantial adverse effects on a public whose
health the Agency is directed by law to protect.
But EPA has been neither candid nor consistent about the policy
choices it has made in revising the nation's air quality standards. The
Agency has so far succeeded in shielding its policy decisions behind
the language of science and expertise, but it has done so at the ex
pense of consistent and principled public management. These con
sequences are the less widely acknowledged, but no less significant,
lessons to be drawn from EPA's recent experience in revising its air
quality standards. Although these rulemakings will likely be remem
bered for the vigorous arguments that they engendered about the
nondelegation doctrine, 440 the more enduring and significant lesson
for administrative law concerns the limitations of science in justifying
risk management decisions. When agencies rely on science to explain
the policy decisions they make , they not only escape their duty to pro
vide a principled account of their decision making, but they also can
find themselves submitting to expediency and post hoc rationalization
in their efforts to defend their actions.
Examination of the ozone and particulate matter rulemakings re
veals that EPA's invocation of science enabled it to ignore numerous
inconsistent positions and incoherent results. The same kind of scien
tific evidence that EPA relied on to tighten its standards also indicated
that significant adverse effects-including, in the case of fine PM, sub
stantial mortality-would persist even at the levels of exposure permit
4
ted by the revised standards. 4 1 EPA failed to offer any meaningful ra
tionale to justify both the enormous costs of these rules and the
significant adverse effects that they still permit. Without any j ustifica
tion, EPA adopted positions in these rulemakings that shifted from

m

See supra notes 1 66, 3 1 7 and accompanying text (illustrating the impossibility of
eliminating all risks associated with exposure to non-threshold pollutants, short of set
ting a standard at zero) .
440 See, e. g. , Coglianese, supra note 1 8 , at 33-35 (noting the tendency of courts and
commentators to focus on the constitutional issues raised in the litigation over EPA's
revised standards ) .
14 1 Supra Part I l . B-C.
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earlier positions the Agency had taken-both in other NAAQS rule
2
makings as well as even earlier in these same proceedings . 44
We have argued that the courts ' acceptance of a dysfunctional leg
islative framework means that to achieve greater consistency in setting
air quality standards, Congress must compel EPA to come clean about
what science can and cannot say and about what policy principles jus
tify its standards . The Agency cannot simply "listen to the science" to
tell it how to make policy choices about how many adverse heal th ef
fects or how much regulatory cost should be tolerated in society. Risk
management calls for value judgments about which it is both possible
and desirable for public officials to defend through policy analysis and
.
normative reasomng. 443
It will probably take new legislation before EPA will begin to adopt
a more principled approach to setting air quality standards , but the
lessons from the recent experience need not await future legislation
to be applied in other contexts. Whenever policyrnakers find them
selves tempted to "listen to the science," they should be careful to
consider what science really can and cannot tell them. Embedded
within any bare claim that a policy decision is "based on" science,
or that science "leads to" a particular policy choice, will be some un
derlying normative position. 444 If the core normative dimension to any
policy decision is camouflaged in science, the resulting policy out
comes, as well as any explanations or rationalizations offered in their
defense , will likely be inconsistent if not unreasonable . To be sure,
high-quality scientific analysis is vitally needed to inform decision
makers about policy problems and to predict the consequences of
different solutions, but appeals to science are no substitute for clear
and careful reasoning about the normative choices inherent in public
policyrnaking.
•

442

See supm Pan II (exposing EPA's "veil of science" in its decision making) .
443 See Brown , supra note 36, at 338 ("The attempt to expunge values is not only
doomed to failure or partiality but is harmful to the objectivity and usefuln ess o f the
resulting endeavor." ) ; l'vlashaw, s upra note l, at 26 ("'Expertise is no longer a protective
shield to be worn l ike a sacred vestment. I t is a competence to be demonstrated by co
gent reason-giving.") .
444 See Mashaw, supra note l , at 32-33 ("Administrators by and large claim not to
be making value judgments . . . . But we know this administrative claim to be h ollow.") .

